Julien Gautier
116e0468b0
phase-2 security baseline the main.ts placeholder has been
advertising since the auth track started. three independent
middlewares + their spa counterparts shipped together because
they only become meaningful as a set.
helmet on the bff:
helmet() with three overrides matching our specific shape:
- HSTS only in production (dev runs on plain http)
- crossOriginResourcePolicy: 'cross-origin' (SPA needs to read
bff json from a different origin)
- CSP disabled in non-prod (bff doesn't render html; default CSP
just adds devtools noise)
cors allowlist env-driven:
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS is now mandatory at boot. readCorsAllowlist()
parses + validates (http(s) only, bare origins, no path/query),
same boot-time validator family as assertSessionSecret etc. the
previous hardcoded localhost fallback is removed — silent
cors misconfiguration is exactly the "works in dev breaks in
prod" trap this guard catches.
double-submit CSRF (session-bound):
- bff mints a 256-bit csrfToken at /auth/callback, stored on
req.session.csrfToken AND mirrored to a js-readable cookie
(__Host-portal_csrf prod / portal_csrf dev). cookie is the
spa's read-only view; session is the source of truth.
- createCsrfMiddleware compares X-CSRF-Token header to the
session token via crypto.timingSafeEqual. skips: safe methods,
anonymous requests, /auth/login + /auth/callback.
- mismatch → 403 {"error":"csrf"} + structured pino warn.
- spa csrfInterceptor reads the cookie via document.cookie and
copies into X-CSRF-Token on mutating bff requests. omitted on
GET/HEAD/OPTIONS and on non-bff origins.
- logout + absolute-timeout middleware now clear the csrf cookie
alongside the session cookie.
notable choices:
- session-bound double-submit, not pure cookie-vs-header. an
attacker who plants a cookie via subdomain takeover would
still need to know the server-side session token. tying the
check to req.session.csrfToken instead of the cookie itself
is what makes this stronger than the canonical recipe.
- csrfInterceptor sits between bffCredentialsInterceptor (which
sets withCredentials) and bffUnauthorizedInterceptor (which
handles 401s). forward order, no surprises.
- no CSRF for anonymous mutating routes in v1 — none exist today
and generating tokens for anonymous sessions conflicts with
express-session's saveUninitialized: false.
specs:
- 239 / 239 pass under the clean-env repro (env -u every config
var including the new CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS).
- +42 specs across check-cors-allowlist, csrf-cookie, csrf
middleware, csrf interceptor, and extended auth.controller /
absolute-timeout coverage for the csrf cookie mirror/clear.
out of scope, landing in follow-ups:
- rate limiting + structured error filter (remaining phase-2
todos)
- CSP fine-tuning for the portal-shell + portal-admin static
bundles
- csrf token rotation on idle-extension (current token lives
the session lifetime)
157 lines
7.7 KiB
Bash
157 lines
7.7 KiB
Bash
# BFF environment template
|
|
# Copy to .env (which is gitignored) and fill in actual values for local development.
|
|
# Production values are managed by the platform's secret manager (see future infrastructure ADR).
|
|
|
|
# Postgres connection (per ADR-0006)
|
|
# Local dev default: dockerised Postgres on port 5432, schema 'public'.
|
|
# Username / password / db must match infra/local/.env (POSTGRES_USER /
|
|
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD / POSTGRES_DB) — those are the source of truth,
|
|
# this is the BFF view of the same connection.
|
|
#
|
|
# IMPORTANT — URL encoding. The password is part of the URL userinfo
|
|
# segment, so any of these characters must be URL-encoded:
|
|
# @ → %40 # → %23 : → %3A / → %2F ? → %3F
|
|
# % → %25 & → %26 = → %3D + → %2B ; → %3B
|
|
# i.e. if your POSTGRES_PASSWORD is "p@ss#1", DATABASE_URL must read
|
|
# "postgresql://portal:p%40ss%231@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
|
|
# The BFF aborts at boot with a clear error if it detects an unencoded
|
|
# special character (see apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-database-url.ts).
|
|
DATABASE_URL="postgresql://portal:portal_dev_change_me@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
|
|
|
|
# Observability (per ADR-0012)
|
|
# All OTEL_* keys are honoured by the OpenTelemetry SDK directly — see
|
|
# apps/portal-bff/src/observability/tracing.ts for the bootstrap.
|
|
# Pino log level: 'info' in prod, 'debug' in dev (default if unset).
|
|
LOG_LEVEL=debug
|
|
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=portal-bff
|
|
OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION=dev
|
|
# Default endpoint targets the Collector provisioned in
|
|
# infra/local/dev.compose.yml. The /v1/traces suffix is required by
|
|
# the HTTP/Protobuf transport.
|
|
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4318/v1/traces
|
|
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL=http/protobuf
|
|
# v1 samples 100 % at the app; tail sampling is delegated to the
|
|
# Collector (per ADR-0012). Override only for spike investigations.
|
|
OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER=always_on
|
|
|
|
# Identity / Entra ID app registration (per ADR-0008 / ADR-0009)
|
|
# Values come from the project's Entra application registration in the
|
|
# Azure Admin Center → App registrations → APF Portal. The four
|
|
# *_INSTANCE_URL / *_TENANT_ID / *_CLIENT_ID / *_CLIENT_SECRET keys
|
|
# are mandatory; the BFF refuses to boot without them (see
|
|
# apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts).
|
|
#
|
|
# ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL is the Microsoft login endpoint — usually
|
|
# https://login.microsoftonline.com/. The authority used by MSAL is
|
|
# `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}${ENTRA_TENANT_ID}` for single-tenant flows,
|
|
# or `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}organizations` / `common` for multi-tenant
|
|
# (per ADR-0008's dual-audience design). v1 uses the tenant-scoped
|
|
# authority; the multi-tenant switch lands when External ID activation
|
|
# is needed.
|
|
#
|
|
# ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET is the high-value secret of this set. Never
|
|
# commit a real value. Production manages it via the deploy platform's
|
|
# secret manager (future infrastructure ADR).
|
|
ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL=https://login.microsoftonline.com/
|
|
ENTRA_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
|
|
ENTRA_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
|
|
ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=replace_with_real_value
|
|
# Redirect URIs registered in Entra alongside the same client id. Both
|
|
# `/auth/callback` and `/auth/logout` paths are mounted by the BFF
|
|
# once the OIDC routes land in a subsequent PR.
|
|
ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback
|
|
ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4200/
|
|
|
|
# Cookie signing secret (per ADR-0009 §"Cookies"). Used to sign the
|
|
# transient pre-auth cookie that carries the OIDC `state` + PKCE
|
|
# verifier between the /auth/login redirect and the /auth/callback
|
|
# round-trip, and (once ADR-0010 ships) the session cookie's
|
|
# integrity layer. Mandatory at boot — the BFF aborts if missing or
|
|
# obviously weak (less than 32 base64-decoded bytes ≈ 256 bits of
|
|
# entropy). Generate a fresh value per environment:
|
|
#
|
|
# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
|
|
SESSION_SECRET=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
|
|
|
|
# Redis connection (per ADR-0010). The BFF uses `ioredis` for session
|
|
# storage (today: just the connection; the express-session +
|
|
# connect-redis middleware lands in the next PR).
|
|
#
|
|
# REDIS_URL — full URL form including auth. Must match `infra/local/.env`
|
|
# (REDIS_PASSWORD + REDIS_PORT) when running against the local Compose
|
|
# stack. Production wiring uses Sentinel (REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS +
|
|
# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME — future-vars block below) and TLS; the current
|
|
# variable supports the dev single-instance shape only.
|
|
REDIS_URL=redis://default:redis_dev_change_me@localhost:6379/0
|
|
|
|
# Session payload encryption (per ADR-0010 §"At-rest encryption").
|
|
# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting the session JSON that connect-redis
|
|
# writes to Redis, so a Redis dump never carries raw user identities
|
|
# / future tokens / claims in plaintext. **Distinct** from
|
|
# SESSION_SECRET, which only signs the cookie's session-id — never
|
|
# reuse one for the other. Mandatory at boot.
|
|
#
|
|
# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
|
|
SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
|
|
|
|
# Session timeouts (per ADR-0010). Both optional with sensible
|
|
# defaults; override only when staging / prod policy diverges.
|
|
# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — sliding window. Each request
|
|
# extends the cookie's `expires` by this many seconds.
|
|
# Default 1800 (30 min).
|
|
# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — hard ceiling. Session is
|
|
# destroyed regardless of activity at this age.
|
|
# Default 43200 (12 h).
|
|
# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=1800
|
|
# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=43200
|
|
|
|
# Per-environment salt used to pseudonymise the user id before it
|
|
# lands in audit rows (per ADR-0013 §"Schema") and in Pino app log
|
|
# lines (per ADR-0012 §"User id hashing"). Same value must be used
|
|
# on both sides so audit and app logs join on `actor_id_hash`.
|
|
#
|
|
# Rotation invalidates the join key — old rows / log lines can no
|
|
# longer be correlated with the new hash. Treat as long-lived per
|
|
# environment. Mandatory at boot.
|
|
#
|
|
# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
|
|
LOG_USER_ID_SALT=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
|
|
|
|
# CORS allowlist (per ADR-0009 §"CORS"). Comma-separated list of
|
|
# origins (scheme://host[:port]) allowed to call the BFF with
|
|
# credentials. The BFF refuses to start without this — silently
|
|
# defaulting to localhost is the classic "works in dev, breaks in
|
|
# prod" trap.
|
|
#
|
|
# Local dev: the portal-shell dev server on :4200. Add :4201 once
|
|
# portal-admin grows its own dev server.
|
|
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:4200
|
|
|
|
# Future env vars introduced by upcoming phases / ADRs:
|
|
#
|
|
# Auth flow (ADR-0009) — additional keys wired as the routes land:
|
|
# ENTRA_CLIENT_CERT_PATH (alternative to ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET)
|
|
# ENTRA_ACCEPTED_TENANT_IDS (CSV; restricts which tenants can sign in
|
|
# in the multi-tenant phase — empty means
|
|
# "only ENTRA_TENANT_ID is accepted")
|
|
#
|
|
# Sessions (ADR-0010) — additional keys wired as the layers land:
|
|
# REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS (CSV `host:port,host:port,…`; prod HA)
|
|
# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME (master name in Sentinel; prod HA)
|
|
# REDIS_TLS ('true' in prod)
|
|
#
|
|
# MFA (ADR-0011):
|
|
# MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS (default 600)
|
|
#
|
|
# Audit trail (ADR-0013):
|
|
# AUDIT_DATABASE_URL (separate creds, role 'audit_writer')
|
|
# AUDIT_ARCHIVER_DATABASE_URL (role 'audit_archiver', for the retention purge job)
|
|
# AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS (default 365)
|
|
#
|
|
# Downstream API access (ADR-0014):
|
|
# OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (32-byte base64, distinct from SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY)
|
|
# BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH
|
|
# BFF_JWKS_KID
|
|
# <SERVICE>_API_BASE_URL (per integrated downstream)
|
|
# <SERVICE>_TIMEOUT_MS (optional, defaults to 5000)
|