Files
apf_portal/.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml
T
julien 0d27f835c3
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fix(ci): replace gitleaks-action with manual install (#50)
## Summary
`gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2` is now paywalled for organisations — the action requires a `GITLEAKS_LICENSE` secret from gitleaks.io (commercial) or it errors out:

​```
🛑 missing gitleaks license. Go grab one at gitleaks.io and store it as a GitHub Secret named GITLEAKS_LICENSE.
​```

Worse, on Gitea it cannot reliably detect personal-vs-org accounts (different API contract), so it defaults to license enforcement and the scan always fails. The **gitleaks binary itself stays MIT-licensed and free** — only the wrapper went commercial.

Mirror the pattern from #45 (Trivy): drop the wrapper, install the binary directly via curl + tar, run the CLI.

## Scope of the PR
The same two broken integrations existed in `.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml` and would have failed silently at next Monday's cron. Fix both files in one PR for consistency.

- **`ci.yml`** — gitleaks step replaced. Per-PR scan uses `--no-git --source .` (working tree only — the scan job uses a shallow checkout anyway).
- **`security-scheduled.yml`** — both gitleaks AND trivy steps replaced; `fetch-depth: 0` added so gitleaks can do its **deep history scan** here (the value-add of the scheduled job over the per-PR gate); `cache: 'pnpm'` dropped from `actions/setup-node` (consistency with #8 — the act_runner cache server is unreachable from job containers).
- `--redact` on both gitleaks invocations so any matched secret is masked in the CI log itself (avoids re-leaking via log artefacts).

## Trade-off
Like Trivy, gitleaks version is now manually pinned. Same comment in the workflow points to releases for bumps.

## Test plan
- [ ] `scan` job goes green end-to-end on this PR (audit ✓, Trivy ✓, gitleaks ✓).
- [ ] `gitleaks version` line in the install step's logs shows `8.21.0`.
- [ ] On `push` to main post-merge, scan stays green.
- [ ] Trigger `security-scheduled` manually (Actions → Run workflow) to verify the deep-history scan path before next Monday's cron fires.

---------

Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #50
2026-05-08 00:05:16 +02:00

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YAML

# Per ADR-0015 (CI/CD on Gitea Actions). Weekly full-tree security
# scans plus a Lighthouse run against the production environment when
# its URL is configured. Complements the per-PR ci.yml workflow with
# broader / longer-running checks that don't fit the per-PR budget.
name: Security and perf — scheduled
on:
schedule:
# Mondays, 04:00 UTC — outside business hours; before the week starts.
- cron: '0 4 * * 1'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
full-tree-scan:
runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
steps:
# fetch-depth: 0 → full history. The per-PR gitleaks scan is
# shallow + working-tree-only; this scheduled job is where we
# do the deep history scan that catches secrets ever committed
# (and not just what's currently checked in).
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- run: pnpm audit
# Full-tree Trivy (no skip-dirs, no severity filter — the per-PR
# gate filters by severity for speed; this run wants the full
# surface for the security feed). Manual install + curl, same
# pattern as ci.yml — see the rationale there.
- name: Install Trivy
env:
TRIVY_VERSION: '0.70.0'
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
run: |
curl -sfL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
-o /tmp/trivy.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
tar -xzf /tmp/trivy.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin trivy
trivy --version
- name: Run Trivy
run: |
trivy fs \
--scanners vuln \
--ignore-unfixed \
.
# Deep gitleaks scan (full git history). Same install pattern as
# ci.yml. `--redact` masks any matched secret in the log so we
# don't leak it via CI logs themselves.
- name: Install gitleaks
env:
GITLEAKS_VERSION: '8.21.0'
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
run: |
curl -sfL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
-o /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz"
tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks
gitleaks version
- name: Run gitleaks (full history)
run: |
gitleaks detect \
--source . \
--redact \
--exit-code 1
lighthouse-prod:
# Skipped silently if the prod URL hasn't been configured yet.
if: vars.LHCI_PROD_URL != ''
runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- run: pnpm exec lhci collect --url=${{ vars.LHCI_PROD_URL }} --numberOfRuns=3
- run: pnpm exec lhci assert --config=./lighthouserc.js
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: lighthouseci-prod-report
path: .lighthouseci/
retention-days: 90