04138b435ab3c0d4fb4f655d67ce02de0c2b7136
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Julien Gautier
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04138b435a |
feat(portal): /api/me/capabilities + cross-app menu links + real role label
PR 3 of 3 — final piece of the user-menu / profile / cross-app
chantier.
BFF
* New `MeModule` ships `GET /api/me/capabilities`, a curated view
derived from the active user-portal session. Returns
`{ canAccessAdmin: boolean }` today; the shape is deliberately
binary so the SPA cannot reconstruct the raw `roles` claim. 401
on missing session, consistent posture with `/auth/me`.
* ADR-0009 amended: new "Curated public view" section codifies
the "no raw roles on `/auth/me`, capabilities is the release
valve" stance; the routes table grows a row for the endpoint.
portal-shell
* New `CapabilitiesService` (app-local) calls the BFF on auth-state
flip and exposes `canAccessAdmin` as a signal. Anonymous
sessions short-circuit to the all-false default without firing
a request.
* Header's `userMenuItems` is now a `computed` — the "Open Portal
Admin" entry appears in the dropdown only when
`canAccessAdmin()` is true, pointing at
`environment.adminAppUrl`.
* Sidebar role widget reads the auth + capabilities signals to
render one of three labels ("Anonymous" / "User" /
"Administrator") in place of the hardcoded "Anonymous".
portal-admin
* Symmetric: unconditional "Open Portal Shell" entry in the admin
user menu, pointing at `environment.shellAppUrl`. Anyone who
can reach portal-admin can reach portal-shell, so no
capabilities check needed.
i18n
* `header.userMenu.openAdmin`, `sidebar.role.{administrator,user}`,
`sidebar.role.aria` reshaped to take the role as a placeholder.
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 julien
|
5bbe2304ff |
feat(portal-bff): helmet + env-driven CORS allowlist + double-submit CSRF (#122)
## Summary Phase-2 security baseline that the `main.ts` placeholder note has been advertising since the auth/session work began. Three independent middlewares + their SPA counterparts, all mounted in a single PR because they only become meaningful together. ### Helmet on the BFF `helmet()` with three overrides matching our specific shape: - **HSTS only in production** — dev runs on plain HTTP, HSTS is just noise. - **`crossOriginResourcePolicy: 'cross-origin'`** — the SPA on its own origin reads JSON from the BFF; the default `same-origin` would block it. - **CSP disabled in non-production** — the BFF doesn't render HTML, so CSP on JSON responses is mostly inert, but Helmet's default CSP triggers noisy `connect-src` violations in browser devtools that we don't need. Everything else is Helmet defaults: `X-Frame-Options=SAMEORIGIN`, `X-Content-Type-Options=nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy=no-referrer`, `X-Powered-By` removed, etc. ### CORS allowlist, env-driven `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` env (comma-separated) is now **mandatory** at boot. The BFF refuses to start without it via `readCorsAllowlist()` — same boot-time validator family as `assertSessionSecret` etc. The previous hardcoded `http://localhost:4200` fallback is gone; getting CORS wrong silently is the kind of "works in dev, breaks in prod" trap the validator is specifically designed to catch. `X-CSRF-Token` is now in the allowed headers. ### Double-submit CSRF - BFF mints a 256-bit `csrfToken` at session creation (`/auth/callback`), stored on `req.session.csrfToken` and mirrored to a JS-readable cookie (`__Host-portal_csrf` prod / `portal_csrf` dev). The cookie is the SPA's read-only view; the server-side session is the source of truth. - `createCsrfMiddleware` (mounted after the session middleware in `main.ts`) compares the `X-CSRF-Token` header with `req.session.csrfToken` using `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. Skips: - safe methods (`GET / HEAD / OPTIONS`), - anonymous requests (no `req.session.user`), - `/api/auth/login` and `/api/auth/callback` (those mint the token themselves). - Mismatch → `403 {"error":"csrf"}` with a structured Pino warn. - SPA's `csrfInterceptor` reads the cookie via `document.cookie` and copies its value into `X-CSRF-Token` on every mutating BFF request. The header is omitted on `GET / HEAD / OPTIONS` (BFF skips them anyway) and on non-BFF origins. - Logout and the absolute-timeout middleware both clear the CSRF cookie alongside the session cookie. ## Notable choices **Session-bound double-submit, not pure cookie-vs-header.** A naive "compare cookie with header" check is defeated when an attacker can plant a cookie (subdomain takeover, etc.). Comparing the header to the server-side session-stored token instead means the attacker would also need to be the authenticated user — which is what CSRF defense is supposed to prevent in the first place. **No CSRF for anonymous mutating routes (v1).** None exist today; we don't have an unauthenticated POST endpoint anywhere. Generating a CSRF token for anonymous sessions would conflict with `saveUninitialized: false` on express-session and add complexity we don't need yet. Anonymous public-form CSRF defenses (site-key, captcha) land if and when those routes ship. **`SameSite=Lax`, not `Strict`, on the CSRF cookie.** Matches the session cookie's policy so the two travel together on the SPA→BFF cross-origin same-site fetch (different ports = different origin, same registrable domain). The double-submit pattern is what gives the protection; `SameSite=Lax` is a belt-and-braces layer. **`csrfInterceptor` runs after `bffCredentialsInterceptor` and before `bffUnauthorizedInterceptor` in the chain.** Order: credentials first (set `withCredentials`), then CSRF (set the header), then unauthorized handling (catch 401s). Forward order, no surprises. **`CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` has no localhost fallback.** I considered keeping the fallback for ergonomics but it makes the BFF silently misconfigured if someone forgets the env. The error message points straight at the file to edit. ## Out of scope (next PRs) - Rate limiting + structured error filter (still in the phase-2 to-do). - CSP fine-tuning when we have actual HTML pages (portal-shell + portal-admin static serving). - CSRF token rotation on idle-extension (today the token lives the session's lifetime; refreshing on each request would invalidate in-flight mutations). ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t test --projects=portal-bff,feature-auth,portal-shell` clean env → **177 + 28 + 34 = 239/239 pass** (was 144 + 19 + 34 = 197 before; +42 specs across CSRF middleware, CSRF cookie helpers, CORS allowlist parser, csrfInterceptor, and extended auth.controller / absolute-timeout coverage). - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t lint build --projects=portal-bff,feature-auth,portal-shell` → clean. - [x] **CI clean-env repro** (lesson from prior PRs): every env var unset (including new `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`) → tests still pass. The BFF refuses to boot without `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, which is the intended behaviour. - [x] Prettier-clean. - [ ] Manual smoke against running BFF: - [ ] Sign in → `__Host-portal_csrf` (prod) / `portal_csrf` (dev) cookie set, value matches `audit.events.payload->>actorIdHash`-style traceability via `req.session.csrfToken` in Redis. - [ ] Hit a future POST route from the SPA → request carries `X-CSRF-Token`, BFF accepts. - [ ] Forge a POST without the header (curl) → 403 `{"error":"csrf"}`. - [ ] Sign out → both cookies cleared. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #122 |
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julien
|
8f125d2a90 |
feat(portal-shell): wire environment.ts per ADR-0018 (#90)
## Summary First implementation step of ADR-0018. Create [`src/environments/environment.ts`](apps/portal-shell/src/environments/environment.ts) holding the two SPA per-environment values the ADR calls out — `bffApiBaseUrl` and `otlpEndpoint` — and replace the hard-coded URLs at the two SPA call sites that needed them. ## What changes - **New `environment.ts`** with dev defaults (`http://localhost:3000/api` and `http://localhost:4318/v1/traces`). Header comment links to ADR-0018, documents the constraint that per-environment siblings must share the same shape, and notes that nothing here is a secret (the SPA bundle is public). - **`observability/tracing.ts`** reads `environment.otlpEndpoint` for the exporter, and **derives** the `propagateTraceHeaderCorsUrls` regex from `environment.bffApiBaseUrl` — a future change to the BFF origin propagates `traceparent` to the right host automatically, no second edit needed. - **`home-status.service.ts`** builds `/health` as `${environment.bffApiBaseUrl}/health`. ## What this PR explicitly does NOT do - **No `environment.staging.ts` / `environment.prod.ts`** yet. The ADR says "ship later" for those, and the real prod / staging URLs are unknown until the infrastructure ADR lands. Dropping plausible-but-wrong URLs into the repo would be worse than waiting. - **No `fileReplacements` configuration in `project.json`** — it depends on the per-environment files existing. Wired in the same PR that introduces them. - **No BFF-side audit pool split** (`AUDIT_DATABASE_URL` validator, second Prisma client, boot-time UPDATE-rejection self-test). Also in the ADR's Confirmation list, but it touches `AuditModule` and deserves its own review. Separate PR. - **No `SERVICE_VERSION` wiring** in `tracing.ts`. Still hard-coded to `'dev'`; the build-time version source (same one that will feed the footer's dev-only version badge) is its own small chantier. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm exec nx run-many -t lint test build --projects=portal-shell` — green (36 / 36 specs unchanged, no new tests needed). - [x] Production build size unchanged (121 kB gzip initial — `environment.ts` is one literal object inlined by the bundler). - [ ] Manual: `pnpm exec nx serve portal-shell` → home page loads, the health widget hits the BFF, Jaeger shows the SPA `document_load` + `fetch` + BFF child span trace. - [ ] Manual: temporarily change `bffApiBaseUrl` to `http://localhost:9999/api` → the fetch fails (expected), and the `traceparent` propagation regex no longer matches `:3000` (verifiable in Network panel — header is absent on cross-origin requests). --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #90 |