Julien Gautier
e43fa5ce24
Second half of the DownstreamApiClient + OBO chantier per ADR-0014.
Ships the signed-assertion strategy (non-Entra downstreams) and the
JWKS publishing endpoint as testable primitives. The framework
around them (DownstreamApiClientFactory, cockatiel, audience
pre-check, error translation) still waits for the first concrete
integration per the ADR's "until then" clause.
What lands
- assertJwksConfig (config/check-jwks-config.ts):
- Reads the PEM private key once at boot, refuses missing /
unreadable / weak material (RSA < 2048, Ed25519, unknown key
type). Derives the JOSE algorithm (RS256 / ES256 / ES384) from
the key shape so neither the strategy nor the JWKS controller
has to re-decide on the hot path.
- Validates BFF_JWKS_KID against [A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,128} so the
value lives unescaped in JWT headers + JWKS payloads.
- Wired in main.ts alongside the other assertX() validators.
- BffSigningKey (downstream/bff-signing-key.ts):
- Singleton holding { config: JwksConfig, publicJwk: JWK }.
publicJwk is derived from the private key via `jose.exportJWK`
on a public KeyObject — no private material leaks through.
- DI token BFF_SIGNING_KEY wires both consumers (strategy +
controller) to the same source of truth.
- SignedAssertionStrategy (downstream/strategies/signed-assertion.strategy.ts):
- Wraps `jose.SignJWT` with the ADR-0014 claim shape: iss,
sub, aud, audience (workforce|customer), claims (curated
subset), trace_id, iat, exp.
- 60 s TTL hard-coded — the ADR mandates it; cache disabled
because the savings on a 60 s JWT would be marginal and a
cache would let replayed assertions linger past their TTL.
- kid header matches the JWKS so a downstream picks the right
key during rotation.
- Supports RS256 / ES256 / ES384 transparently — picks the alg
the validator derived at boot.
- JwksController (downstream/jwks.controller.ts):
- GET /.well-known/jwks.json returns { keys: [<single jwk>] }.
- main.ts excludes /.well-known/* from the global /api prefix so
the route lands at the bare root per RFC 8615.
- No auth gate (the JWKS is the verification anchor — gating it
would defeat the purpose). Read-only, so the CSRF middleware's
GET-exempt path already handles it.
Configuration
- Generate a key:
mkdir -p apps/portal-bff/.secrets && \
openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \
-out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
- BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH (path to the PEM)
- BFF_JWKS_KID (URL-safe id, 4..128 chars)
- Both mandatory at boot.
- `apps/portal-bff/.secrets/` is matched by the repo's existing
*.pem / *.key gitignore patterns.
Deps
- jose@^6 added as a direct dep (was transitive). Pinned at the
workspace root since the BFF is the only consumer today and the
package isn't part of the Angular bundle graph.
- jest.config.cts: jose ships ESM-only, so its node_modules path
is removed from transformIgnorePatterns. The pattern walks
pnpm's deep `.pnpm/` layout — anything under /node_modules/ that
also contains `jose` somewhere in the path gets transformed.
Tests: +24 specs (env validators 11, signing key 4, strategy 6,
controller 3).
Out of scope (deferred per ADR-0014 "until then"):
- DownstreamApiClientFactory + per-service typed config.
- cockatiel resilience composition.
- Audience pre-check at the call site.
- Error translation tables.
- OTel custom spans `downstream.<service>.<verb>.<path>`.
- The framework wiring that calls SignedAssertionStrategy.sign()
+ attaches the `X-User-Assertion` + ServiceCredential auth
header to outbound HTTP requests.
- Key rotation (the JWKS lists one key for now; rotation chantier
adds a second entry + a window-based eviction policy).
These land alongside the first concrete integration so the
framework shape is validated against a real consumer.
209 lines
11 KiB
Bash
209 lines
11 KiB
Bash
# BFF environment template
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# Copy to .env (which is gitignored) and fill in actual values for local development.
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# Production values are managed by the platform's secret manager (see future infrastructure ADR).
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# Postgres connection (per ADR-0006)
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# Local dev default: dockerised Postgres on port 5432, schema 'public'.
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# Username / password / db must match infra/local/.env (POSTGRES_USER /
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# POSTGRES_PASSWORD / POSTGRES_DB) — those are the source of truth,
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# this is the BFF view of the same connection.
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#
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# IMPORTANT — URL encoding. The password is part of the URL userinfo
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# segment, so any of these characters must be URL-encoded:
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# @ → %40 # → %23 : → %3A / → %2F ? → %3F
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# % → %25 & → %26 = → %3D + → %2B ; → %3B
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# i.e. if your POSTGRES_PASSWORD is "p@ss#1", DATABASE_URL must read
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# "postgresql://portal:p%40ss%231@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
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# The BFF aborts at boot with a clear error if it detects an unencoded
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# special character (see apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-database-url.ts).
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DATABASE_URL="postgresql://portal:portal_dev_change_me@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
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# Observability (per ADR-0012)
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# All OTEL_* keys are honoured by the OpenTelemetry SDK directly — see
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# apps/portal-bff/src/observability/tracing.ts for the bootstrap.
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# Pino log level: 'info' in prod, 'debug' in dev (default if unset).
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LOG_LEVEL=debug
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OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=portal-bff
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OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION=dev
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# Default endpoint targets the Collector provisioned in
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# infra/local/dev.compose.yml. The /v1/traces suffix is required by
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# the HTTP/Protobuf transport.
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OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4318/v1/traces
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OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL=http/protobuf
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# v1 samples 100 % at the app; tail sampling is delegated to the
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# Collector (per ADR-0012). Override only for spike investigations.
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OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER=always_on
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# Identity / Entra ID app registration (per ADR-0008 / ADR-0009)
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# Values come from the project's Entra application registration in the
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# Azure Admin Center → App registrations → APF Portal. The four
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# *_INSTANCE_URL / *_TENANT_ID / *_CLIENT_ID / *_CLIENT_SECRET keys
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# are mandatory; the BFF refuses to boot without them (see
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# apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts).
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#
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# ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL is the Microsoft login endpoint — usually
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# https://login.microsoftonline.com/. The authority used by MSAL is
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# `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}${ENTRA_TENANT_ID}` for single-tenant flows,
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# or `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}organizations` / `common` for multi-tenant
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# (per ADR-0008's dual-audience design). v1 uses the tenant-scoped
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# authority; the multi-tenant switch lands when External ID activation
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# is needed.
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#
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# ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET is the high-value secret of this set. Never
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# commit a real value. Production manages it via the deploy platform's
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# secret manager (future infrastructure ADR).
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ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL=https://login.microsoftonline.com/
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ENTRA_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
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ENTRA_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
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ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=replace_with_real_value
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# Redirect URIs registered in Entra alongside the same client id.
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# User portal — `/api/auth/callback` is the OIDC return URL; the
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# post-logout URL is where Entra sends the browser after RP-initiated
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# logout (typically the SPA landing page).
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ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback
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ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4200/
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# Admin portal — distinct callback per ADR-0020 §"Sessions — distinct
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# from `portal-shell`" so Entra routes the response to the matching
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# session. Both `ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI` and `ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI`
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# must be registered in the same Entra app registration's
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# "Redirect URIs" list. Distinct post-logout URL routes admin
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# sign-outs to the admin SPA's landing page (port 4300 in dev — see
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# apps/portal-admin/project.json `serve.options.port`).
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ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/admin/auth/callback
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ENTRA_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4300/
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# Cookie signing secret (per ADR-0009 §"Cookies"). Used to sign the
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# transient pre-auth cookie that carries the OIDC `state` + PKCE
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# verifier between the /auth/login redirect and the /auth/callback
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# round-trip, and (once ADR-0010 ships) the session cookie's
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# integrity layer. Mandatory at boot — the BFF aborts if missing or
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# obviously weak (less than 32 base64-decoded bytes ≈ 256 bits of
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# entropy). Generate a fresh value per environment:
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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SESSION_SECRET=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# Redis connection (per ADR-0010). The BFF uses `ioredis` for session
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# storage (today: just the connection; the express-session +
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# connect-redis middleware lands in the next PR).
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#
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# REDIS_URL — full URL form including auth. Must match `infra/local/.env`
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# (REDIS_PASSWORD + REDIS_PORT) when running against the local Compose
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# stack. Production wiring uses Sentinel (REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS +
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME — future-vars block below) and TLS; the current
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# variable supports the dev single-instance shape only.
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REDIS_URL=redis://default:redis_dev_change_me@localhost:6379/0
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# Session payload encryption (per ADR-0010 §"At-rest encryption").
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# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting the session JSON that connect-redis
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# writes to Redis, so a Redis dump never carries raw user identities
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# / future tokens / claims in plaintext. **Distinct** from
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# SESSION_SECRET, which only signs the cookie's session-id — never
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# reuse one for the other. Mandatory at boot.
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# OBO downstream-token cache encryption (per ADR-0014 §"Token cache
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# (for OBO)"). AES-256-GCM key for encrypting Entra-issued downstream
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# tokens cached in Redis under `obo:{actor_id_hash}:{resource}`.
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# **Dedicated key** — must differ from SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY so a
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# leak of one does not cascade into the other. The boot validator
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# refuses an identical value. Mandatory at boot.
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# BFF JWKS signing material (per ADR-0014 §"Service strategy"). The
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# BFF mints short-lived `X-User-Assertion` JWTs to propagate user
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# identity to non-Entra downstreams; downstreams verify the signature
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# against `/.well-known/jwks.json`. Both values are mandatory at boot.
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#
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# Generate an RSA private key:
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# mkdir -p apps/portal-bff/.secrets && \
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# openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \
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# -out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
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#
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# RSA-2048 is the minimum the validator accepts; 3072 is the
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# default recommendation. EC P-256 / P-384 also accepted.
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BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
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# Stable key id published in the JWKS + emitted in the JWT `kid`
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# header. URL-safe charset only ([A-Za-z0-9_-], 4–128 chars). Bump
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# this when rotating to a new key.
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BFF_JWKS_KID=bff-2026-05
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# Session timeouts (per ADR-0010). Both optional with sensible
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# defaults; override only when staging / prod policy diverges.
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# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — sliding window. Each request
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# extends the cookie's `expires` by this many seconds.
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# Default 1800 (30 min).
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# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — hard ceiling. Session is
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# destroyed regardless of activity at this age.
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# Default 43200 (12 h).
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# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=1800
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# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=43200
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# Per-environment salt used to pseudonymise the user id before it
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# lands in audit rows (per ADR-0013 §"Schema") and in Pino app log
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# lines (per ADR-0012 §"User id hashing"). Same value must be used
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# on both sides so audit and app logs join on `actor_id_hash`.
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#
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# Rotation invalidates the join key — old rows / log lines can no
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# longer be correlated with the new hash. Treat as long-lived per
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# environment. Mandatory at boot.
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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LOG_USER_ID_SALT=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# CORS allowlist (per ADR-0009 §"CORS"). Comma-separated list of
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# origins (scheme://host[:port]) allowed to call the BFF with
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# credentials. The BFF refuses to start without this — silently
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# defaulting to localhost is the classic "works in dev, breaks in
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# prod" trap.
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#
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# Local dev: portal-shell on :4200 and portal-admin on :4300 — both
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# call the BFF with credentials. Source of truth for the ports:
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# `apps/<app>/project.json` `serve.options.port`.
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CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:4200,http://localhost:4300
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# Rate limiting (per ADR-0015 §"DoS mitigation"). Both optional
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# with conservative defaults; override per environment when traffic
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# patterns demand it. The BFF keys buckets by session id when the
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# request is authenticated, by remote IP otherwise — rotating
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# sessions doesn't dodge the limit.
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# RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE — general bucket. Default 120 (~ 2 r/s).
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# RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_PER_MINUTE — stricter bucket on /auth/login and
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# /auth/callback. Default 10/min, to
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# slow brute-force / replay loops
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# without inconveniencing legit users.
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# RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=120
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# RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_PER_MINUTE=10
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# Future env vars introduced by upcoming phases / ADRs:
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#
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# Auth flow (ADR-0009) — additional keys wired as the routes land:
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# ENTRA_CLIENT_CERT_PATH (alternative to ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET)
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# ENTRA_ACCEPTED_TENANT_IDS (CSV; restricts which tenants can sign in
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# in the multi-tenant phase — empty means
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# "only ENTRA_TENANT_ID is accepted")
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#
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# Sessions (ADR-0010) — additional keys wired as the layers land:
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS (CSV `host:port,host:port,…`; prod HA)
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME (master name in Sentinel; prod HA)
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# REDIS_TLS ('true' in prod)
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#
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# MFA (ADR-0011):
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# MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS (default 600)
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#
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# Audit trail (ADR-0013):
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# AUDIT_DATABASE_URL (separate creds, role 'audit_writer')
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# AUDIT_ARCHIVER_DATABASE_URL (role 'audit_archiver', for the retention purge job)
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# AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS (default 365)
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#
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# Downstream API access (ADR-0014):
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# OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY — wired
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# BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH — wired
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# BFF_JWKS_KID — wired
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# <SERVICE>_API_BASE_URL (per integrated downstream — lands with the first integration)
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# <SERVICE>_TIMEOUT_MS (optional, defaults to 5000 — lands with the first integration)
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