Julien Gautier
04138b435a
PR 3 of 3 — final piece of the user-menu / profile / cross-app
chantier.
BFF
* New `MeModule` ships `GET /api/me/capabilities`, a curated view
derived from the active user-portal session. Returns
`{ canAccessAdmin: boolean }` today; the shape is deliberately
binary so the SPA cannot reconstruct the raw `roles` claim. 401
on missing session, consistent posture with `/auth/me`.
* ADR-0009 amended: new "Curated public view" section codifies
the "no raw roles on `/auth/me`, capabilities is the release
valve" stance; the routes table grows a row for the endpoint.
portal-shell
* New `CapabilitiesService` (app-local) calls the BFF on auth-state
flip and exposes `canAccessAdmin` as a signal. Anonymous
sessions short-circuit to the all-false default without firing
a request.
* Header's `userMenuItems` is now a `computed` — the "Open Portal
Admin" entry appears in the dropdown only when
`canAccessAdmin()` is true, pointing at
`environment.adminAppUrl`.
* Sidebar role widget reads the auth + capabilities signals to
render one of three labels ("Anonymous" / "User" /
"Administrator") in place of the hardcoded "Anonymous".
portal-admin
* Symmetric: unconditional "Open Portal Shell" entry in the admin
user menu, pointing at `environment.shellAppUrl`. Anyone who
can reach portal-admin can reach portal-shell, so no
capabilities check needed.
i18n
* `header.userMenu.openAdmin`, `sidebar.role.{administrator,user}`,
`sidebar.role.aria` reshaped to take the role as a placeholder.
54 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
54 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Per-environment configuration for the SPA, per ADR-0018.
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*
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* This file holds the **dev defaults** and is the one checked in.
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* Per-environment siblings (`environment.staging.ts`,
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* `environment.prod.ts`) land alongside this file later; the
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* production / staging build configurations in `project.json` declare
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* a `fileReplacements` entry that swaps this file for the target one
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* at build time.
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*
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* Constraint: every sibling must export an `environment` object of
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* the same shape. TypeScript will catch missing keys at the
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* consuming site once a sibling exists.
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*
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* Nothing here is a secret. The SPA is a static bundle; secrets that
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* ever needed to live here would, by definition, be public. Per-user
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* / per-tenant secrets live in the BFF session payload (ADR-0010).
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*/
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export const environment = {
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/**
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* Origin + prefix of the BFF HTTP API. The SPA prepends this to
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* every backend call (`${bffApiBaseUrl}/health`, etc.) and derives
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* the OTel trace-header propagation pattern from its origin (see
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* `observability/tracing.ts`).
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*/
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bffApiBaseUrl: 'http://localhost:3000/api',
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/**
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* Name of the BFF's CSRF cookie. Mirrors the BFF's
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* `csrfCookieName()` convention: `__Host-portal_csrf` in
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* production (Secure-required, hence excluded from HTTP dev),
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* `portal_csrf` otherwise. Read by the `csrfInterceptor` to
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* echo the value back in the `X-CSRF-Token` request header.
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*/
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bffCsrfCookieName: 'portal_csrf',
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/**
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* OTLP/HTTP traces endpoint. Targets the Collector in
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* `infra/local/dev.compose.yml`. CORS is enabled there — see
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* `infra/local/otel-collector.yaml`.
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*/
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otlpEndpoint: 'http://localhost:4318/v1/traces',
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/**
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* Origin of the sibling `portal-admin` SPA — driver of the
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* cross-app "Open Portal Admin" entry in the user menu (gated on
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* `CapabilitiesService.canAccessAdmin`). Per ADR-0020 the two
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* SPAs live on distinct origins / cookies / sessions, so this is
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* a raw cross-origin `<a href>` jump, not an Angular route.
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* Per-env siblings override the host.
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*/
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adminAppUrl: 'http://localhost:4300',
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};
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