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julien a463199728
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feat(infra): reactivate act_runner cache by sharing the runners network (#82)
## Summary

Closes the deferred-since-day-one cache-server gap (documented as "Cache server (deferred)" in `infra/README.md` and mentioned every time we hit a slow CI install).

**Root cause.** `act_runner`'s built-in cache server binds inside the runner container and advertises an IP on the compose-defined `apf-portal-act-runners` bridge — but jobs are spawned via the mounted `/var/run/docker.sock`, which puts them on Docker's anonymous default `bridge`. The advertised URL is unreachable from the job, every cache request burns a ~2 min `ETIMEDOUT` (restore + save), the hit rate is zero.

**Fix.** Tell `act_runner` to attach jobs to the same compose-defined bridge as the runners, via `container.network` in the shared `runner-config.yaml`. The advertised cache URL becomes a normal internal-network DNS hop, jobs reach the cache server, `cache: 'pnpm'` works end-to-end.

**Blast-radius trade-off** (bounded). Every container on `apf-portal-act-runners` is one of our runner containers, plus the jobs they spawn — all of which already have full docker-socket access. Sharing a network doesn't widen what a malicious workflow can already do; it just lets jobs reach the cache server.

## What lands

- `infra/runner-config.yaml` — add `container.network: apf-portal-act-runners`. Surface the `cache.enabled: true` default explicitly so the toggle is discoverable.
- `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` — re-enable `cache: 'pnpm'` on every `actions/setup-node` step (5 jobs). Drop the now-stale block comment that explained the disablement.
- `.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml` — same on the two setup-node steps.
- `infra/README.md` "Cache server" section rewritten — was `"(deferred)"`, now describes the working setup, rationale, and the disable toggle.
- `ci.yml`'s Trivy comment trimmed to drop the cross-reference to the deferred-cache-server section that no longer exists.

## Roll-out (manual, post-merge, on the runner host)

```bash
cd <repo>/infra
git pull
./ci-runners.sh rotate
```

`rotate` recreates the containers with the new `runner-config.yaml` mount intact (rolling restart, ~15 s pause between each runner so the CI pipeline stays online).

## Test plan

- [ ] CI green on this PR (the gates run on the runners as configured **before** rollout, so this PR's run is one last "uncached" cycle).
- [ ] After rollout, the next CI run's `Set up Node.js` step shows the cache restore attempt **succeed quickly** (no ETIMEDOUT). The `Run pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` step on the first post-rollout run still reports `Progress: resolved N, reused 0, downloaded N` (cold seed).
- [ ] The **second** post-rollout run reports `reused N, downloaded 0` (or a small downloaded delta if Renovate moved a dep meanwhile) — the cache hit is real.
- [ ] `Complete job` step at the end no longer shows `reserveCache failed: connect ETIMEDOUT` warnings.
- [ ] Wall-clock for a typical PR's CI drops by ~5-10 min (5 jobs × ~30-90 s saved on `pnpm install` + the 2× ~2 min ETIMEDOUTs we used to eat).

---------

Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #82
2026-05-10 19:03:58 +02:00

106 lines
4.2 KiB
YAML

# Per ADR-0015 (CI/CD on Gitea Actions). Weekly full-tree security
# scans plus a Lighthouse run against the production environment when
# its URL is configured. Complements the per-PR ci.yml workflow with
# broader / longer-running checks that don't fit the per-PR budget.
name: Security and perf — scheduled
on:
schedule:
# Mondays, 04:00 UTC — outside business hours; before the week starts.
- cron: '0 4 * * 1'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
full-tree-scan:
runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
# Step ordering mirrors ci.yml: scanners run before `pnpm install`
# so the working tree is not polluted with node_modules content
# (READMEs / fixtures of upstream packages contain demo
# secrets that gitleaks false-positives on by the hundreds).
# The deep-history gitleaks scan here doesn't strictly need it
# (history doesn't contain node_modules), but consistency with
# ci.yml keeps the two workflows reading the same way.
steps:
# fetch-depth: 0 → full history. The per-PR gitleaks scan is
# shallow + working-tree-only; this scheduled job is where we
# do the deep history scan that catches secrets ever committed
# (and not just what's currently checked in).
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
cache: 'pnpm'
# Full-tree Trivy (no skip-dirs, no severity filter — the per-PR
# gate filters by severity for speed; this run wants the full
# surface for the security feed). Manual install + curl, same
# pattern as ci.yml — see the rationale there.
- name: Install Trivy
env:
# renovate: datasource=github-releases depName=aquasecurity/trivy
TRIVY_VERSION: '0.70.0'
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
run: |
curl -sfL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
-o /tmp/trivy.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"
tar -xzf /tmp/trivy.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin trivy
trivy --version
- name: Run Trivy
run: |
trivy fs \
--scanners vuln \
--ignore-unfixed \
.
# Deep gitleaks scan (full git history). Same install pattern as
# ci.yml. `--redact` masks any matched secret in the log so we
# don't leak it via CI logs themselves.
- name: Install gitleaks
env:
# renovate: datasource=github-releases depName=gitleaks/gitleaks
GITLEAKS_VERSION: '8.30.1'
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUBCOM_TOKEN }}
run: |
curl -sfL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" \
-o /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz \
"https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz"
tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks
gitleaks version
- name: Run gitleaks (full history)
run: |
gitleaks detect \
--source . \
--redact \
--exit-code 1
# npm-advisory check (against pnpm-lock.yaml). Run last so
# `pnpm install` does not pollute the working tree before the
# scanners above.
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- run: pnpm audit
lighthouse-prod:
# Skipped silently if the prod URL hasn't been configured yet.
if: vars.LHCI_PROD_URL != ''
runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
cache: 'pnpm'
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- run: pnpm exec lhci collect --url=${{ vars.LHCI_PROD_URL }} --numberOfRuns=3
- run: pnpm exec lhci assert --config=./lighthouserc.js
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: lighthouseci-prod-report
path: .lighthouseci/
retention-days: 90