d41f63d3e9d608f8c188e74402d29c21488c03da
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 julien
|
1513ad327c |
feat(portal-bff): openapi spec + scalar api reference UI (dev-only) (#143)
## Summary Adds an OpenAPI 3 spec + a [Scalar API Reference](https://scalar.com/) UI to `portal-bff`, dev-only. The BFF previously had no way to *see* its HTTP surface short of grepping for `@Get` / `@Post`; this PR generates the spec from the existing Nest controllers via [`@nestjs/swagger`](https://docs.nestjs.com/openapi/introduction) and renders it through Scalar — a modern alternative to the classic Swagger UI (single-page, fast, dark-mode native, better typography). ## What lands ### Two new dev-only routes | Route | What it serves | | --- | --- | | `GET /api/openapi.json` | Raw OpenAPI 3 document. External tools (Bruno / Insomnia / Postman) import from here. | | `GET /api/docs` | Scalar API Reference HTML page. Loads the JSON spec at render time and renders the full endpoint catalogue with a "Try it" panel. | Both routes are gated behind `process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production'` in [`setupOpenApi`](apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.ts) — production deployments don't need the docs surface, and publishing it would hand an attacker a curated map of every authenticated endpoint + every DTO shape. If a future ops use-case wants the spec in prod (internal gateway, contract testing), the gate is one line away from an opt-in `OPENAPI_PUBLISH=true` env knob. ### Core implementation — [`apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.ts) Two exported helpers: - **`buildOpenApiDocument(app)`** — wraps Nest's `DocumentBuilder` + `SwaggerModule.createDocument`. Sets title, description (mentions the CSRF caveat — see below), version, and registers **two** cookie security schemes: - `portal_session` for the user-portal surface ([ADR-0009](docs/decisions/0009-auth-flow-oidc-pkce-msal-node.md)). - `portal_admin_session` for the admin-portal surface ([ADR-0020](docs/decisions/0020-portal-admin-app.md)). No `@ApiBearerAuth` is declared — the BFF never exposes a bearer-auth surface (SPA never holds tokens per ADR-0009; downstream OBO tokens are server-side only per ADR-0014). - **`setupOpenApi(app, globalPrefix)`** — short-circuits in production, otherwise binds the two routes via the Express adapter directly (`app.getHttpAdapter().get(...)` and `app.use(...)`). The OpenAPI JSON is a static asset and Scalar is a vanilla Express middleware — wrapping either in a Nest controller would add zero value and an extra layer of indirection. Wired into bootstrap at [`apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts:220`](apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts#L220), immediately after the JWKS endpoint mount and before `app.listen()`. ### Controllers decorated with `@ApiTags` / `@ApiOperation` / `@ApiCookieAuth` Annotations are cosmetic but make the spec actually browsable. Tag taxonomy: | Controller | Tag | Security | | --- | --- | --- | | [`AppController`](apps/portal-bff/src/app/app.controller.ts) | `app (scaffolding)` | — | | [`HealthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/health/health.controller.ts) | `health` | — | | [`AuthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.ts) | `auth (user portal)` | `portal_session` on `/me` + `/logout` | | [`AdminAuthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-auth.controller.ts) | `auth (admin portal)` | `portal_admin_session` on `/me` + `/logout` | | [`AdminController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin.controller.ts) | `admin (self-test)` | class-level `portal_admin_session` | | [`AdminAuditController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-audit.controller.ts) | `admin (audit log)` | class-level `portal_admin_session` | | [`AdminUsersController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-users.controller.ts) | `admin (user directory)` | class-level `portal_admin_session` | `@ApiOperation({ summary: … })` added on every route — populates the one-line description Scalar shows in its left-rail TOC. ### Deps + Jest - `@nestjs/swagger ^11` (matches the Nest 11 major already pinned) and `@scalar/nestjs-api-reference` added to the workspace root. - [`jest.config.cts`](apps/portal-bff/jest.config.cts) — widened `transformIgnorePatterns` from `/node_modules/(?!.*jose)/` to `/node_modules/(?!.*(jose|@scalar/))/`. `@scalar/client-side-rendering` (a transitive dep) ships ESM-only; without this widening the spec suite fails to load the module under ts-jest. ## Notes for the reviewer - **Why two cookie schemes rather than one?** Scalar renders a per-endpoint lock icon driven by the security scheme name. Splitting `portal_session` / `portal_admin_session` keeps the indicator semantically truthful — `/api/auth/me` and `/api/admin/auth/me` look identical otherwise. - **CSRF caveat.** Mutating routes (`POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE`) require `X-CSRF-Token` per [ADR-0009](docs/decisions/0009-auth-flow-oidc-pkce-msal-node.md). The header must be set manually in Scalar's "Try it" panel to the value of the `portal_csrf` cookie when exercising those routes. The spec description mentions it; auto-injecting the header from the cookie is a future polish. - **No ADR for this.** `@nestjs/swagger` is the framework's own first-party tooling; Scalar is a thin UI on top of a standard OpenAPI 3 document. Both replaceable without touching the controllers (the `@Api*` annotations are spec-standard). Dev-only, no prod surface — doesn't cross any of the bars that warrant an ADR per [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md). - **Express-layer routing.** Same pattern as the JWKS endpoint (#139): the OpenAPI JSON is a static asset and Scalar a vanilla Express handler, so wiring through Nest's router adds no value. ## Test plan - [x] **5 new specs** in [`apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.spec.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.spec.ts) — document shape (openapi version, title, version), both cookie schemes declared, smoke controller route captured in `paths`, production short-circuit (no routes mounted, no `app.use` called), dev mount (JSON at `/api/openapi.json` via the HTTP adapter, Scalar UI at `/api/docs` via `app.use`). - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **396 specs pass** (was 391). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean. - [x] Manual dev smoke: `pnpm nx serve portal-bff`, `curl /api/openapi.json | jq .info` returns title + version, open `/api/docs` in a browser, every controller's routes visible under their tag, lock icons match the cookie scheme on guarded routes. ## What's next — light follow-ups Not blocking this PR; mentioned so they're not lost: - Auto-inject the `X-CSRF-Token` header in Scalar from the `portal_csrf` cookie (custom Scalar config preset). - Promote `@ApiOperation` summaries with multi-line `description`s on the more involved routes (`/api/admin/audit`, `/api/admin/users`). - Annotate DTOs with `@ApiProperty` once the first contract-test consumer arrives — Nest can also pick them up automatically with the `@nestjs/swagger` ts-plugin if we wire it into the Nx build target. Deferred until the spec is consumed by tooling that benefits from the precision. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #143 |
||
|
julien
|
282a972346 |
feat(portal-bff): signed-assertion strategy + /.well-known/jwks.json (#138)
## Summary Second half of the **DownstreamApiClient + OBO** chantier per [ADR-0014](docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md). Ships the **signed-assertion strategy** (non-Entra downstreams) and the **JWKS publishing endpoint** as testable primitives, completing the strategy layer the OBO PR (#137) started. The framework around them (DownstreamApiClientFactory, cockatiel, audience pre-check, error translation) still waits for the first concrete integration per the ADR's own "until then" clause. After this PR the BFF has, ready to plug into a future integration: - `OboStrategy` — Entra-protected downstreams (PR #137) - `SignedAssertionStrategy` — non-Entra downstreams (this PR) - `DownstreamTokenCache` — encrypted-at-rest OBO token cache (PR #137) - `GET /.well-known/jwks.json` — public key publication (this PR) ## What lands ### [`assertJwksConfig`](apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-jwks-config.ts) Boot validator for `BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` + `BFF_JWKS_KID`. Reads the PEM file once at startup, refuses missing / unreadable / weak material (RSA < 2048, Ed25519, unknown key type), derives the JOSE algorithm (`RS256` / `ES256` / `ES384`) from the key shape, and validates the kid against `[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,128}` so the value lives unescaped in JWT headers + JWKS payloads. ### [`BffSigningKey`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/bff-signing-key.ts) Singleton holding `{ config: JwksConfig, publicJwk: JWK }`. The `publicJwk` is derived from the **public half** of the key (via `jose.exportJWK` on a `createPublicKey`-derived `KeyObject`) so no private material can leak through. Single DI source for both consumers (strategy + JWKS controller) so a key rotation only changes one provider. ### [`SignedAssertionStrategy`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/strategies/signed-assertion.strategy.ts) Wraps `jose.SignJWT` with the ADR-0014 claim shape: ```json { "iss": "portal-bff", "sub": "<actor_id_hash>", "aud": "<downstream-name>", "audience": "workforce" | "customer", "claims": { /* curated subset */ }, "exp": <now + 60s>, "iat": <now>, "trace_id": "<W3C trace id>" } ``` - **60 s TTL** hard-coded — the ADR mandates it. - **No JWT cache** — at 60 s lifetime the savings would be negligible and a cache would let replayed assertions linger past their useful life. The signing operation itself is cheap (~hundreds of µs for RS256 with a 3 KB key). - **kid in the protected header** matches the JWKS so a downstream picks the right key during rotation. - Supports **RS256 / ES256 / ES384** transparently — picks the alg the validator derived at boot. ### [`JwksController`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/jwks.controller.ts) `GET /.well-known/jwks.json` returns `{ keys: [<single jwk>] }`. v1 publishes one key; the rotation chantier will add a second entry + window-based eviction so a downstream that cached the previous JWK keeps verifying during cut-over. [`main.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts) excludes `/.well-known/*` from the global `/api` prefix so the route lands at the bare root per RFC 8615. No auth gate — the JWKS is the verification anchor; gating it would defeat the purpose. The CSRF middleware already exempts GET methods, so the route comes out clean. ## Required env update (mandatory at boot) Generate the key: ```bash mkdir -p apps/portal-bff/.secrets openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \ -out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem ``` Set in `apps/portal-bff/.env`: ```env BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem BFF_JWKS_KID=bff-2026-05 ``` The repo's existing `*.pem` / `*.key` gitignore patterns cover `.secrets/`. ## Dependency - **`jose@^6`** added as a direct dep (was transitive via MSAL). Pinned at the workspace root since the BFF is the only consumer today and the package isn't part of the Angular bundle graph. - `jest.config.cts`: `jose` ships ESM-only, so its `node_modules` path is removed from `transformIgnorePatterns`. The pattern walks pnpm's deep `.pnpm/` layout — anything under `/node_modules/` whose path also contains `jose` somewhere gets transformed by ts-jest. ## Out of scope (deferred until the first concrete integration) Per ADR-0014's "until then" clause: - `DownstreamApiClientFactory` + per-service typed `DownstreamApiConfig`. - `cockatiel` resilience composition (timeout, retry, circuit breaker, bulkhead). - Audience pre-check at the call site (`audienceConstraint` → `authz.deny` audit). - Error translation tables per service. - OTel custom spans `downstream.<service>.<verb>.<path>`. - The framework code that actually calls `SignedAssertionStrategy.sign()` and attaches `X-User-Assertion` + the `ServiceCredential` auth header to an outbound HTTP request. - Key rotation (the JWKS lists one key for now; the rotation chantier adds the second entry + eviction policy). These land alongside the first concrete integration so the framework shape is validated against a real consumer, not speculative needs. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **358 specs pass** (was 334; +24: env validators 11, signing key 4, strategy 6, controller 3). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean. - [x] Env validator: missing path, unreadable file, garbage PEM, RSA-1024 (weak), Ed25519 (unsupported), missing kid, illegal kid charset, kid too short. - [x] Signing key: RSA / EC P-256 / EC P-384 round-trip to public JWK with no private material (`d`, `p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq`, `qi` all absent from the published JWK). - [x] Strategy: claim shape matches ADR-0014, `exp - iat == 60`, audience mismatch rejected, signature mismatch rejected, EC P-256 signing path (ES256), per-call freshness. - [x] Controller: returns JWKS with the single public key, no private material leaks. - [ ] Manual smoke: generate a key locally + set the two env vars + `curl http://localhost:3000/.well-known/jwks.json` should return the JWKS shape with the chosen kid. ## Notes for the reviewer - The strategy uses `setProtectedHeader({ alg, kid })` — the kid in the protected header is the canonical way to tell a verifier "use the entry with this kid in the JWKS". Without it, a verifier holding two keys during rotation has to try both. - The `60 s` TTL is intentionally not env-overridable. ADR-0014 mandates it; making it tunable would create a tempting knob to widen the replay window for "performance". - `jose` was already in the tree transitively (likely via MSAL). Promoting it to a direct dep + pinning means a future hoist deduplication can't silently remove it without our review. ## What's next The chantier's strategy layer is complete. Open follow-ups on the roadmap: - **First concrete downstream integration** — when a real consumer arrives, the framework gets built around the two strategies (DownstreamApiClientFactory, cockatiel resilience, audience pre-check, error translation, OTel spans, audit events). Until then the strategies + cache + JWKS sit ready. - **Strategic security baseline ADR** — RSSI sign-off on ASVS / HDS / GDPR / NIS 2. Paused per [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md) §"Repository status". - **portal-admin v1 modules** — CMS pages, menu management, user list. Each is its own self-contained chantier. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #138 |
||
 Julien Gautier
|
bea5e1954f |
chore: generate portal-shell and portal-bff apps per ADR-0004 / ADR-0005
Add the @nx/angular, @nx/nest, @nx/vite, @nx/eslint plugins, then generate the two apps. Adjust the empty-template tsconfig.base.json to be Angular-compatible (drop project references and customConditions that the empty-template defaults to but Angular doesn't support; keep the strict-TS extensions from ADR-0004). apps/portal-shell (Angular 21): - standalone APIs, routing, SCSS, esbuild - vitest-angular as unitTestRunner, playwright for e2e - strict mode - tags scope:portal-shell, type:app - app.config.ts wired with provideZonelessChangeDetection() per ADR-0004 (Angular 21 + Nx 22 generates without zone.js by default) apps/portal-bff (NestJS 11): - Express adapter (default per ADR-0005) - Jest as unitTestRunner - tags scope:portal-bff, type:app - main.ts wired with a global ValidationPipe configured whitelist + forbidNonWhitelisted + transform per ADR-0005 - Phase-2 security additions (helmet, CORS, sessions, CSRF, rate limit, auth guards, error filter) deferred to their respective ADRs - placeholder comment in main.ts Workspace dependencies: class-validator + class-transformer added (required by NestJS ValidationPipe at runtime). Nx-generated .gitignore additions (.angular, __screenshots__) merged into ours. .vscode/extensions.json and launch.json added by Nx are kept (do not override our existing settings.json). |