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feat(users): add Person + User + UserScope + lazy provisioner (ADR-0026 PR 1) (#232)
## Summary

First implementation PR for [ADR-0026](docs/decisions/0026-person-user-portal-data-model.md) (portal-side identity model). Ships:

- `Person` golden record + `User` portal-account overlay + `UserScope` Prisma models;
- `PersonAndUserProvisioner` service called from `SessionEstablisher.establish` (blocking — lazy-creates `Person` + `User` at first OIDC callback);
- `PERSON_SOURCES` closed-set catalogue + drift-gate extension;
- `PrincipalBuilder.build(user, identity)` signature update + `ScopeResolver.resolve({ userId })` seam change — `Principal.user.{id, personId}` now carry real portal UUIDs, no longer the `entraOid` placeholder.

No consumer for `UserScope` yet — `PrismaScopeResolver` lands in ADR-0026 PR 2. The `StubScopeResolver` continues to return `[{ kind: 'unrestricted' }]` for everyone.

## What lands

| File | Change |
| --- | --- |
| `apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma` | **+3 models** in the `public` schema: `Person` (UUID PK + PII + nullable email indexed-not-unique + source catalogue + nullable externalId + back-ref to User), `User` (UUID PK + 1-to-1 personId FK + unique entraOid + tenantId + lastSignInAt + scopes[]), `UserScope` (UUID PK + userId FK with `onDelete: Cascade` + kind + opaque value with `@default("")` + source + nullable expiresAt + `@@unique([userId, kind, value])`). All comments explain the cross-references to ADR-0025 / ADR-0027 / ADR-0029. |
| `apps/portal-bff/prisma/migrations/20260526210000_add_person_user_userscope/migration.sql` | **New** hand-written migration. DDL for the 3 tables, indexes (Person: source/externalId/email; User: unique personId + unique entraOid; UserScope: unique composite + plain userId), FKs with the correct `ON DELETE` actions (User.personId → RESTRICT; UserScope.userId → CASCADE — both Prisma defaults given the schema's `Delegation?` / explicit `onDelete: Cascade`). |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/users/person-source.ts` + `.spec.ts` | **New** catalogue. `PERSON_SOURCES = ['self-signin', 'admin-ui', 'seed'] as const`, `PersonSource` type union, `isPersonSource` type guard. Spec follows the structure-kind shape (catalogue content, no duplicates, type guard true/false, narrowing test via `String()` to widen). |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/users/person-and-user-provisioner.service.ts` + `.spec.ts` | **New** blocking provisioner. Fast path: `findUnique by entraOid` + `update lastSignInAt`. Cold path: nested `create` of Person + linked User in a single transaction. Race-condition handling: catches P2002 on `User.entraOid` and re-runs `ensureUser` (loser of a concurrent first-sign-in falls through to the now-warm fast path). Defense-in-depth `isPersonSource` check on the constant. Spec covers cold/warm/race/non-P2002-propagation paths + `splitDisplayName` cases (single token / trailing whitespace / empty / multi-word). |
| `scripts/check-catalogue-drift.mjs` | Property-literal scanner generalised. Adds `extractPersonSources` + `findPersonSourceViolationsInFile` (property `source` instead of `kind`, otherwise identical to the structure-kind scanner). The two extractors share `extractAsConstArray(path, constName)` and the two property scanners share `findPropertyLiteralViolations(path, validValues, sourceText, opts)`. Error-message formatter unchanged. Closing hint extended to reference all three catalogue locations. |
| `scripts/check-catalogue-drift.spec.mjs` | Fixture now writes a `person-source.ts` alongside `structure-kind.ts`. 7 new tests: extractPersonSources (2), findPersonSourceViolationsInFile (5: skip-no-import, no-violation, flag, non-literal, line/col). Aggregation test updated to assert decorator + Structure.kind + Person.source violations all surface together. **29 tests total, all passing.** |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/auth/scope-resolver.ts` | `resolve(input: { entraOid })` → `resolve(input: { userId })`. Stub still ignores its argument; PR 2's `PrismaScopeResolver` will key queries on `User.id`. Comment block updated to reflect that ADR-0026 PR 1 is now landed (no longer "proposed"). |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/auth/principal-builder.ts` | Signature: `build(user)` → `build(user, identity: { userId, personId })`. `Principal.user.id` / `Principal.user.personId` populated from `identity` instead of `user.oid`. Scope resolver called with `{ userId: identity.userId }`. Doc comment block updated to remove the "placeholder" caveat and document the new wiring. |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/auth/principal-builder.spec.ts` | New `TEST_IDENTITY` constant. Every `builder.build(...)` call gets the second arg. New assertions on `principal.user.id` / `principal.user.personId` carrying the test identity. Edge-case test "asks the scope resolver to resolve by entraOid" renamed + retargeted to `{ userId }`. **All 19 persona tests + 5 edge cases pass.** |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/auth/session-establisher.service.ts` | New constructor arg `personUserProvisioner: PersonAndUserProvisioner`. `establish()` calls `ensureUser({ oid, tenantId, displayName, email: user.username })` **before** `principalBuilder.build` so the identity is available. Comment block explains the Entra `preferred_username` → `Person.email` mapping and the blocking-vs-best-effort distinction with `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn`. |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/auth/session-establisher.service.spec.ts` | Fixture extended with `provisioner` mock + `PROVISIONED_IDENTITY` constant. `STUB_PRINCIPAL` now carries those UUIDs instead of `user.oid`. New tests: (1) provisioner is called with the right input shape; (2) provisioner runs **before** `principalBuilder.build` (`mock.invocationCallOrder` assertion); (3) provisioner failure propagates and nothing downstream runs (build / audit / directory). |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.spec.ts` | Provisioner mock added to the controller fixture (the controller's specs don't exercise provisioning themselves but `SessionEstablisher`'s constructor needs the arg). Principal stub's UUIDs aligned with the new provisioned shape. |
| `apps/portal-bff/src/users/users.module.ts` | `PersonAndUserProvisioner` registered + exported alongside `UserDirectoryService`. `@Global` so the auth module's `SessionEstablisher` can inject both without re-routing the module graph. Comment block updated to document the blocking/best-effort distinction between the two. |

## Key choices

- **Provisioner is blocking**, not best-effort. Distinct from `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn` which is still best-effort (ADR-0020 admin-list cache, swallows its own errors). Both run from `SessionEstablisher.establish` per the new ordering: (1) provisioner — blocking, (2) build principal — uses identity, (3) save session, (4) cookie, (5) user-session index (best-effort), (6) audit (blocking ADR-0013), (7) UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn (best-effort), (8) log. A provisioner failure short-circuits the whole flow before any of (3)..(8) — the spec asserts this explicitly.
- **No email-based dedup in v1.** `Person.email` is indexed (not unique). The provisioner keys ONLY on `entraOid`. ADR-0026 §"Why no email-based merging in v1" — two distinct humans genuinely share emails; ADR-0029's sync flow handles operator-confirmed reconciliation.
- **Race-condition handling on first sign-in.** Two concurrent first-sign-ins for the same `entraOid` both fall through to `create`. The unique constraint on `User.entraOid` rejects the loser with P2002; the provisioner catches that specific code and re-runs `ensureUser` — fast path now warm. Pathological infinite-loop guarded by the warm-path behaviour on the second attempt. Spec covers the success retry + the non-P2002 propagation paths.
- **ScopeResolver seam moved from `{ entraOid }` to `{ userId }`.** The stub doesn't care about its argument either way; the change is the seam for ADR-0026 PR 2's `PrismaScopeResolver`, which keys `userScope` queries on `User.id` (UUID). Doing the rename now keeps PR 2 to "swap the implementation" only.
- **`PersonAndUserProvisioner.SELF_SIGNIN_SOURCE`** is a typed constant inside the class, not a magic string. Defense in depth: TS type union (compile-time) + drift gate (`source: 'self-signin'` literal is in a file importing `person-source.ts` — flagged if it ever drifts off-catalogue) + runtime `isPersonSource` check (error log + throw if the constant is mutated to an off-catalogue value).
- **UserDirectoryService stays.** ADR-0020's admin-list cache is functionally redundant with Person + User now, but folding it would extend the PR scope (DTO + reader + admin UI + migration of existing rows). Out of scope here — flagged as a follow-up.

## Local verification

- [x] `node scripts/check-catalogue-drift.mjs` — clean (`4 privileges, 24 roles, 7 structure kinds, 3 person sources`).
- [x] `node --test scripts/check-catalogue-drift.spec.mjs` — **29 tests passing** (was 22 — +7 for PERSON_SOURCES).
- [x] `pnpm exec nx lint portal-bff` — **0 errors**, 13 warnings (all pre-existing, none from this PR).
- [x] `pnpm exec nx test portal-bff` (filtered to the 6 affected spec files) — **766 tests passing**.
- [x] `pnpm exec prisma generate` — client regenerated with the 3 new models.

## Test plan — remaining (on a fresh dev DB)

- [ ] `./infra/local/dev.sh down -v && ./infra/local/dev.sh up` (wipe + reboot) then `cd apps/portal-bff && pnpm exec prisma migrate dev` — applies the new migration cleanly, no drift prompt.
- [ ] `pnpm exec prisma studio` — `persons` / `users` / `user_scopes` tables visible, all empty (no seed in this PR).
- [ ] Sign in via `apf-portal` against the test tenant — `users` table gets one row, `persons` table gets one row, `user_scopes` stays empty. Principal in the session carries the provisioned UUIDs (not the `entraOid`).
- [ ] **Review focus** — the provisioner's race-handling logic; the `Entra preferred_username → Person.email` mapping in `SessionEstablisher`; the ScopeResolver seam change rationale; the FK actions in the migration SQL (especially CASCADE on UserScope.userId vs RESTRICT on User.personId).

## What's next

- **ADR-0026 PR 2** — `PrismaScopeResolver` replacing `StubScopeResolver` + `/admin/users/:id/scopes` admin-app screen + `prisma/seed.ts` populating the 19 test personas' `user_scopes` per `notes/test-tenant-role-assignments.md` (referencing this PR's `User.id` and ADR-0027 PR 1's `Structure.code` values).
- **Future PR (out of this scope)** — fold `UserDirectoryEntry` into Person + User now that the latter exists. Touches AdminUsersReader, the DTO, the admin SPA, and a data migration for existing rows. Defer until ADR-0026 PR 2 stabilises.

---------

Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #232
2026-05-26 13:57:36 +02:00

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// Prisma schema for portal-bff.
//
// `multiSchema` preview is enabled because per ADR-0013 the audit log
// lives in its own `audit` schema with role-based append-only access
// (audit_owner / audit_writer / audit_reader / audit_archiver). The
// public schema holds the regular business data; only audit.events
// lives in audit.
generator client {
provider = "prisma-client-js"
previewFeatures = ["multiSchema"]
}
datasource db {
provider = "postgresql"
url = env("DATABASE_URL")
schemas = ["public", "audit"]
}
// ============================================================
// Audit log (per ADR-0013)
// ============================================================
//
// Append-only by Postgres role grants — the schema, roles, and
// default privileges are provisioned by infra/local/init/postgres/
// 01-init.sql in dev and the equivalent production manifest. The
// migration that creates this table re-applies the grants
// explicitly and ALTERs the table owner to `audit_owner` so the
// runtime role contract holds even when the migration runs as a
// privileged migrator account.
//
// At runtime, the BFF wraps every INSERT into this table in a
// transaction that begins with `SET LOCAL ROLE audit_writer`, so
// even a compromised BFF connection cannot UPDATE / TRUNCATE /
// DELETE — those grants are not on `audit_writer`.
enum AuditAudience {
workforce
customer
@@schema("audit")
}
enum AuditOutcome {
success
failure
denied
@@schema("audit")
}
// ============================================================
// User directory (per ADR-0020 §"v1 scope — User list")
// ============================================================
//
// Persistent ledger of every identity that has signed in to either
// portal-shell or portal-admin. Upserted at sign-in by
// `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn` (called from
// `SessionEstablisher.establish`), read by the future
// `GET /api/admin/users` endpoint per ADR-0020 §"User list
// (read-only)".
//
// **Not the source of truth for identity.** Entra ID is. This table
// is a cache the BFF maintains so the admin UI can list "everyone
// who's ever signed in" without re-querying the directory at
// every render. Per-tenant `oid` is the join key on the audit side
// (combined with the salted hash) — never the BFF's primary actor
// identifier elsewhere.
//
// **Distinct from the upcoming ADR-0026 `User` model.** That one
// (UUID PK + FK to `Person` + lazy-created at OIDC callback) is the
// portal-account overlay on a `Person` golden record. This
// `UserDirectoryEntry` is the ADR-0020 sign-in cache — different
// semantics, kept apart so neither concept overloads the other.
//
// **No PII redaction on read.** Per ADR-0013 the audit module
// hashes the actor id to defend against an audit-log dump leaking
// who-did-what. This table is the *deliberate* PII storage: an
// admin browsing the user list explicitly wants display names and
// usernames. The trust boundary is the admin role gate
// (ADR-0020 §"Auth — `admin` role claim").
model UserDirectoryEntry {
// Entra `oid` — stable per-user identifier inside the tenant.
// Used as the natural primary key. Per-tenant uniqueness is
// sufficient: the dual-audience design (ADR-0008) currently
// assumes single workforce tenant; cross-tenant collisions
// become a separate ADR when we onboard the second one.
oid String @id
tid String
audience String
username String
displayName String @map("display_name")
// `first_seen_at` is set once at first sign-in and never
// updated thereafter. Lets the admin list "users since
// <date>" without joining anything.
firstSeenAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("first_seen_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
// `last_seen_at` is set every time the upsert fires (one upsert
// per sign-in), so "most recently active" can be computed
// without scanning audit.events.
lastSeenAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("last_seen_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
@@map("user_directory_entries")
@@schema("public")
@@index([lastSeenAt(sort: Desc)])
@@index([username])
}
// ============================================================
// Identity model (per ADR-0026)
// ============================================================
//
// `Person` golden record + `User` portal-account overlay (one-to-zero-
// or-one). Distinct from `UserDirectoryEntry` above — that one is the
// ADR-0020 sign-in cache keyed on Entra `oid`; these are the portal's
// stable identity model keyed on UUIDs and form the basis for the
// `@RequireScope` Prisma resolver landing in ADR-0026 PR 2.
//
// `Person` exists whether or not the human ever signs in (workforce
// pre-provisioning, dossier bénéficiaires, alumni). `User` is the
// portal-access overlay, lazy-created at first OIDC callback by
// `PersonAndUserProvisioner.ensureUser`. `UserScope` backs the ADR-0025
// scope axis with opaque `value` strings referencing ADR-0027's
// `Structure.code` / `Delegation.code` / `Region.code` — no FK at the
// DB level so historical scope rows survive structure decommissioning.
model Person {
id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
// PII — firstName + lastName are subject to ADR-0013 redaction rules
// when emitted to logs.
firstName String @map("first_name")
lastName String @map("last_name")
// Primary contact email. Indexed for operator lookup but NOT unique
// — two distinct humans genuinely can share emails (shared family
// alias, generic info@ at a small partner organisation, error in an
// upstream feed). ADR-0029's reconciliation flow surfaces candidate
// duplicates for operator confirmation rather than auto-merging.
email String?
// Closed-set catalogue, drift-gated. See
// `apps/portal-bff/src/users/person-source.ts` for the legal values.
// v1: 'self-signin' / 'admin-ui' / 'seed'. ADR-0029 adds 'pleiades'
// and 'acteurs-plus'.
source String
// Upstream-system identifier (Pléiades matricule, Acteurs+ id).
// Nullable in v1 — populated by ADR-0029's syncs.
externalId String? @map("external_id")
createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt @map("updated_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
// Back-ref. NULL when the Person has no portal account (workforce
// pre-provisioning, dossier bénéficiaire, alumni).
user User?
@@map("persons")
@@schema("public")
@@index([source])
@@index([externalId])
@@index([email])
}
model User {
id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
// 1-to-1 with Person. The unique constraint on personId enforces
// "at most one User per Person"; back-ref `Person.user` is the
// other half.
personId String @unique @map("person_id") @db.Uuid
person Person @relation(fields: [personId], references: [id])
// Entra object id — stable per-user identifier inside the tenant.
// Unique because two separate Person+User pairs cannot share an
// Entra identity.
entraOid String @unique @map("entra_oid")
// Entra tenant id. Stored alongside the oid so a future dual-
// audience activation (ADR-0008) can disambiguate.
tenantId String @map("tenant_id")
// Refreshed by `PersonAndUserProvisioner.ensureUser` on every
// sign-in. Surfaced in the future /admin/users/:id screen.
lastSignInAt DateTime? @map("last_sign_in_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt @map("updated_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
scopes UserScope[]
@@map("users")
@@schema("public")
}
model UserScope {
id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
userId String @map("user_id") @db.Uuid
// CASCADE so revoking a User wipes their scope rows in one delete.
user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
// One of the six ADR-0025 scope kinds: 'self' / 'etablissement' /
// 'delegation' / 'region' / 'siege' / 'unrestricted'. Not pulled
// from a Prisma enum because the value's semantics belong to the
// `shared-auth` catalogue, not the database; the drift gate
// already enforces the closed set at the call sites.
kind String
// Per-kind payload — semantics owned by ADR-0027. For 'etablissement'
// the value is a Structure.code; for 'delegation' it is a
// Delegation.code; for 'region' it is a Region.code. Empty string
// for 'self' / 'siege' / 'unrestricted'. NO FK to ADR-0027 tables —
// historical scope rows survive structure decommissioning; the
// admin-UI write path (ADR-0026 PR 2) validates at insert time.
value String @default("")
// Provenance, same catalogue posture as Person.source. v1:
// 'admin-ui' / 'seed'. ADR-0029 adds upstream-sync values and a
// reconciliation policy.
source String
createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
// When non-null and past, the row is ignored at sign-in. Supports
// interim-director-for-two-months patterns and admin UI scope
// revocations.
expiresAt DateTime? @map("expires_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
@@map("user_scopes")
@@schema("public")
@@unique([userId, kind, value])
@@index([userId])
}
// ============================================================
// Organisational hierarchy (per ADR-0027)
// ============================================================
//
// Region → Delegation → Structure. The portal's scope-axis
// dereferences these three layers — the BFF guard
// `principalCoversResource` walks etablissement → delegation →
// region to decide whether a scope covers a resource (per
// ADR-0025).
//
// Population in v1: a small inline seed in the
// `add_org_hierarchy` migration (the codes the test tenant
// exercises). The full APF inventory ships with ADR-0029's
// cascade sync, which writes additively into these columns —
// no schema churn at sync time.
model Region {
// INSEE region code (2 digits — '75' Nouvelle-Aquitaine,
// '11' Île-de-France). Externally meaningful and stable
// across reorgs; doubles as primary key.
code String @id
name String
delegations Delegation[]
@@map("regions")
@@schema("public")
}
model Delegation {
// French department code (2-3 chars — '33' Gironde, '2A',
// '971'). Same rationale as Region.code.
code String @id
name String
regionCode String @map("region_code")
region Region @relation(fields: [regionCode], references: [code])
structures Structure[]
@@map("delegations")
@@schema("public")
@@index([regionCode])
}
model Structure {
// Portal-internal stable code, externally meaningful. For
// medico-social structures: code = FINESS (9 digits). For
// non-medico-social: APF-internal slug ('siege',
// 'apf-bdx-merignac', 'ea-toulouse', …). Opaque at the type
// level; matching is string equality, not parsing.
code String @id
name String
// Closed set, drift-gated. Legal values are tracked in
// `apps/portal-bff/src/structures/structure-kind.ts` and
// mirrored by a Postgres CHECK constraint on this column
// (see the migration). `scripts/check-catalogue-drift.mjs`
// asserts the TS constant matches the values used in code.
kind String
// FINESS (9 digits). NULL for non-medico-social structures.
// Unique when present. Cascade's StructureSourceFiness is
// the long-term authoritative carrier; the portal denormalises
// it inline here for v1 scope-axis checks. ADR-0029's sync
// owns the write path.
finess String? @unique
// SIRET (14 chars: 9 SIREN + 5 NIC). NULL when the structure
// is not SIRENE-registered (most antennes, dispositifs).
// Unique when present.
siret String? @unique
// Pléiades payroll code (6 chars). NULL in v1 — populated by
// ADR-0029's Pléiades sync once it ships.
codePaie String? @unique @map("code_paie")
// Parent delegation. NULL for structures not attached to one
// (siège, mouvement national, …).
delegationCode String? @map("delegation_code")
delegation Delegation? @relation(fields: [delegationCode], references: [code])
@@map("structures")
@@schema("public")
@@index([kind])
@@index([delegationCode])
}
model AuditEvent {
id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
eventType String @map("event_type")
audience AuditAudience
// Salted hash (LOG_USER_ID_SALT) of the actor's stable id. NULL
// when the actor is unauthenticated (e.g. failed login attempt
// before resolving an identity). The same salt is used by the
// BFF Pino logger so audit and app logs cross-correlate on this
// field.
actorIdHash String? @map("actor_id_hash")
// W3C trace id (32 hex chars) of the request that produced the
// event. Cross-correlates with traces in Jaeger and with Pino
// log lines that carry the same `trace_id` field. NULL only if
// the event was emitted outside any inbound request (e.g. a
// future cron job).
traceId String? @map("trace_id")
// Free-form identifier of what the event is *about* — typically
// a domain entity URI like `user:42` or `dossier:xyz`. NULL when
// the event is system-wide and has no clear subject.
subject String?
outcome AuditOutcome
// Event-specific structured detail. Redaction of PII is the
// caller's responsibility; the BFF Pino redact list is the
// reference allow-/deny-list.
payload Json?
@@map("events")
@@schema("audit")
@@index([createdAt])
@@index([eventType])
@@index([traceId])
}