Julien Gautier
f35045f3e8
First successful gitleaks run flagged 381 "leaks" — all of them inside `node_modules/` and `.pnpm-store/`, populated by the `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` step that runs earlier in the job. Upstream packages routinely embed demo RSA keys / fake API tokens in their READMEs and test fixtures, and gitleaks (correctly, by its rules) flags them all. This is the same class of false-positive Trivy hit before us in #49. Move both scanners (Trivy + gitleaks) to BEFORE `pnpm install`: - Trivy scans `pnpm-lock.yaml` for vulns; the lockfile is committed, no install required. - Gitleaks scans the working tree (`--no-git --source .` in ci.yml; deep history in security-scheduled.yml). Without `pnpm install`, the only files present are our own source code, which is what we actually want to scan. - `pnpm audit` reads `pnpm-lock.yaml` against the advisory DB — also doesn't need node_modules. The install before audit remains for the workspace-integrity sanity check. Net result: clean scans, no allowlist file to maintain, scanners run faster (smaller tree to walk). The ordering rationale is documented inline at the top of each job's `steps:` block so a future contributor doesn't innocently shuffle the steps and re-introduce the false-positive flood. Apply the same reordering to `security-scheduled.yml` for consistency, even though its deep-history gitleaks scan does not suffer the same false positives (history does not contain node_modules; gitignored from day one).
102 lines
4.0 KiB
YAML
102 lines
4.0 KiB
YAML
# Per ADR-0015 (CI/CD on Gitea Actions). Weekly full-tree security
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# scans plus a Lighthouse run against the production environment when
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# its URL is configured. Complements the per-PR ci.yml workflow with
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# broader / longer-running checks that don't fit the per-PR budget.
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name: Security and perf — scheduled
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on:
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schedule:
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# Mondays, 04:00 UTC — outside business hours; before the week starts.
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- cron: '0 4 * * 1'
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workflow_dispatch:
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jobs:
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full-tree-scan:
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runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
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# Step ordering mirrors ci.yml: scanners run before `pnpm install`
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# so the working tree is not polluted with node_modules content
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# (READMEs / fixtures of upstream packages contain demo
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# secrets that gitleaks false-positives on by the hundreds).
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# The deep-history gitleaks scan here doesn't strictly need it
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# (history doesn't contain node_modules), but consistency with
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# ci.yml keeps the two workflows reading the same way.
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steps:
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# fetch-depth: 0 → full history. The per-PR gitleaks scan is
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# shallow + working-tree-only; this scheduled job is where we
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# do the deep history scan that catches secrets ever committed
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# (and not just what's currently checked in).
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- uses: actions/checkout@v6
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with:
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fetch-depth: 0
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- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
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- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
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with:
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node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
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# Full-tree Trivy (no skip-dirs, no severity filter — the per-PR
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# gate filters by severity for speed; this run wants the full
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# surface for the security feed). Manual install + curl, same
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# pattern as ci.yml — see the rationale there.
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- name: Install Trivy
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env:
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TRIVY_VERSION: '0.70.0'
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GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
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run: |
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curl -sfL \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
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-o /tmp/trivy.tar.gz \
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"https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
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tar -xzf /tmp/trivy.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin trivy
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trivy --version
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- name: Run Trivy
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run: |
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trivy fs \
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--scanners vuln \
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--ignore-unfixed \
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.
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# Deep gitleaks scan (full git history). Same install pattern as
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# ci.yml. `--redact` masks any matched secret in the log so we
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# don't leak it via CI logs themselves.
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- name: Install gitleaks
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env:
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GITLEAKS_VERSION: '8.21.0'
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GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
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run: |
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curl -sfL \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
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-o /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz \
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"https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz"
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tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks
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gitleaks version
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- name: Run gitleaks (full history)
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run: |
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gitleaks detect \
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--source . \
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--redact \
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--exit-code 1
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# npm-advisory check (against pnpm-lock.yaml). Run last so
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# `pnpm install` does not pollute the working tree before the
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# scanners above.
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- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
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- run: pnpm audit
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lighthouse-prod:
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# Skipped silently if the prod URL hasn't been configured yet.
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if: vars.LHCI_PROD_URL != ''
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runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v6
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- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
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- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
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with:
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node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
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- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
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- run: pnpm exec lhci collect --url=${{ vars.LHCI_PROD_URL }} --numberOfRuns=3
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- run: pnpm exec lhci assert --config=./lighthouserc.js
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- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
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if: always()
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with:
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name: lighthouseci-prod-report
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path: .lighthouseci/
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retention-days: 90
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