056848e502
Schema: Person golden record + User portal-account overlay (1-to-0-or-1)
+ UserScope (the table behind the ADR-0025 scope axis). All in the
public schema. UserScope.value is opaque (no FK to ADR-0027 tables -
historical scope rows survive structure decommissioning).
Migration: hand-written, follows the existing convention. FKs with
correct ON DELETE actions (RESTRICT on User.personId for the required
relation, CASCADE on UserScope.userId via explicit onDelete: Cascade
in the schema).
Catalogue: PERSON_SOURCES = [self-signin, admin-ui, seed] as const
under apps/portal-bff/src/users/person-source.ts. Defense in depth =
TS type union + drift gate scanner extension (property literal
"source: 'X'" in files importing person-source.ts).
PersonAndUserProvisioner: blocking lazy-create at first OIDC callback.
Fast path = findUnique by entraOid + update lastSignInAt. Cold path =
nested create of Person + User in one transaction. Race-condition
handling: catches P2002 on User.entraOid unique constraint and re-runs
ensureUser. Defense-in-depth isPersonSource check on the constant.
PrincipalBuilder signature: build(user, identity: { userId, personId }).
Principal.user.{id, personId} populated from real UUIDs. ScopeResolver
seam moved from { entraOid } to { userId } so PR 2's PrismaScopeResolver
can key queries on User.id.
SessionEstablisher: new constructor arg personUserProvisioner.
establish() calls ensureUser BEFORE principalBuilder.build so the
identity is available. Entra preferred_username (= AuthenticatedUser.
username) maps to Person.email per ADR-0026 lifecycle. Provisioner
failure short-circuits the whole flow before save / cookie / audit /
directory.
UserDirectoryService stays as the ADR-0020 admin-list cache - folding
it into Person+User is a follow-up after ADR-0026 PR 2 stabilises.
Local verification: drift gate clean (4 / 24 / 7 / 3), 29 drift-gate
spec tests passing, portal-bff lint 0 errors, 766 portal-bff specs
passing.
342 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
342 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
// Prisma schema for portal-bff.
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//
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// `multiSchema` preview is enabled because per ADR-0013 the audit log
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// lives in its own `audit` schema with role-based append-only access
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// (audit_owner / audit_writer / audit_reader / audit_archiver). The
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// public schema holds the regular business data; only audit.events
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// lives in audit.
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generator client {
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provider = "prisma-client-js"
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previewFeatures = ["multiSchema"]
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}
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datasource db {
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provider = "postgresql"
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url = env("DATABASE_URL")
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schemas = ["public", "audit"]
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}
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// ============================================================
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// Audit log (per ADR-0013)
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// ============================================================
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//
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// Append-only by Postgres role grants — the schema, roles, and
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// default privileges are provisioned by infra/local/init/postgres/
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// 01-init.sql in dev and the equivalent production manifest. The
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// migration that creates this table re-applies the grants
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// explicitly and ALTERs the table owner to `audit_owner` so the
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// runtime role contract holds even when the migration runs as a
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// privileged migrator account.
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//
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// At runtime, the BFF wraps every INSERT into this table in a
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// transaction that begins with `SET LOCAL ROLE audit_writer`, so
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// even a compromised BFF connection cannot UPDATE / TRUNCATE /
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// DELETE — those grants are not on `audit_writer`.
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enum AuditAudience {
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workforce
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customer
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@@schema("audit")
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}
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enum AuditOutcome {
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success
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failure
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denied
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@@schema("audit")
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}
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// ============================================================
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// User directory (per ADR-0020 §"v1 scope — User list")
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// ============================================================
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//
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// Persistent ledger of every identity that has signed in to either
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// portal-shell or portal-admin. Upserted at sign-in by
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// `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn` (called from
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// `SessionEstablisher.establish`), read by the future
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// `GET /api/admin/users` endpoint per ADR-0020 §"User list
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// (read-only)".
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//
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// **Not the source of truth for identity.** Entra ID is. This table
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// is a cache the BFF maintains so the admin UI can list "everyone
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// who's ever signed in" without re-querying the directory at
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// every render. Per-tenant `oid` is the join key on the audit side
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// (combined with the salted hash) — never the BFF's primary actor
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// identifier elsewhere.
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//
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// **Distinct from the upcoming ADR-0026 `User` model.** That one
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// (UUID PK + FK to `Person` + lazy-created at OIDC callback) is the
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// portal-account overlay on a `Person` golden record. This
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// `UserDirectoryEntry` is the ADR-0020 sign-in cache — different
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// semantics, kept apart so neither concept overloads the other.
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//
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// **No PII redaction on read.** Per ADR-0013 the audit module
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// hashes the actor id to defend against an audit-log dump leaking
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// who-did-what. This table is the *deliberate* PII storage: an
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// admin browsing the user list explicitly wants display names and
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// usernames. The trust boundary is the admin role gate
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// (ADR-0020 §"Auth — `admin` role claim").
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model UserDirectoryEntry {
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// Entra `oid` — stable per-user identifier inside the tenant.
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// Used as the natural primary key. Per-tenant uniqueness is
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// sufficient: the dual-audience design (ADR-0008) currently
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// assumes single workforce tenant; cross-tenant collisions
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// become a separate ADR when we onboard the second one.
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oid String @id
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tid String
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audience String
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username String
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displayName String @map("display_name")
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// `first_seen_at` is set once at first sign-in and never
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// updated thereafter. Lets the admin list "users since
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// <date>" without joining anything.
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firstSeenAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("first_seen_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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// `last_seen_at` is set every time the upsert fires (one upsert
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// per sign-in), so "most recently active" can be computed
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// without scanning audit.events.
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lastSeenAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("last_seen_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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@@map("user_directory_entries")
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@@schema("public")
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@@index([lastSeenAt(sort: Desc)])
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@@index([username])
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}
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// ============================================================
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// Identity model (per ADR-0026)
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// ============================================================
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//
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// `Person` golden record + `User` portal-account overlay (one-to-zero-
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// or-one). Distinct from `UserDirectoryEntry` above — that one is the
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// ADR-0020 sign-in cache keyed on Entra `oid`; these are the portal's
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// stable identity model keyed on UUIDs and form the basis for the
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// `@RequireScope` Prisma resolver landing in ADR-0026 PR 2.
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//
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// `Person` exists whether or not the human ever signs in (workforce
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// pre-provisioning, dossier bénéficiaires, alumni). `User` is the
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// portal-access overlay, lazy-created at first OIDC callback by
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// `PersonAndUserProvisioner.ensureUser`. `UserScope` backs the ADR-0025
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// scope axis with opaque `value` strings referencing ADR-0027's
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// `Structure.code` / `Delegation.code` / `Region.code` — no FK at the
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// DB level so historical scope rows survive structure decommissioning.
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model Person {
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id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
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// PII — firstName + lastName are subject to ADR-0013 redaction rules
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// when emitted to logs.
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firstName String @map("first_name")
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lastName String @map("last_name")
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// Primary contact email. Indexed for operator lookup but NOT unique
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// — two distinct humans genuinely can share emails (shared family
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// alias, generic info@ at a small partner organisation, error in an
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// upstream feed). ADR-0029's reconciliation flow surfaces candidate
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// duplicates for operator confirmation rather than auto-merging.
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email String?
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// Closed-set catalogue, drift-gated. See
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// `apps/portal-bff/src/users/person-source.ts` for the legal values.
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// v1: 'self-signin' / 'admin-ui' / 'seed'. ADR-0029 adds 'pleiades'
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// and 'acteurs-plus'.
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source String
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// Upstream-system identifier (Pléiades matricule, Acteurs+ id).
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// Nullable in v1 — populated by ADR-0029's syncs.
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externalId String? @map("external_id")
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createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt @map("updated_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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// Back-ref. NULL when the Person has no portal account (workforce
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// pre-provisioning, dossier bénéficiaire, alumni).
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user User?
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@@map("persons")
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@@schema("public")
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@@index([source])
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@@index([externalId])
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@@index([email])
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}
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model User {
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id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
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// 1-to-1 with Person. The unique constraint on personId enforces
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// "at most one User per Person"; back-ref `Person.user` is the
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// other half.
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personId String @unique @map("person_id") @db.Uuid
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person Person @relation(fields: [personId], references: [id])
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// Entra object id — stable per-user identifier inside the tenant.
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// Unique because two separate Person+User pairs cannot share an
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// Entra identity.
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entraOid String @unique @map("entra_oid")
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// Entra tenant id. Stored alongside the oid so a future dual-
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// audience activation (ADR-0008) can disambiguate.
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tenantId String @map("tenant_id")
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// Refreshed by `PersonAndUserProvisioner.ensureUser` on every
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// sign-in. Surfaced in the future /admin/users/:id screen.
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lastSignInAt DateTime? @map("last_sign_in_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt @map("updated_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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scopes UserScope[]
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@@map("users")
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@@schema("public")
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}
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model UserScope {
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id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
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userId String @map("user_id") @db.Uuid
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// CASCADE so revoking a User wipes their scope rows in one delete.
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user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
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// One of the six ADR-0025 scope kinds: 'self' / 'etablissement' /
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// 'delegation' / 'region' / 'siege' / 'unrestricted'. Not pulled
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// from a Prisma enum because the value's semantics belong to the
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// `shared-auth` catalogue, not the database; the drift gate
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// already enforces the closed set at the call sites.
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kind String
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// Per-kind payload — semantics owned by ADR-0027. For 'etablissement'
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// the value is a Structure.code; for 'delegation' it is a
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// Delegation.code; for 'region' it is a Region.code. Empty string
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// for 'self' / 'siege' / 'unrestricted'. NO FK to ADR-0027 tables —
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// historical scope rows survive structure decommissioning; the
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// admin-UI write path (ADR-0026 PR 2) validates at insert time.
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value String @default("")
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// Provenance, same catalogue posture as Person.source. v1:
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// 'admin-ui' / 'seed'. ADR-0029 adds upstream-sync values and a
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// reconciliation policy.
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source String
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createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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// When non-null and past, the row is ignored at sign-in. Supports
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// interim-director-for-two-months patterns and admin UI scope
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// revocations.
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expiresAt DateTime? @map("expires_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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@@map("user_scopes")
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@@schema("public")
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@@unique([userId, kind, value])
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@@index([userId])
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}
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// ============================================================
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// Organisational hierarchy (per ADR-0027)
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// ============================================================
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//
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// Region → Delegation → Structure. The portal's scope-axis
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// dereferences these three layers — the BFF guard
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// `principalCoversResource` walks etablissement → delegation →
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// region to decide whether a scope covers a resource (per
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// ADR-0025).
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//
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// Population in v1: a small inline seed in the
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// `add_org_hierarchy` migration (the codes the test tenant
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// exercises). The full APF inventory ships with ADR-0029's
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// cascade sync, which writes additively into these columns —
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// no schema churn at sync time.
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model Region {
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// INSEE region code (2 digits — '75' Nouvelle-Aquitaine,
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// '11' Île-de-France). Externally meaningful and stable
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// across reorgs; doubles as primary key.
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code String @id
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name String
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delegations Delegation[]
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@@map("regions")
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@@schema("public")
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}
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model Delegation {
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// French department code (2-3 chars — '33' Gironde, '2A',
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// '971'). Same rationale as Region.code.
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code String @id
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name String
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regionCode String @map("region_code")
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region Region @relation(fields: [regionCode], references: [code])
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structures Structure[]
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@@map("delegations")
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@@schema("public")
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@@index([regionCode])
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}
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model Structure {
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// Portal-internal stable code, externally meaningful. For
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// medico-social structures: code = FINESS (9 digits). For
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// non-medico-social: APF-internal slug ('siege',
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// 'apf-bdx-merignac', 'ea-toulouse', …). Opaque at the type
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// level; matching is string equality, not parsing.
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code String @id
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name String
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// Closed set, drift-gated. Legal values are tracked in
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// `apps/portal-bff/src/structures/structure-kind.ts` and
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// mirrored by a Postgres CHECK constraint on this column
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// (see the migration). `scripts/check-catalogue-drift.mjs`
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// asserts the TS constant matches the values used in code.
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kind String
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// FINESS (9 digits). NULL for non-medico-social structures.
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// Unique when present. Cascade's StructureSourceFiness is
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// the long-term authoritative carrier; the portal denormalises
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// it inline here for v1 scope-axis checks. ADR-0029's sync
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// owns the write path.
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finess String? @unique
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// SIRET (14 chars: 9 SIREN + 5 NIC). NULL when the structure
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// is not SIRENE-registered (most antennes, dispositifs).
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// Unique when present.
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siret String? @unique
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// Pléiades payroll code (6 chars). NULL in v1 — populated by
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// ADR-0029's Pléiades sync once it ships.
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codePaie String? @unique @map("code_paie")
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// Parent delegation. NULL for structures not attached to one
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// (siège, mouvement national, …).
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delegationCode String? @map("delegation_code")
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delegation Delegation? @relation(fields: [delegationCode], references: [code])
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@@map("structures")
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@@schema("public")
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@@index([kind])
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@@index([delegationCode])
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}
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model AuditEvent {
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id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
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createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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eventType String @map("event_type")
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audience AuditAudience
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// Salted hash (LOG_USER_ID_SALT) of the actor's stable id. NULL
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// when the actor is unauthenticated (e.g. failed login attempt
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// before resolving an identity). The same salt is used by the
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// BFF Pino logger so audit and app logs cross-correlate on this
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// field.
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actorIdHash String? @map("actor_id_hash")
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// W3C trace id (32 hex chars) of the request that produced the
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// event. Cross-correlates with traces in Jaeger and with Pino
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// log lines that carry the same `trace_id` field. NULL only if
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// the event was emitted outside any inbound request (e.g. a
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// future cron job).
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traceId String? @map("trace_id")
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// Free-form identifier of what the event is *about* — typically
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// a domain entity URI like `user:42` or `dossier:xyz`. NULL when
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// the event is system-wide and has no clear subject.
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subject String?
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outcome AuditOutcome
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// Event-specific structured detail. Redaction of PII is the
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// caller's responsibility; the BFF Pino redact list is the
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// reference allow-/deny-list.
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payload Json?
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@@map("events")
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@@schema("audit")
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@@index([createdAt])
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@@index([eventType])
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@@index([traceId])
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}
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