Files
apf_portal/.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml
T
Julien Gautier 2f41178935
CI / commits (pull_request) Successful in 11m3s
CI / scan (pull_request) Successful in 11m5s
CI / check (pull_request) Successful in 11m10s
CI / a11y (pull_request) Successful in 56s
CI / perf (pull_request) Successful in 1m46s
feat(infra): reactivate act_runner cache by sharing the runners network
The deferred-since-day-one cache-server gap (documented as
"Cache server (deferred)" in infra/README.md, mentioned every
time we hit a slow CI install). Root cause: act_runner's
built-in cache server binds inside the runner container and
advertises an IP on the compose-defined `apf-portal-act-runners`
bridge — but jobs are spawned via the mounted /var/run/docker.
sock, which puts them on Docker's anonymous default `bridge`
instead. The advertised URL is unreachable from the job, every
cache request burns a ~2 min ETIMEDOUT (restore + save), the
hit rate is zero.

Fix: tell act_runner to attach jobs to the same compose-defined
bridge as the runners, via `container.network` in the shared
runner-config.yaml. The advertised cache URL becomes a normal
internal-network DNS hop, jobs reach the cache server, and
`cache: 'pnpm'` works end-to-end.

The blast-radius trade-off is bounded: every container on the
apf-portal-act-runners network is one of our runner containers
(plus the jobs they spawn), all of which already have full
docker-socket access. Sharing a network does not widen what a
malicious workflow can already do; it just lets jobs reach the
cache server.

Changes:
- infra/runner-config.yaml: add `container.network: apf-portal-
  act-runners`. Surface the `cache.enabled: true` default
  explicitly so a future contributor knows where the toggle is.
- .gitea/workflows/ci.yml: re-enable `cache: 'pnpm'` on every
  actions/setup-node step (5 jobs). Drop the now-stale block
  comment that explained the disablement.
- .gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml: same on the two
  setup-node steps in this workflow.
- infra/README.md "Cache server" section rewritten — was
  "(deferred)", now describes the working setup, with the
  rationale and blast-radius note. The disable toggle is
  documented inline.
- ci.yml's Trivy comment trimmed to drop the cross-reference to
  the deferred-cache-server section that no longer exists.

Roll-out on the runner host (manual, post-merge):

    cd <repo>/infra
    git pull
    ./ci-runners.sh rotate

`rotate` recreates the containers with the new
runner-config.yaml mount intact. The first CI job after rollout
seeds the cache from cold (~30-60 s install); subsequent jobs
should report `reused N` instead of `downloaded N` in the
`pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` line and finish a few minutes
faster overall.
2026-05-10 18:54:04 +02:00

106 lines
4.2 KiB
YAML

# Per ADR-0015 (CI/CD on Gitea Actions). Weekly full-tree security
# scans plus a Lighthouse run against the production environment when
# its URL is configured. Complements the per-PR ci.yml workflow with
# broader / longer-running checks that don't fit the per-PR budget.
name: Security and perf — scheduled
on:
schedule:
# Mondays, 04:00 UTC — outside business hours; before the week starts.
- cron: '0 4 * * 1'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
full-tree-scan:
runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
# Step ordering mirrors ci.yml: scanners run before `pnpm install`
# so the working tree is not polluted with node_modules content
# (READMEs / fixtures of upstream packages contain demo
# secrets that gitleaks false-positives on by the hundreds).
# The deep-history gitleaks scan here doesn't strictly need it
# (history doesn't contain node_modules), but consistency with
# ci.yml keeps the two workflows reading the same way.
steps:
# fetch-depth: 0 → full history. The per-PR gitleaks scan is
# shallow + working-tree-only; this scheduled job is where we
# do the deep history scan that catches secrets ever committed
# (and not just what's currently checked in).
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
cache: 'pnpm'
# Full-tree Trivy (no skip-dirs, no severity filter — the per-PR
# gate filters by severity for speed; this run wants the full
# surface for the security feed). Manual install + curl, same
# pattern as ci.yml — see the rationale there.
- name: Install Trivy
env:
# renovate: datasource=github-releases depName=aquasecurity/trivy
TRIVY_VERSION: '0.70.0'
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
run: |
curl -sfL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
-o /tmp/trivy.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
tar -xzf /tmp/trivy.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin trivy
trivy --version
- name: Run Trivy
run: |
trivy fs \
--scanners vuln \
--ignore-unfixed \
.
# Deep gitleaks scan (full git history). Same install pattern as
# ci.yml. `--redact` masks any matched secret in the log so we
# don't leak it via CI logs themselves.
- name: Install gitleaks
env:
# renovate: datasource=github-releases depName=gitleaks/gitleaks
GITLEAKS_VERSION: '8.30.1'
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
run: |
curl -sfL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
-o /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz"
tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks
gitleaks version
- name: Run gitleaks (full history)
run: |
gitleaks detect \
--source . \
--redact \
--exit-code 1
# npm-advisory check (against pnpm-lock.yaml). Run last so
# `pnpm install` does not pollute the working tree before the
# scanners above.
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- run: pnpm audit
lighthouse-prod:
# Skipped silently if the prod URL hasn't been configured yet.
if: vars.LHCI_PROD_URL != ''
runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
cache: 'pnpm'
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- run: pnpm exec lhci collect --url=${{ vars.LHCI_PROD_URL }} --numberOfRuns=3
- run: pnpm exec lhci assert --config=./lighthouserc.js
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: lighthouseci-prod-report
path: .lighthouseci/
retention-days: 90