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| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 APF Portal Bot
|
b08966ba1f | ||
 julien
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2a5ab4fb46 | ||
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julien
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c97f250836 | ||
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julien
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b427576d5e | ||
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julien
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2ffbfc4034 | ||
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APF Portal Bot
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b7440788d5 | ||
|
julien
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db7e479dde | ||
|
APF Portal Bot
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cca3b76771 | ||
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julien
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045ff924a8 | ||
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julien
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f9f5f171eb | ||
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julien
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a84ea2d116 | ||
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julien
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c080d1ad89 |
@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ pnpm-debug.log*
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infra/*-tenant.entra.json
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!infra/*-tenant.entra.example.json
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# Tenant-private Entra per-persona oids consumed by prisma/seed.ts
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# (ADR-0026 §"Seed personas"). Same pattern — commit only the example.
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infra/*-tenant.personas.json
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!infra/*-tenant.personas.example.json
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# OS / editor scrap
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.DS_Store
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Thumbs.db
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@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@
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},
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"development": {
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"buildTarget": "portal-admin:build:development"
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},
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"https": {
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"buildTarget": "portal-admin:build:development",
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"ssl": true,
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"sslKey": ".secrets/dev-tls.key",
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"sslCert": ".secrets/dev-tls.pem"
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}
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},
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"defaultConfiguration": "development"
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@@ -60,6 +60,23 @@ ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=replace_with_real_value
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# User portal — `/api/auth/callback` is the OIDC return URL; the
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# post-logout URL is where Entra sends the browser after RP-initiated
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# logout (typically the SPA landing page).
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#
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# The four `localhost` values below are the **WSL-native default** —
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# browser and BFF on the same host, `http://localhost:*` redirect
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# URIs (which Entra accepts as the only exception to its HTTPS rule).
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# Leave them here in this file regardless of how the docker `apps`
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# profile is being run.
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#
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# For the ADR-0030 dockerised `apps` profile accessed via a
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# hostname (e.g. `https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4200/`), do NOT
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# edit these values — instead override them at the compose level
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# from `infra/local/.env`. Compose's `environment:` block on the
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# `portal-bff` service interpolates each of these four vars at
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# parse time and wins over `env_file:`, so the BFF in the container
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# sees the hostname URIs while native `nx serve` keeps reading
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# this file's localhost defaults. See
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# `infra/README.md` → "Switching between dev modes" for the
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# two-mode toggle.
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ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback
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ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4200/
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# Admin portal — distinct callback per ADR-0020 §"Sessions — distinct
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@@ -153,6 +153,32 @@ describe('createRateLimitMiddleware', () => {
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await mw(makeReq({ ip: '10.0.0.11', path: '/api/x' }), res, next);
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expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(429);
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});
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it('keys IPv6 addresses by their /56 prefix so per-host rotation cannot bypass the bucket', async () => {
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const mw = createRateLimitMiddleware({ perMinute: 1, authPerMinute: 99 });
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const next = jest.fn() as unknown as NextFunction;
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// Two addresses inside `2001:db8:abcd:0000::/56` must share a
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// bucket — otherwise an attacker swaps the host suffix on every
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// retry and the per-IP limit never bites. This is the bypass the
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// lib's `ERR_ERL_KEY_GEN_IPV6` boot-time validation refuses to
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// ship. (The lib v8 default mask is `/56`, a typical residential
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// ISP customer allocation.)
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let res = makeRes();
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await mw(makeReq({ ip: '2001:db8:abcd::1', path: '/api/x' }), res, next);
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expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(429);
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res = makeRes();
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await mw(makeReq({ ip: '2001:db8:abcd::ffff', path: '/api/x' }), res, next);
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expect(res.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(429);
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// Different `/56` (`2001:db8:abce::/56`) — independent bucket.
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// Confirms the truncation does not collapse all IPv6 traffic into
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// one global bucket.
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res = makeRes();
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await mw(makeReq({ ip: '2001:db8:abce::1', path: '/api/x' }), res, next);
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expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(429);
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});
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});
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function restore(name: string, value: string | undefined): void {
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import type { NextFunction, Request, RequestHandler, Response } from 'express';
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import rateLimit, { type Options } from 'express-rate-limit';
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import rateLimit, { ipKeyGenerator, type Options } from 'express-rate-limit';
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import { errorResponse } from './structured-error.filter';
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/**
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@@ -79,7 +79,14 @@ export function createRateLimitMiddleware(config: RateLimitConfig): RequestHandl
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if (hasSession && sessionId) {
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return `s:${sessionId}`;
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}
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return `ip:${req.ip ?? 'unknown'}`;
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// `ipKeyGenerator` normalises the address before keying — most
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// importantly, it truncates IPv6 to its `/56` prefix (the lib v8
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// default — a typical residential ISP customer allocation) so an
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// attacker can't rotate through the trailing bits of their own
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// subnet to escape the per-IP bucket. The lib raises
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// `ERR_ERL_KEY_GEN_IPV6` at boot if a custom keyGenerator returns
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// `req.ip` verbatim, exactly to prevent that bypass.
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return `ip:${ipKeyGenerator(req.ip ?? 'unknown')}`;
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},
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handler: (_req: Request, res: Response, _next: NextFunction, _optionsUsed: Options) => {
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res.status(429).json(errorResponse('rate_limited', 'Too many requests'));
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@@ -92,6 +92,12 @@
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},
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"development": {
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"buildTarget": "portal-shell:build:development"
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},
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"https": {
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"buildTarget": "portal-shell:build:development",
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"ssl": true,
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"sslKey": ".secrets/dev-tls.key",
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"sslCert": ".secrets/dev-tls.pem"
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}
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},
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"defaultConfiguration": "development"
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+209
-23
@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@
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Infrastructure-as-code artefacts for the project. Separate from application code and from documentation: this folder contains the recipes and configs that the team and ops use to stand up running infrastructure (CI runners, future local-dev databases, future on-prem deploy assets).
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| Subject | File / Folder | ADR / Reference |
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| -------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Self-hosted CI runners (Gitea Actions) | [`ci-runners.compose.yml`](ci-runners.compose.yml) | [ADR-0015 §"Runners"](../docs/decisions/0015-cicd-gitea-actions.md) |
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| Shared `act_runner` configuration | [`runner-config.yaml`](runner-config.yaml) | [ADR-0015 §"Runners"](../docs/decisions/0015-cicd-gitea-actions.md) |
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| CI runners convenience script | [`ci-runners.sh`](ci-runners.sh) | See "Convenience script" below |
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| Runtime state of the runners | `data/` (git-ignored after `.gitignore`) | — |
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| Env-vars template for the runners | `.env.example` (`.env` is git-ignored) | — |
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| Local-dev runtime stack | [`local/`](local/) | [ADR-0006](../docs/decisions/0006-persistence-postgresql-prisma.md), [ADR-0010](../docs/decisions/0010-session-management-redis.md), [ADR-0012](../docs/decisions/0012-observability-pino-opentelemetry.md), [ADR-0013](../docs/decisions/0013-audit-trail-separated-postgres-append-only.md) |
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| Entra group GUID → role slug map | [`test-tenant.entra.example.json`](test-tenant.entra.example.json) (`*-tenant.entra.json` is git-ignored) | [ADR-0025 §"Sources of truth — Entra-side configuration"](../docs/decisions/0025-authorization-model-privileges-roles-scopes.md) |
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| Subject | File / Folder | ADR / Reference |
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| -------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Self-hosted CI runners (Gitea Actions) | [`ci-runners.compose.yml`](ci-runners.compose.yml) | [ADR-0015 §"Runners"](../docs/decisions/0015-cicd-gitea-actions.md) |
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| Shared `act_runner` configuration | [`runner-config.yaml`](runner-config.yaml) | [ADR-0015 §"Runners"](../docs/decisions/0015-cicd-gitea-actions.md) |
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| CI runners convenience script | [`ci-runners.sh`](ci-runners.sh) | See "Convenience script" below |
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| Runtime state of the runners | `data/` (git-ignored after `.gitignore`) | — |
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| Env-vars template for the runners | `.env.example` (`.env` is git-ignored) | — |
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| Local-dev runtime stack | [`local/`](local/) | [ADR-0006](../docs/decisions/0006-persistence-postgresql-prisma.md), [ADR-0010](../docs/decisions/0010-session-management-redis.md), [ADR-0012](../docs/decisions/0012-observability-pino-opentelemetry.md), [ADR-0013](../docs/decisions/0013-audit-trail-separated-postgres-append-only.md) |
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| Entra group GUID → role slug map | [`test-tenant.entra.example.json`](test-tenant.entra.example.json) (`*-tenant.entra.json` is git-ignored) | [ADR-0025 §"Sources of truth — Entra-side configuration"](../docs/decisions/0025-authorization-model-privileges-roles-scopes.md) |
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| Per-persona Entra `oid` map | [`test-tenant.personas.example.json`](test-tenant.personas.example.json) (`*-tenant.personas.json` is git-ignored) | [ADR-0026 §"Seed personas"](../docs/decisions/0026-person-user-portal-data-model.md) — consumed by `apps/portal-bff/prisma/seed.ts` |
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Future folders / files that will land here as the corresponding ADRs ship:
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@@ -186,20 +187,20 @@ $EDITOR infra/local/.env
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Run `./infra/local/dev.sh help` for the full reference. Cheat-sheet:
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| Command | Effect |
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| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up` | Core only (postgres + redis + otel-collector) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up all` | Core + every profile |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up dbtools` | Core + pgweb |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up observability` | Core + Jaeger |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up serve-static` | Core + Caddy serving `dist/.../browser/` per ADR-0019 |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up apps` | Core + the three Nx dev servers in Docker (ADR-0030) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh down` | Tear down the whole stack (every profile in scope) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh down -v` | Tear down + wipe named volumes (incl. audit-roles bootstrap) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh stop pgweb` | Stop one service (containers stay around) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh status` | `docker compose ps`, with every profile visible |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh logs otel-collector` | Follow logs |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh exec postgres psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB"` | Run a command inside a service |
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| Command | Effect |
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| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up` | Core only (postgres + redis + otel-collector) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up all` | Core + dbtools + observability + apps (full dev stack). serve-static is excluded — it would collide with apps on port 4200 |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up dbtools` | Core + pgweb |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up observability` | Core + Jaeger |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up serve-static` | Core + Caddy serving `dist/.../browser/` per ADR-0019 |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh up apps` | Core + the three Nx dev servers in Docker (ADR-0030) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh down` | Tear down the whole stack (every profile in scope) |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh down -v` | Tear down + wipe named volumes (incl. audit-roles bootstrap) |
|
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh stop pgweb` | Stop one service (containers stay around) |
|
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh status` | `docker compose ps`, with every profile visible |
|
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh logs otel-collector` | Follow logs |
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| `./infra/local/dev.sh exec postgres psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB"` | Run a command inside a service |
|
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|
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Anything not matching one of the named verbs is passed through to `docker compose -f dev.compose.yml ...` (with every profile flagged in), so you keep the full Compose surface available — `./dev.sh config`, `./dev.sh top`, `./dev.sh inspect …`, etc.
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@@ -226,6 +227,191 @@ How it works (see [ADR-0030](../docs/decisions/0030-dockerised-dev-mode.md)):
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The three dev modes (native `nx serve`, devcontainer, this `apps` profile) and when to use each are summarised in [docs/setup/01-dev-debian-vm-setup.md](../docs/setup/01-dev-debian-vm-setup.md).
|
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|
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### Switching between dev modes — `localhost` vs hostname
|
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|
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Within the `apps` profile, there are **two access modes** for the SPA. They differ only in how the browser reaches the dev-servers — the BFF and the rest of the stack are unchanged. The toggle is a single file: [`infra/local/.env`](local/.env.example).
|
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|
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| Mode | When to use | What flips |
|
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| ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
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| **A — `localhost` (default)** | Solo dev, browser on the same workstation as the VSCode Remote-SSH client. No cert plumbing, no `hosts` file change. The fastest path to a working stack. | Nothing — `infra/local/.env` is the default. |
|
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| **B — HTTPS hostname** | A teammate (or PM / QA) needs to browse YOUR VM from THEIR machine, or you have a shared VM. Requires the team mkcert CA already installed (see "Team mkcert CA on `vm-gitlab`" below) and `apf-portal.dev-XX.local` in their `hosts` file. | `NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https` plus the four `ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI` lines in `infra/local/.env` (commented template in `.env.example`). |
|
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|
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The toggle works because Compose's `environment:` block on the `portal-bff` service interpolates each `ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI` from `infra/local/.env` with a `localhost` fallback, and wins over `env_file:`. As a result `apps/portal-bff/.env` keeps its native-friendly `localhost` defaults regardless of mode — native `nx serve` (no Docker) and Mode A both read the same `.env` cleanly, while Mode B sees the override only inside the container.
|
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|
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#### Mode A — `localhost` via VSCode port forwarding
|
||||
|
||||
1. Make sure `infra/local/.env` does NOT set `NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION` (or sets it to `development`) and leaves the four `ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI` lines commented (this is the `.env.example` default).
|
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2. `./infra/local/dev.sh up apps`.
|
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3. VSCode Remote-SSH auto-discovers the published ports (panel **PORTS** at the bottom of VSCode) and forwards them to your workstation. If a port doesn't show up, "Forward a Port" manually (4200, 4300, 3000).
|
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4. Open `http://localhost:4200/` on the workstation. The SPA loads, fetches `/api/...` (proxied to the BFF inside Compose), and the OIDC callback at `http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback` (already registered in Entra) is reachable through the same VSCode tunnel.
|
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|
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Nothing else to configure. No mkcert. No `hosts` file. No cert warning.
|
||||
|
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#### Mode B — HTTPS hostname (`apf-portal.dev-XX.local`)
|
||||
|
||||
Detailed setup in the next two subsections ("HTTPS dev-server setup" + "Team mkcert CA on `vm-gitlab`"). Once the workstation has the team CA installed and the host file knows the hostname, switching is:
|
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|
||||
1. In `infra/local/.env`, uncomment the five Mode B lines (and replace `dev-jg` with the right hostname).
|
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2. `./infra/local/dev.sh down && ./infra/local/dev.sh up apps`.
|
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3. Browse `https://apf-portal.dev-XX.local:4200/`.
|
||||
|
||||
To switch back to Mode A: comment those five lines, `down && up apps`. No other file touched.
|
||||
|
||||
### HTTPS dev-server setup — remote-browser access via a hostname
|
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|
||||
By default the dev-servers serve plain HTTP — fine when the browser is on the same host as the BFF (`http://localhost:4200/`), which is also the only HTTP origin Entra accepts as a redirect URI. The moment you access the SPA over a **hostname** (e.g. `apf-portal.dev.local`, useful when the browser sits on a workstation and the stack runs on a shared / per-dev VM), Entra refuses the `http:` redirect URI and the dev-servers must terminate TLS.
|
||||
|
||||
The setup is one-time per dev:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Install [mkcert](https://github.com/FiloSottile/mkcert)** on your workstation (the machine where the browser runs) and bootstrap its local CA:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Debian / WSL Ubuntu:
|
||||
sudo apt install -y libnss3-tools
|
||||
# macOS:
|
||||
# brew install mkcert nss
|
||||
# Windows (PowerShell, choco):
|
||||
# choco install mkcert
|
||||
mkcert -install
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Generate the cert** for the hostname you registered in your `/etc/hosts` and in Entra. From the repo root on your workstation:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
mkdir -p .secrets
|
||||
mkcert -key-file .secrets/dev-tls.key -cert-file .secrets/dev-tls.pem \
|
||||
apf-portal.dev-jg.local # ← replace with YOUR hostname
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`.secrets/` is git-ignored; the bind-mount in the `apps` profile (the repo at `/workspace`) makes the files visible inside the containers at the path the `https` configuration expects.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Update `apps/portal-bff/.env`** so the BFF tells Entra the matching HTTPS URIs — see the redirect-URI block in [`apps/portal-bff/.env.example`](../apps/portal-bff/.env.example) for the override pattern. The same URIs must be registered in your Entra app registration's "Redirect URIs" list (the BFF only sends one of them per auth request; Entra validates it is on the list).
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Enable the `https` Nx serve configuration** for the compose dev-servers by adding to `infra/local/.env`:
|
||||
|
||||
```env
|
||||
NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The compose command resolves `--configuration=${NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION:-development}` at parse time, so the SPAs pick up the `https` config defined in `apps/portal-shell/project.json` and `apps/portal-admin/project.json`. The BFF stays HTTP behind the proxy — only the public origin is HTTPS.
|
||||
|
||||
5. `./infra/local/dev.sh up apps` → browser opens `https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4200/`. No cert warning (mkcert's CA is trusted by the workstation after step 1).
|
||||
|
||||
Native `nx serve` (WSL / localhost) is **unaffected** — it keeps using the `development` configuration by default, no SSL required, and the `localhost` URIs registered in Entra still work.
|
||||
|
||||
When real DNS + corp-CA-signed certs arrive, the hostname can be reused as-is (Entra registrations are literal strings — they don't care who signs the cert). Drop the cert files back into `.secrets/` and remove the mkcert step.
|
||||
|
||||
### Team mkcert CA on `vm-gitlab` — sharing the trust root
|
||||
|
||||
The previous section is the **solo flow** (one dev mints their own CA, certs only trusted by their own workstation). It does not let a teammate browse another dev's VM without a certificate warning — every dev has their own private CA, none of which the others trust.
|
||||
|
||||
For a multi-dev team the canonical pattern is one shared CA held on `vm-gitlab`. The CA private key (`rootCA-key.pem`) stays on `vm-gitlab` — never copied to any workstation; only the public `rootCA.pem` is distributed to each developer's Windows trust store, and the R&D Lead mints per-VM certs on `vm-gitlab` when a new VM (or new developer) joins. Browsing any dev VM from any workstation then "just works" — green padlock, no warning.
|
||||
|
||||
This subsection assumes the per-dev workstation procedure of "HTTPS dev-server setup" above is what every developer will do **once**, with the rootCA.pem they receive from this shared CA.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Initial setup on `vm-gitlab` (one-time, by the R&D Lead)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# 1. Install mkcert on vm-gitlab (no service to run — mkcert is one-shot).
|
||||
sudo curl -fsSL https://dl.filippo.io/mkcert/latest?for=linux/amd64 \
|
||||
-o /usr/local/bin/mkcert
|
||||
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/mkcert
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Create the shared CAROOT, root-only.
|
||||
sudo mkdir -p /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca
|
||||
sudo chown root:root /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca
|
||||
sudo chmod 700 /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Generate the CA into that CAROOT. (`-install` here just touches
|
||||
# the local trust store of vm-gitlab — cosmetic for an infra VM,
|
||||
# no harm.)
|
||||
sudo CAROOT=/srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca mkcert -install
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. Verify.
|
||||
sudo ls -la /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca/
|
||||
# → rootCA.pem (-rw-r--r--), rootCA-key.pem (-rw-------, root only)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
After this, the CA exists and is owned by `root` on `vm-gitlab`. Developers never touch it directly.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Minting a cert for a dev VM (R&D Lead, on `vm-gitlab`)
|
||||
|
||||
Repeat once per VM hostname (`apf-portal.dev-jg.local`, `apf-portal.dev-vc.local`, `apf-portal.dev.local`, …). Replace `<host>` and the SSH/scp target accordingly:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sudo CAROOT=/srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca mkcert \
|
||||
-key-file /tmp/<host>-tls.key \
|
||||
-cert-file /tmp/<host>-tls.pem \
|
||||
apf-portal.<host>.local
|
||||
|
||||
# Sanity check.
|
||||
sudo openssl x509 -in /tmp/<host>-tls.pem -noout -subject -issuer
|
||||
# subject CN must be apf-portal.<host>.local; issuer the mkcert CA name.
|
||||
|
||||
# Ship to the target VM, renaming to the path the `https` Nx serve
|
||||
# configuration expects (.secrets/dev-tls.{key,pem}).
|
||||
sudo scp /tmp/<host>-tls.key <vm>:~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/dev-tls.key
|
||||
sudo scp /tmp/<host>-tls.pem <vm>:~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/dev-tls.pem
|
||||
|
||||
# Wipe the staging copies.
|
||||
sudo rm /tmp/<host>-tls.*
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The certificate is good for ~2 years (mkcert default). When it nears expiry, regenerate with the same command and re-`scp` — the dev-server picks up the new files on next restart.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Onboarding a new developer
|
||||
|
||||
A new teammate needs **three things**: a copy of `rootCA.pem` (public, low-sensitivity), a per-VM cert minted by the R&D Lead, and the same hosts-file + `.env` configuration every dev follows.
|
||||
|
||||
**R&D Lead side** — on `vm-gitlab`:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Hand off the public CA cert to the new dev via a secure channel
|
||||
# (1Password shared vault, Bitwarden, direct scp). Never plain e-mail.
|
||||
sudo cat /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca/rootCA.pem
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then mint that dev's per-VM cert (see "Minting a cert for a dev VM" above) and ship it to their VM's `~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/`.
|
||||
|
||||
**New developer side** — on their Windows workstation:
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# 1. Install mkcert (only to get the `-install` command — no need to
|
||||
# generate certs on the workstation).
|
||||
choco install mkcert -y
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Drop the rootCA.pem they received into the local CAROOT path.
|
||||
$caroot = mkcert -CAROOT
|
||||
Copy-Item "C:\path\to\rootCA.pem" "$caroot\rootCA.pem"
|
||||
# NB: only rootCA.pem — they do NOT receive rootCA-key.pem.
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Register the team CA in their Windows trust store.
|
||||
mkcert -install
|
||||
# Confirm the Windows security dialog. Their machine now trusts every
|
||||
# cert minted by the team CA on vm-gitlab.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Then they:
|
||||
|
||||
- Edit `C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts` (admin) and add the entries for every VM they want to reach (their own + the others as needed):
|
||||
```
|
||||
10.100.201.20 apf-portal.dev-vc.local
|
||||
10.100.201.21 apf-portal.dev-jg.local
|
||||
10.100.201.22 apf-portal.dev.local
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Edit `apps/portal-bff/.env` on their VM so the four `ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI` values point at `https://apf-portal.<their-host>:{4200,4300}/...` (the matching URIs are already registered Entra-side — no action there).
|
||||
- Set `NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https` in `infra/local/.env` on their VM.
|
||||
- `./infra/local/dev.sh down && ./infra/local/dev.sh up apps`.
|
||||
|
||||
Total onboarding budget: ~5 min of R&D Lead time on `vm-gitlab` (mint + transfer) + ~10 min of work on the new dev's workstation + VM. No SSH access to `vm-gitlab` is granted to developers — only the R&D Lead operates the CA.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Operational notes
|
||||
|
||||
- **Departures.** mkcert has no CRL; revoking trust on a former dev's machine isn't actionable from the CA side. The risk surface is what that dev could have signed before leaving — and they only ever had the public `rootCA.pem`, never the private key, so they cannot have signed anything in your trust circle. No action required when a dev leaves.
|
||||
- **CA rotation.** Rare (audit, suspected compromise, annual hygiene). Regenerate the CA on `vm-gitlab`, re-mint every VM's cert, redistribute the new `rootCA.pem` to each dev. Each dev re-imports + re-`mkcert -install`. No `.env` or Entra change.
|
||||
- **Per-VM cert rotation.** Same pattern as initial mint — regenerate, scp, `dev.sh restart portal-shell portal-admin`. No client-side action.
|
||||
- **Migration to a corp-signed CA.** When the infra team issues an internal-CA-signed cert (already trusted by every domain-joined workstation, no mkcert step), drop those files into `.secrets/dev-tls.{key,pem}` and remove the team mkcert CA from each dev's trust store. Entra registrations are unchanged — they reference hostname + port, not the issuer.
|
||||
|
||||
### Service endpoints (defaults)
|
||||
|
||||
| Service | Host port | Purpose |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,3 +35,29 @@ OTEL_HTTP_PORT=4318
|
||||
PGWEB_PORT=8081
|
||||
JAEGER_UI_PORT=16686
|
||||
SERVE_STATIC_PORT=4200
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- Apps (`--profile apps`)
|
||||
# Two access modes for the SPA dev-servers — pick one. The switch
|
||||
# happens entirely in this file (compose interpolates the SPA's nx
|
||||
# serve --configuration AND the BFF's ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI from here);
|
||||
# `apps/portal-bff/.env` stays at its localhost defaults regardless.
|
||||
# See infra/README.md → "Switching between dev modes".
|
||||
|
||||
# === Mode A — Localhost / VSCode port-forwarding (DEFAULT) ===
|
||||
# Leave the entire Mode B block below commented. The SPA dev-servers
|
||||
# stay on plain HTTP, the BFF receives the `http://localhost:*`
|
||||
# redirect URIs already registered in Entra. Browse `http://
|
||||
# localhost:4200/` from the workstation — VSCode Remote-SSH auto-
|
||||
# forwards 4200 / 4300 / 3000 from the VM.
|
||||
|
||||
# === Mode B — HTTPS via hostname (apf-portal.dev-XX.local) ===
|
||||
# Required when the SPA is accessed via a hostname (Entra refuses
|
||||
# `http:` for non-`localhost` redirect URIs — see the team mkcert CA
|
||||
# setup in infra/README.md). Replace `dev-jg` with YOUR hostname and
|
||||
# uncomment the five lines.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https
|
||||
# ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI=https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4200/api/auth/callback
|
||||
# ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4200/
|
||||
# ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI=https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4300/api/admin/auth/callback
|
||||
# ENTRA_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4300/
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -240,6 +240,21 @@ services:
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: 'postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER:-portal}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-portal_dev}?schema=public'
|
||||
REDIS_URL: 'redis://default:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@redis:6379/0'
|
||||
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: 'http://otel-collector:4318/v1/traces'
|
||||
# OIDC redirect URIs. Driven by infra/local/.env so switching
|
||||
# between the two access modes — `localhost` (default; VSCode
|
||||
# Remote-SSH port-forwarding) and `https` hostname (the
|
||||
# ADR-0030 mkcert path) — is a single-file change. Unset →
|
||||
# localhost defaults; set in infra/local/.env to override with
|
||||
# an `https://apf-portal.dev-XX.local:…` hostname. See the
|
||||
# "Switching between dev modes" subsection of infra/README.md.
|
||||
# Compose `environment` overrides `env_file`, so the BFF's
|
||||
# own .env stays at localhost (so native `nx serve` works
|
||||
# untouched) and only `infra/local/.env` carries the
|
||||
# docker-apps-mode override.
|
||||
ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI: ${ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI:-http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback}
|
||||
ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI: ${ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI:-http://localhost:4200/}
|
||||
ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI: ${ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI:-http://localhost:3000/api/admin/auth/callback}
|
||||
ENTRA_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI: ${ENTRA_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI:-http://localhost:4300/}
|
||||
# Secrets (Entra / session / jwks) come from the BFF's own dev env.
|
||||
# `required: false` so SPA-only devs can `up` without it — the BFF
|
||||
# then fails its own boot-time config validators with a clear message
|
||||
@@ -266,7 +281,27 @@ services:
|
||||
# /api proxy at the BFF container by name (Compose DNS). Native
|
||||
# `nx serve` leaves BFF_TARGET unset and falls back to localhost.
|
||||
BFF_TARGET: http://portal-bff:3000
|
||||
command: ['pnpm', 'exec', 'nx', 'serve', 'portal-shell', '--host', '0.0.0.0', '--port', '4200']
|
||||
# `--configuration=${NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION:-development}` is
|
||||
# interpolated by Compose at YAML parse time from
|
||||
# `infra/local/.env`. Set `NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https` there to
|
||||
# serve over TLS — required when accessing via a hostname (Entra
|
||||
# rejects `http:` for non-`localhost` redirect URIs). See the
|
||||
# `https` configuration in apps/portal-shell/project.json + the
|
||||
# "HTTPS dev-server setup" section in infra/README.md for the
|
||||
# mkcert procedure.
|
||||
command:
|
||||
[
|
||||
'pnpm',
|
||||
'exec',
|
||||
'nx',
|
||||
'serve',
|
||||
'portal-shell',
|
||||
'--host',
|
||||
'0.0.0.0',
|
||||
'--port',
|
||||
'4200',
|
||||
'--configuration=${NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION:-development}',
|
||||
]
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- '${SHELL_PORT:-4200}:4200'
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
@@ -279,7 +314,20 @@ services:
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
# See portal-shell — same proxy target for the admin SPA.
|
||||
BFF_TARGET: http://portal-bff:3000
|
||||
command: ['pnpm', 'exec', 'nx', 'serve', 'portal-admin', '--host', '0.0.0.0', '--port', '4300']
|
||||
# See portal-shell for the NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION rationale.
|
||||
command:
|
||||
[
|
||||
'pnpm',
|
||||
'exec',
|
||||
'nx',
|
||||
'serve',
|
||||
'portal-admin',
|
||||
'--host',
|
||||
'0.0.0.0',
|
||||
'--port',
|
||||
'4300',
|
||||
'--configuration=${NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION:-development}',
|
||||
]
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- '${ADMIN_PORT:-4300}:4300'
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
|
||||
+21
-4
@@ -14,10 +14,23 @@ set -euo pipefail
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
COMPOSE_FILE="${SCRIPT_DIR}/dev.compose.yml"
|
||||
|
||||
# Profiles defined in dev.compose.yml. Keep in sync if a new profile
|
||||
# is added.
|
||||
# Every profile defined in dev.compose.yml, used as the teardown /
|
||||
# status / logs scope so a profile started under a custom flag is
|
||||
# always reachable later. Keep in sync if a new profile is added.
|
||||
ALL_PROFILES=(dbtools observability serve-static apps)
|
||||
|
||||
# What `up all` expands to — everything you want running for a full
|
||||
# dev session. `serve-static` is deliberately excluded:
|
||||
# - it would collide with `apps` on host port 4200 (both publish the
|
||||
# SPA there by default — Caddy serves the production build, the
|
||||
# `apps` profile runs the Angular dev-server);
|
||||
# - without a prior `nx build --configuration=production`, Caddy
|
||||
# just 404s every request, so it adds nothing to a comprehensive
|
||||
# `up all` invocation. Users who actually need it run
|
||||
# `./infra/local/dev.sh up serve-static` (and `down` still tears
|
||||
# it down because it's in ALL_PROFILES above).
|
||||
UP_ALL_PROFILES=(dbtools observability apps)
|
||||
|
||||
# Build "--profile p1 --profile p2 …" as separate arguments.
|
||||
build_all_profile_flags() {
|
||||
local p
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +69,11 @@ Commands:
|
||||
up [target...] Bring up the stack.
|
||||
Targets:
|
||||
(none) core only (postgres + redis + otel-collector)
|
||||
all core + all profiles
|
||||
all core + dbtools + observability + apps —
|
||||
the full dev stack. serve-static is
|
||||
EXCLUDED because it collides with apps
|
||||
on port 4200; run it explicitly when
|
||||
you actually want to serve a prod build.
|
||||
dbtools core + pgweb
|
||||
observability core + jaeger
|
||||
serve-static core + caddy (production-build reverse proxy)
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +136,7 @@ case "$cmd" in
|
||||
if [[ $# -eq 0 ]]; then
|
||||
dc_core up -d
|
||||
elif [[ "$1" == "all" ]]; then
|
||||
dc_all up -d
|
||||
up_with_profiles "${UP_ALL_PROFILES[@]}"
|
||||
else
|
||||
up_with_profiles "$@"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
|
||||
"axios@<1.15.2": ">=1.15.2",
|
||||
"@angular-devkit/core>ajv@<8.18.0": ">=8.18.0",
|
||||
"brace-expansion@<5.0.6": ">=5.0.6",
|
||||
"dompurify@<3.4.5": ">=3.4.5",
|
||||
"esbuild@<0.25.0": ">=0.25.0",
|
||||
"follow-redirects@<1.16.0": ">=1.16.0",
|
||||
"ip-address@<10.1.1": ">=10.1.1",
|
||||
|
||||
Generated
+196
-171
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
Reference in New Issue
Block a user