feat(portal-bff): signed-assertion strategy + /.well-known/jwks.json (#138)

## Summary

Second half of the **DownstreamApiClient + OBO** chantier per [ADR-0014](docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md). Ships the **signed-assertion strategy** (non-Entra downstreams) and the **JWKS publishing endpoint** as testable primitives, completing the strategy layer the OBO PR (#137) started. The framework around them (DownstreamApiClientFactory, cockatiel, audience pre-check, error translation) still waits for the first concrete integration per the ADR's own "until then" clause.

After this PR the BFF has, ready to plug into a future integration:

- `OboStrategy` — Entra-protected downstreams (PR #137)
- `SignedAssertionStrategy` — non-Entra downstreams (this PR)
- `DownstreamTokenCache` — encrypted-at-rest OBO token cache (PR #137)
- `GET /.well-known/jwks.json` — public key publication (this PR)

## What lands

### [`assertJwksConfig`](apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-jwks-config.ts)

Boot validator for `BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` + `BFF_JWKS_KID`. Reads the PEM file once at startup, refuses missing / unreadable / weak material (RSA < 2048, Ed25519, unknown key type), derives the JOSE algorithm (`RS256` / `ES256` / `ES384`) from the key shape, and validates the kid against `[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,128}` so the value lives unescaped in JWT headers + JWKS payloads.

### [`BffSigningKey`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/bff-signing-key.ts)

Singleton holding `{ config: JwksConfig, publicJwk: JWK }`. The `publicJwk` is derived from the **public half** of the key (via `jose.exportJWK` on a `createPublicKey`-derived `KeyObject`) so no private material can leak through. Single DI source for both consumers (strategy + JWKS controller) so a key rotation only changes one provider.

### [`SignedAssertionStrategy`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/strategies/signed-assertion.strategy.ts)

Wraps `jose.SignJWT` with the ADR-0014 claim shape:

```json
{
  "iss": "portal-bff",
  "sub": "<actor_id_hash>",
  "aud": "<downstream-name>",
  "audience": "workforce" | "customer",
  "claims": { /* curated subset */ },
  "exp": <now + 60s>,
  "iat": <now>,
  "trace_id": "<W3C trace id>"
}
```

- **60 s TTL** hard-coded — the ADR mandates it.
- **No JWT cache** — at 60 s lifetime the savings would be negligible and a cache would let replayed assertions linger past their useful life. The signing operation itself is cheap (~hundreds of µs for RS256 with a 3 KB key).
- **kid in the protected header** matches the JWKS so a downstream picks the right key during rotation.
- Supports **RS256 / ES256 / ES384** transparently — picks the alg the validator derived at boot.

### [`JwksController`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/jwks.controller.ts)

`GET /.well-known/jwks.json` returns `{ keys: [<single jwk>] }`. v1 publishes one key; the rotation chantier will add a second entry + window-based eviction so a downstream that cached the previous JWK keeps verifying during cut-over.

[`main.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts) excludes `/.well-known/*` from the global `/api` prefix so the route lands at the bare root per RFC 8615. No auth gate — the JWKS is the verification anchor; gating it would defeat the purpose. The CSRF middleware already exempts GET methods, so the route comes out clean.

## Required env update (mandatory at boot)

Generate the key:

```bash
mkdir -p apps/portal-bff/.secrets
openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \
  -out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
```

Set in `apps/portal-bff/.env`:

```env
BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
BFF_JWKS_KID=bff-2026-05
```

The repo's existing `*.pem` / `*.key` gitignore patterns cover `.secrets/`.

## Dependency

- **`jose@^6`** added as a direct dep (was transitive via MSAL). Pinned at the workspace root since the BFF is the only consumer today and the package isn't part of the Angular bundle graph.
- `jest.config.cts`: `jose` ships ESM-only, so its `node_modules` path is removed from `transformIgnorePatterns`. The pattern walks pnpm's deep `.pnpm/` layout — anything under `/node_modules/` whose path also contains `jose` somewhere gets transformed by ts-jest.

## Out of scope (deferred until the first concrete integration)

Per ADR-0014's "until then" clause:

- `DownstreamApiClientFactory` + per-service typed `DownstreamApiConfig`.
- `cockatiel` resilience composition (timeout, retry, circuit breaker, bulkhead).
- Audience pre-check at the call site (`audienceConstraint` → `authz.deny` audit).
- Error translation tables per service.
- OTel custom spans `downstream.<service>.<verb>.<path>`.
- The framework code that actually calls `SignedAssertionStrategy.sign()` and attaches `X-User-Assertion` + the `ServiceCredential` auth header to an outbound HTTP request.
- Key rotation (the JWKS lists one key for now; the rotation chantier adds the second entry + eviction policy).

These land alongside the first concrete integration so the framework shape is validated against a real consumer, not speculative needs.

## Test plan

- [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **358 specs pass** (was 334; +24: env validators 11, signing key 4, strategy 6, controller 3).
- [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean.
- [x] Env validator: missing path, unreadable file, garbage PEM, RSA-1024 (weak), Ed25519 (unsupported), missing kid, illegal kid charset, kid too short.
- [x] Signing key: RSA / EC P-256 / EC P-384 round-trip to public JWK with no private material (`d`, `p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq`, `qi` all absent from the published JWK).
- [x] Strategy: claim shape matches ADR-0014, `exp - iat == 60`, audience mismatch rejected, signature mismatch rejected, EC P-256 signing path (ES256), per-call freshness.
- [x] Controller: returns JWKS with the single public key, no private material leaks.
- [ ] Manual smoke: generate a key locally + set the two env vars + `curl http://localhost:3000/.well-known/jwks.json` should return the JWKS shape with the chosen kid.

## Notes for the reviewer

- The strategy uses `setProtectedHeader({ alg, kid })` — the kid in the protected header is the canonical way to tell a verifier "use the entry with this kid in the JWKS". Without it, a verifier holding two keys during rotation has to try both.
- The `60 s` TTL is intentionally not env-overridable. ADR-0014 mandates it; making it tunable would create a tempting knob to widen the replay window for "performance".
- `jose` was already in the tree transitively (likely via MSAL). Promoting it to a direct dep + pinning means a future hoist deduplication can't silently remove it without our review.

## What's next

The chantier's strategy layer is complete. Open follow-ups on the roadmap:

- **First concrete downstream integration** — when a real consumer arrives, the framework gets built around the two strategies (DownstreamApiClientFactory, cockatiel resilience, audience pre-check, error translation, OTel spans, audit events). Until then the strategies + cache + JWKS sit ready.
- **Strategic security baseline ADR** — RSSI sign-off on ASVS / HDS / GDPR / NIS 2. Paused per [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md) §"Repository status".
- **portal-admin v1 modules** — CMS pages, menu management, user list. Each is its own self-contained chantier.

---------

Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #138

apps/portal-bff/.env.example

@@ -114,6 +114,24 @@ SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
 #   node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
 OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
 
+# BFF JWKS signing material (per ADR-0014 §"Service strategy"). The
+# BFF mints short-lived `X-User-Assertion` JWTs to propagate user
+# identity to non-Entra downstreams; downstreams verify the signature
+# against `/.well-known/jwks.json`. Both values are mandatory at boot.
+#
+# Generate an RSA private key:
+#   mkdir -p apps/portal-bff/.secrets && \
+#   openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \
+#     -out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
+#
+# RSA-2048 is the minimum the validator accepts; 3072 is the
+# default recommendation. EC P-256 / P-384 also accepted.
+BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
+# Stable key id published in the JWKS + emitted in the JWT `kid`
+# header. URL-safe charset only ([A-Za-z0-9_-], 4–128 chars). Bump
+# this when rotating to a new key.
+BFF_JWKS_KID=bff-2026-05
+
 # Session timeouts (per ADR-0010). Both optional with sensible
 # defaults; override only when staging / prod policy diverges.
 #   SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — sliding window. Each request
@@ -183,8 +201,8 @@ CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:4200,http://localhost:4300
 #   AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS            (default 365)
 #
 # Downstream API access (ADR-0014):
-#   OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY        — wired (see above, line 113)
-#   BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH       (next PR: signed-assertion strategy)
-#   BFF_JWKS_KID                    (next PR: signed-assertion strategy)
-#   <SERVICE>_API_BASE_URL          (per integrated downstream)
-#   <SERVICE>_TIMEOUT_MS            (optional, defaults to 5000)
+#   OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY        — wired
+#   BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH       — wired
+#   BFF_JWKS_KID                    — wired
+#   <SERVICE>_API_BASE_URL          (per integrated downstream — lands with the first integration)
+#   <SERVICE>_TIMEOUT_MS            (optional, defaults to 5000 — lands with the first integration)

apps/portal-bff/jest.config.cts

@@ -6,5 +6,16 @@ module.exports = {
     '^.+\\.[tj]s$': ['ts-jest', { tsconfig: '<rootDir>/tsconfig.spec.json' }],
   },
   moduleFileExtensions: ['ts', 'js', 'html'],
+  // `jose` ships ESM-only; without an explicit transform exception
+  // ts-jest skips node_modules and Jest fails parsing the import
+  // statements. Listed by name rather than a broad pattern so a
+  // future ESM-only dep is a conscious addition.
+  //
+  // The pattern walks pnpm's deep layout: any path under
+  // `/node_modules/` is ignored UNLESS the path also contains
+  // `jose` somewhere — that catches both the hoisted symlink at
+  // `node_modules/jose/...` and the pnpm-internal real path at
+  // `node_modules/.pnpm/jose@<version>/node_modules/jose/...`.
+  transformIgnorePatterns: ['/node_modules/(?!.*jose)'],
   coverageDirectory: '../../coverage/apps/portal-bff',
 };

apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-jwks-config.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto';
+import { assertJwksConfig } from './check-jwks-config';
+
+const tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'apf-jwks-spec-'));
+
+function writeKey(
+  filename: string,
+  type: 'rsa-3072' | 'rsa-1024' | 'ec-p256' | 'ec-p384' | 'ed25519' | 'garbage',
+): string {
+  const path = join(tmpDir, filename);
+  let pem: string;
+  switch (type) {
+    case 'rsa-3072':
+      pem = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 3072 }).privateKey.export({
+        type: 'pkcs8',
+        format: 'pem',
+      }) as string;
+      break;
+    case 'rsa-1024':
+      pem = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 1024 }).privateKey.export({
+        type: 'pkcs8',
+        format: 'pem',
+      }) as string;
+      break;
+    case 'ec-p256':
+      pem = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'prime256v1' }).privateKey.export({
+        type: 'pkcs8',
+        format: 'pem',
+      }) as string;
+      break;
+    case 'ec-p384':
+      pem = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'secp384r1' }).privateKey.export({
+        type: 'pkcs8',
+        format: 'pem',
+      }) as string;
+      break;
+    case 'ed25519':
+      pem = generateKeyPairSync('ed25519').privateKey.export({
+        type: 'pkcs8',
+        format: 'pem',
+      }) as string;
+      break;
+    case 'garbage':
+      pem = '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nbm90LWEta2V5\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n';
+      break;
+  }
+  writeFileSync(path, pem);
+  return path;
+}
+
+describe('assertJwksConfig', () => {
+  const originalPath = process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'];
+  const originalKid = process.env['BFF_JWKS_KID'];
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_KID'] = 'bff-2026-05';
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    restore('BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH', originalPath);
+    restore('BFF_JWKS_KID', originalKid);
+  });
+
+  it('returns the parsed key + kid + alg=RS256 for a well-formed RSA-3072 key', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('rsa.pem', 'rsa-3072');
+    const config = assertJwksConfig();
+    expect(config.kid).toBe('bff-2026-05');
+    expect(config.alg).toBe('RS256');
+    expect(config.privateKey.asymmetricKeyType).toBe('rsa');
+  });
+
+  it('returns alg=ES256 for an EC P-256 key', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('ec256.pem', 'ec-p256');
+    expect(assertJwksConfig().alg).toBe('ES256');
+  });
+
+  it('returns alg=ES384 for an EC P-384 key', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('ec384.pem', 'ec-p384');
+    expect(assertJwksConfig().alg).toBe('ES384');
+  });
+
+  it('throws when BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH is unset', () => {
+    delete process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'];
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH is not set/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when the file does not exist', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = join(tmpDir, 'missing.pem');
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/could not be read/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when the file is not a valid PEM private key', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('garbage.pem', 'garbage');
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/not a valid PEM private key/);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses RSA keys weaker than 2048 bits', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('weak.pem', 'rsa-1024');
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/unsupported key type/);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses Ed25519 keys (v1 supports RSA + EC P-256/P-384 only)', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('ed25519.pem', 'ed25519');
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/unsupported key type/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when BFF_JWKS_KID is unset', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('rsa.pem', 'rsa-3072');
+    delete process.env['BFF_JWKS_KID'];
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/BFF_JWKS_KID is not set/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when BFF_JWKS_KID has illegal characters', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('rsa.pem', 'rsa-3072');
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_KID'] = 'has spaces and !';
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/must match/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when BFF_JWKS_KID is too short', () => {
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'] = writeKey('rsa.pem', 'rsa-3072');
+    process.env['BFF_JWKS_KID'] = 'ab';
+    expect(() => assertJwksConfig()).toThrow(/must match/);
+  });
+});
+
+function restore(name: string, original: string | undefined): void {
+  if (original === undefined) {
+    delete process.env[name];
+  } else {
+    process.env[name] = original;
+  }
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-jwks-config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { createPrivateKey, type KeyObject } from 'node:crypto';
+
+/**
+ * Boot-time validators for the BFF's JWKS publishing material, per
+ * [ADR-0014](../../../../docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md)
+ * §"Service strategy (non-Entra downstreams)":
+ *
+ *   "The downstream verifies the signature against the BFF's
+ *    published JWKS at `/.well-known/jwks.json`"
+ *
+ * Two env vars together describe the BFF's signing identity:
+ *
+ *   - `BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` — filesystem path to a PEM-encoded
+ *     private key (RSA-2048 or stronger, or EC P-256 / P-384). The
+ *     file is read once at boot; the BFF refuses to start if it's
+ *     missing, unreadable, or the key is weak.
+ *   - `BFF_JWKS_KID` — stable identifier published in the JWKS and
+ *     emitted in the JWT header so a downstream can pick the right
+ *     key when rotation introduces a second entry. URL-safe charset
+ *     (`[A-Za-z0-9_-]+`) so it lives unescaped in JWT headers.
+ *
+ * Returns the parsed `KeyObject` (private) + kid so the application
+ * layer never re-reads the file at request time — a perf wart given
+ * how often `X-User-Assertion` JWTs get minted on a busy downstream
+ * call site.
+ */
+
+const KID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,128}$/;
+
+export interface JwksConfig {
+  /** PEM-parsed private key, ready for `jose.SignJWT` consumption. */
+  readonly privateKey: KeyObject;
+  /** Stable identifier published in the JWKS + the JWT `kid` header. */
+  readonly kid: string;
+  /**
+   * JOSE algorithm derived from the key type. RSA → RS256;
+   * EC → ES256 / ES384 depending on curve. Kept on the config so
+   * the strategy doesn't have to re-derive it on every sign call.
+   */
+  readonly alg: 'RS256' | 'ES256' | 'ES384';
+}
+
+export function assertJwksConfig(): JwksConfig {
+  const path = process.env['BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH'];
+  if (path === undefined || path === '') {
+    throw new Error(
+      `BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH is not set. Generate a key with ` +
+        `"openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 -out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem" ` +
+        `and set BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH to its path. Required for the ADR-0014 ` +
+        `signed-assertion strategy.`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  let pem: string;
+  try {
+    pem = readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH could not be read at "${path}": ` +
+        `${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  let privateKey: KeyObject;
+  try {
+    privateKey = createPrivateKey(pem);
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH ("${path}") is not a valid PEM private key: ` +
+        `${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const alg = deriveAlg(privateKey);
+  if (alg === null) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH ("${path}") uses an unsupported key type ` +
+        `("${privateKey.asymmetricKeyType ?? 'unknown'}"). Use RSA-2048+ or EC ` +
+        `(P-256, P-384). Symmetric / Ed25519 keys are not accepted in v1.`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const rawKid = process.env['BFF_JWKS_KID'];
+  if (rawKid === undefined || rawKid === '') {
+    throw new Error(
+      `BFF_JWKS_KID is not set. Pick a stable identifier for the key (per ADR-0014 ` +
+        `§"Configuration") — e.g. "bff-2026-05" — and put it in apps/portal-bff/.env. ` +
+        `URL-safe charset only ([A-Za-z0-9_-]).`,
+    );
+  }
+  if (!KID_RE.test(rawKid)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `BFF_JWKS_KID must match ${KID_RE.source} (URL-safe, 4–128 chars). Got: ${rawKid}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  return { privateKey, kid: rawKid, alg };
+}
+
+function deriveAlg(key: KeyObject): JwksConfig['alg'] | null {
+  if (key.asymmetricKeyType === 'rsa') {
+    // RSA modulus length is in bits. `asymmetricKeyDetails.modulusLength` is
+    // the canonical accessor on Node 16+.
+    const modulus = key.asymmetricKeyDetails?.modulusLength;
+    if (modulus === undefined || modulus < 2048) {
+      // Weak key — refuse rather than silently sign with it.
+      return null;
+    }
+    return 'RS256';
+  }
+  if (key.asymmetricKeyType === 'ec') {
+    const curve = key.asymmetricKeyDetails?.namedCurve;
+    if (curve === 'prime256v1' || curve === 'P-256') return 'ES256';
+    if (curve === 'secp384r1' || curve === 'P-384') return 'ES384';
+    return null;
+  }
+  return null;
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/bff-signing-key.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+import { createPrivateKey, generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto';
+import { buildBffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
+
+function rsaKey() {
+  const { privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
+  return createPrivateKey(privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }));
+}
+
+function ecKey(curve: 'prime256v1' | 'secp384r1') {
+  const { privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: curve });
+  return createPrivateKey(privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }));
+}
+
+describe('buildBffSigningKey', () => {
+  it('produces a public JWK with kid + alg + use=sig from an RSA private key', async () => {
+    const key = await buildBffSigningKey({
+      privateKey: rsaKey(),
+      kid: 'bff-2026-05',
+      alg: 'RS256',
+    });
+    expect(key.publicJwk.kty).toBe('RSA');
+    expect(key.publicJwk.kid).toBe('bff-2026-05');
+    expect(key.publicJwk.alg).toBe('RS256');
+    expect(key.publicJwk.use).toBe('sig');
+    // No private-material leak — the public JWK must not carry `d`, `p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq`, `qi`.
+    expect(key.publicJwk.d).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(key.publicJwk.p).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(key.publicJwk.q).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('produces a public JWK with kty=EC + crv=P-256 for an EC P-256 key', async () => {
+    const key = await buildBffSigningKey({
+      privateKey: ecKey('prime256v1'),
+      kid: 'bff-2026-05',
+      alg: 'ES256',
+    });
+    expect(key.publicJwk.kty).toBe('EC');
+    expect(key.publicJwk.crv).toBe('P-256');
+    expect(key.publicJwk.alg).toBe('ES256');
+    expect(key.publicJwk.d).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('produces a public JWK with crv=P-384 for an EC P-384 key', async () => {
+    const key = await buildBffSigningKey({
+      privateKey: ecKey('secp384r1'),
+      kid: 'bff-2026-05',
+      alg: 'ES384',
+    });
+    expect(key.publicJwk.crv).toBe('P-384');
+    expect(key.publicJwk.alg).toBe('ES384');
+  });
+
+  it('exposes the full original config on the returned BffSigningKey', async () => {
+    const privateKey = rsaKey();
+    const built = await buildBffSigningKey({ privateKey, kid: 'rotated-kid', alg: 'RS256' });
+    expect(built.config.privateKey).toBe(privateKey);
+    expect(built.config.kid).toBe('rotated-kid');
+    expect(built.config.alg).toBe('RS256');
+  });
+});

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/bff-signing-key.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+import type { JWK } from 'jose';
+import { exportJWK } from 'jose';
+import { createPublicKey } from 'node:crypto';
+import type { JwksConfig } from '../config/check-jwks-config';
+
+/**
+ * Resolved BFF signing identity — the parsed private key, the
+ * derived public JWK (ready to ship in `/.well-known/jwks.json`),
+ * the `kid`, and the JOSE algorithm. Computed once at boot from
+ * `assertJwksConfig()` so neither the strategy nor the JWKS
+ * controller has to re-derive on the hot path.
+ *
+ * The DI token {@link BFF_SIGNING_KEY} wires this into Nest's
+ * provider graph. Both the `SignedAssertionStrategy` (signing) and
+ * the JWKS controller (publishing) read from this same instance —
+ * one source of truth for the BFF's signing material.
+ */
+export interface BffSigningKey {
+  readonly config: JwksConfig;
+  /** Public JWK shape, derived from the private key. Includes `kid`, `alg`, `use=sig`. */
+  readonly publicJwk: JWK;
+}
+
+export const BFF_SIGNING_KEY = 'BFF_SIGNING_KEY';
+
+/**
+ * Builds the {@link BffSigningKey} from the validated env config.
+ * Async because `jose.exportJWK` is async on Node — it operates on
+ * Web Crypto's KeyObject under the hood.
+ */
+export async function buildBffSigningKey(config: JwksConfig): Promise<BffSigningKey> {
+  // `exportJWK` accepts either a public KeyObject or a CryptoKey.
+  // We have the private one — derive the public first so the
+  // exported JWK has no private material.
+  const publicKey = createPublicKey(config.privateKey);
+  const baseJwk = await exportJWK(publicKey);
+  const publicJwk: JWK = {
+    ...baseJwk,
+    kid: config.kid,
+    alg: config.alg,
+    use: 'sig',
+  };
+  return { config, publicJwk };
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/downstream.module.ts

@@ -1,44 +1,57 @@
 import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { assertJwksConfig } from '../config/check-jwks-config';
 import { assertOboCacheEncryptionKey } from '../config/check-obo-cache-encryption-key';
 import { AuthModule } from '../auth/auth.module';
 import { RedisModule } from '../redis/redis.module';
+import { BFF_SIGNING_KEY, buildBffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
 import { DownstreamTokenCache } from './downstream-token-cache.service';
 import { OBO_CACHE_KEY } from './downstream.token';
+import { JwksController } from './jwks.controller';
 import { OboStrategy } from './strategies/obo.strategy';
+import { SignedAssertionStrategy } from './strategies/signed-assertion.strategy';
 
 /**
  * `DownstreamModule` — primitives for the downstream-API framework
  * per [ADR-0014](../../../../docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md).
  *
- * **Scope (v1).** This module ships the auth-strategy primitives
- * and the OBO token cache only. The framework around them
- * (`DownstreamApiClientFactory`, cockatiel resilience stack,
- * audience pre-check, error translation table, OTel custom spans)
- * lands alongside the first concrete consumer per the ADR's own
- * guidance:
+ * **Scope (v1).** This module ships the auth-strategy primitives,
+ * the OBO token cache, and the BFF's JWKS publishing endpoint. The
+ * framework around them (`DownstreamApiClientFactory`, cockatiel
+ * resilience stack, audience pre-check, error translation, OTel
+ * custom spans) lands alongside the first concrete consumer per the
+ * ADR's own guidance:
  *
  *   "Mitigated by writing the framework code only in the same
  *    iteration as the first concrete integration; until then, this
  *    ADR plus mock-driven unit tests on the strategies (OBO,
  *    signed-assertion) keep the design honest."
  *
- * Until then `OboStrategy` is unused at runtime — exported here so
- * its unit tests can construct it through DI and the future
- * integration only has to import this module.
+ * What's exposed for the future integration to consume:
  *
- * Imports `AuthModule` to consume `MSAL_CLIENT`, `RedisModule` for
- * the shared `ioredis` client.
+ *   - `OboStrategy` (Entra-protected downstreams).
+ *   - `SignedAssertionStrategy` (non-Entra downstreams).
+ *   - `DownstreamTokenCache` (used internally by OboStrategy; exposed
+ *     in case a future consumer wants direct cache management).
+ *
+ * Imports `AuthModule` for the shared `MSAL_CLIENT`, `RedisModule`
+ * for the shared `ioredis` client.
  */
 @Module({
   imports: [AuthModule, RedisModule],
+  controllers: [JwksController],
   providers: [
     {
       provide: OBO_CACHE_KEY,
       useFactory: () => assertOboCacheEncryptionKey(),
     },
+    {
+      provide: BFF_SIGNING_KEY,
+      useFactory: () => buildBffSigningKey(assertJwksConfig()),
+    },
     DownstreamTokenCache,
     OboStrategy,
+    SignedAssertionStrategy,
   ],
-  exports: [OboStrategy, DownstreamTokenCache],
+  exports: [OboStrategy, SignedAssertionStrategy, DownstreamTokenCache],
 })
 export class DownstreamModule {}

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/jwks.controller.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import { createPrivateKey, generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto';
+import { buildBffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
+import { JwksController } from './jwks.controller';
+
+async function makeController() {
+  const { privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
+  const key = await buildBffSigningKey({
+    privateKey: createPrivateKey(privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' })),
+    kid: 'bff-2026-05',
+    alg: 'RS256',
+  });
+  return { controller: new JwksController(key), key };
+}
+
+describe('JwksController', () => {
+  it('returns a JWKS-shaped object with the single configured public key', async () => {
+    const { controller, key } = await makeController();
+    const res = controller.jwks();
+    expect(Array.isArray(res.keys)).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.keys).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(res.keys[0]).toBe(key.publicJwk);
+  });
+
+  it('the served key carries the kid + alg + use=sig the publisher derived', async () => {
+    const { controller } = await makeController();
+    const [jwk] = controller.jwks().keys;
+    expect(jwk?.kid).toBe('bff-2026-05');
+    expect(jwk?.alg).toBe('RS256');
+    expect(jwk?.use).toBe('sig');
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT leak private RSA components (d/p/q/dp/dq/qi) over the wire', async () => {
+    const { controller } = await makeController();
+    const [jwk] = controller.jwks().keys;
+    expect(jwk?.d).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(jwk?.p).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(jwk?.q).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(jwk?.dp).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(jwk?.dq).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(jwk?.qi).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/jwks.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { Controller, Get, Inject } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { JWK } from 'jose';
+import { BFF_SIGNING_KEY, type BffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
+
+/**
+ * `GET /.well-known/jwks.json` — publishes the BFF's public key
+ * material so downstream services can verify `X-User-Assertion`
+ * JWTs minted by `SignedAssertionStrategy` per
+ * [ADR-0014](../../../../docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md)
+ * §"Service strategy".
+ *
+ * v1 publishes a single key. When the rotation chantier ships,
+ * `keys` will hold both the current and the previous public JWKs
+ * so a downstream that cached the previous one keeps verifying
+ * during the cut-over window. The shape is JWKS-canonical so
+ * existing JOSE clients on the downstream side just point at the
+ * URL and work.
+ *
+ * **Routing** — the controller's `@Controller('.well-known/jwks.json')`
+ * combined with `main.ts`'s `setGlobalPrefix('api', { exclude:
+ * [/^\.well-known/] })` lands the route at the bare-root path
+ * (`/.well-known/jwks.json`), which is where the well-known URI
+ * convention places it (RFC 8615).
+ *
+ * **No auth / no CSRF.** Public by design — the JWKS is the
+ * downstream's verification anchor; gating it would defeat the
+ * purpose. The double-submit CSRF middleware already exempts GET
+ * methods so the route comes out clean.
+ */
+@Controller('.well-known/jwks.json')
+export class JwksController {
+  constructor(@Inject(BFF_SIGNING_KEY) private readonly key: BffSigningKey) {}
+
+  @Get()
+  jwks(): { keys: readonly JWK[] } {
+    return { keys: [this.key.publicJwk] };
+  }
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/strategies/signed-assertion.strategy.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+import { createPrivateKey, createPublicKey, generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto';
+import { jwtVerify } from 'jose';
+import { buildBffSigningKey, type BffSigningKey } from '../bff-signing-key';
+import { SignedAssertionStrategy } from './signed-assertion.strategy';
+
+async function makeStrategy(): Promise<{ strategy: SignedAssertionStrategy; key: BffSigningKey }> {
+  const { privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
+  const key = await buildBffSigningKey({
+    privateKey: createPrivateKey(privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' })),
+    kid: 'bff-2026-05',
+    alg: 'RS256',
+  });
+  return { strategy: new SignedAssertionStrategy(key), key };
+}
+
+const INPUT = {
+  actorIdHash: 'hash(jane)',
+  audience: 'workforce' as const,
+  downstreamName: 'svc-cms',
+  claims: { tenant: 't', roles: ['editor'] },
+  traceId: 'abc123def456',
+};
+
+describe('SignedAssertionStrategy.sign', () => {
+  it('mints a JWT verifiable against the BFF public key with the expected claim set', async () => {
+    const { strategy, key } = await makeStrategy();
+    const jwt = await strategy.sign(INPUT);
+
+    const { payload, protectedHeader } = await jwtVerify(
+      jwt,
+      createPublicKey(key.config.privateKey),
+      { issuer: 'portal-bff', audience: 'svc-cms' },
+    );
+
+    expect(protectedHeader.alg).toBe('RS256');
+    expect(protectedHeader.kid).toBe('bff-2026-05');
+    expect(payload.iss).toBe('portal-bff');
+    expect(payload.sub).toBe('hash(jane)');
+    expect(payload.aud).toBe('svc-cms');
+    // Non-standard claims per ADR-0014 §"Service strategy":
+    expect(payload['audience']).toBe('workforce');
+    expect(payload['claims']).toEqual({ tenant: 't', roles: ['editor'] });
+    expect(payload['trace_id']).toBe('abc123def456');
+  });
+
+  it('sets exp = iat + 60 seconds (matches ADR-0014 §"Service strategy")', async () => {
+    const { strategy, key } = await makeStrategy();
+    const jwt = await strategy.sign(INPUT);
+    const { payload } = await jwtVerify(jwt, createPublicKey(key.config.privateKey), {
+      issuer: 'portal-bff',
+      audience: 'svc-cms',
+    });
+    expect(typeof payload.iat).toBe('number');
+    expect(typeof payload.exp).toBe('number');
+    expect((payload.exp as number) - (payload.iat as number)).toBe(60);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects with audience mismatch when the downstream verifies against the wrong aud', async () => {
+    const { strategy, key } = await makeStrategy();
+    const jwt = await strategy.sign(INPUT);
+    await expect(
+      jwtVerify(jwt, createPublicKey(key.config.privateKey), {
+        issuer: 'portal-bff',
+        audience: 'svc-other', // wrong target
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/"aud"/i);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects when verified against a different public key (signature mismatch)', async () => {
+    const { strategy } = await makeStrategy();
+    const jwt = await strategy.sign(INPUT);
+    // Forge a different RSA keypair — its public half cannot
+    // verify the JWT signed under the original private key.
+    const { privateKey: otherPriv } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
+    const otherPub = createPublicKey(otherPriv.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }));
+    await expect(
+      jwtVerify(jwt, otherPub, { issuer: 'portal-bff', audience: 'svc-cms' }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/signature/i);
+  });
+
+  it('mints a different JWT for each call (no caching, fresh iat each time)', async () => {
+    const { strategy } = await makeStrategy();
+    const a = await strategy.sign(INPUT);
+    // jose's setIssuedAt uses second-resolution; wait > 1s to make
+    // sure iat differs deterministically. Faking time keeps the
+    // test fast.
+    jest.useFakeTimers().setSystemTime(Date.now() + 2000);
+    try {
+      const b = await strategy.sign(INPUT);
+      expect(a).not.toBe(b);
+    } finally {
+      jest.useRealTimers();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('signs against the EC P-256 key with alg=ES256', async () => {
+    const { privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'prime256v1' });
+    const key = await buildBffSigningKey({
+      privateKey: createPrivateKey(privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' })),
+      kid: 'ec-kid',
+      alg: 'ES256',
+    });
+    const strategy = new SignedAssertionStrategy(key);
+    const jwt = await strategy.sign(INPUT);
+    const { protectedHeader } = await jwtVerify(jwt, createPublicKey(key.config.privateKey), {
+      issuer: 'portal-bff',
+      audience: 'svc-cms',
+    });
+    expect(protectedHeader.alg).toBe('ES256');
+    expect(protectedHeader.kid).toBe('ec-kid');
+  });
+});

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/strategies/signed-assertion.strategy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { SignJWT } from 'jose';
+import { BFF_SIGNING_KEY, type BffSigningKey } from '../bff-signing-key';
+
+/**
+ * Caller-supplied inputs. The future framework integration fills
+ * these from the active request:
+ *
+ *   - `actorIdHash` — salted user-id hash from the audit module.
+ *     Goes into `sub`. Never the raw user id (per ADR-0013 §"Salted
+ *     hash actor_id"); never a user-controlled value.
+ *   - `audience` — workforce or customer per ADR-0008. Drives
+ *     downstream audience-aware authorization without forcing the
+ *     downstream to call back to the IdP.
+ *   - `downstreamName` — stable downstream identifier; becomes the
+ *     JWT `aud`. The downstream rejects assertions not targeted at
+ *     itself, so a leaked assertion can't be replayed at a
+ *     different service.
+ *   - `claims` — curated subset of session claims the downstream
+ *     needs to make its authorization decision. The framework is
+ *     responsible for the curation (allow-list, never the full
+ *     session); this strategy treats it as opaque structured data.
+ *   - `traceId` — W3C trace id of the originating request. Lets the
+ *     downstream emit its own logs/audit referencing the same trace
+ *     so a correlation across BFF + downstream is one-step.
+ */
+export interface SignedAssertionInput {
+  readonly actorIdHash: string;
+  readonly audience: 'workforce' | 'customer';
+  readonly downstreamName: string;
+  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+  readonly traceId: string;
+}
+
+/** Issuer value baked into every assertion. Stable string, no env override. */
+const ISSUER = 'portal-bff';
+
+/** Assertion lifetime — 60 s per ADR-0014 §"Service strategy". */
+const ASSERTION_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
+
+/**
+ * `SignedAssertionStrategy` per
+ * [ADR-0014](../../../../docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md)
+ * §"Service strategy (non-Entra downstreams)".
+ *
+ * Mints a short-lived JWT that propagates user identity to a
+ * downstream without giving the downstream a token it could replay
+ * against Entra. The downstream verifies the signature against the
+ * BFF's `/.well-known/jwks.json` and makes its own authZ decision
+ * from the claims.
+ *
+ * Claim shape per the ADR:
+ *
+ * ```
+ * {
+ *   "iss": "portal-bff",
+ *   "sub": "<actor_id_hash>",
+ *   "aud": "<downstream-name>",
+ *   "audience": "workforce" | "customer",
+ *   "claims": { … },
+ *   "exp": <now + 60s>,
+ *   "iat": <now>,
+ *   "trace_id": "<W3C trace id>"
+ * }
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Each call mints a fresh JWT — there's no caching. At ~60 s TTL
+ * the savings would be negligible and a cache would create a window
+ * where a replayed assertion lingers past its useful life. The
+ * signing operation itself is cheap (a few hundred microseconds for
+ * RS256 with a 3 KB key).
+ */
+@Injectable()
+export class SignedAssertionStrategy {
+  constructor(@Inject(BFF_SIGNING_KEY) private readonly key: BffSigningKey) {}
+
+  async sign(input: SignedAssertionInput): Promise<string> {
+    const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    return await new SignJWT({
+      audience: input.audience,
+      claims: input.claims,
+      trace_id: input.traceId,
+    })
+      .setProtectedHeader({ alg: this.key.config.alg, kid: this.key.config.kid })
+      .setIssuer(ISSUER)
+      .setSubject(input.actorIdHash)
+      .setAudience(input.downstreamName)
+      .setIssuedAt(now)
+      .setExpirationTime(now + ASSERTION_TTL_SECONDS)
+      .sign(this.key.config.privateKey);
+  }
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // OpenTelemetry auto-instrumentations and is silently un-traced.
 import './observability/tracing';
 
-import { ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { RequestMethod, ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { NestFactory } from '@nestjs/core';
 import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser';
 import helmet from 'helmet';
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { AppModule } from './app/app.module';
 import { readCorsAllowlist } from './config/check-cors-allowlist';
 import { assertDatabaseUrl } from './config/check-database-url';
 import { assertEntraConfig } from './config/check-entra-config';
+import { assertJwksConfig } from './config/check-jwks-config';
 import { assertRedisConfig } from './config/check-redis-config';
 import { assertLogUserIdSalt } from './config/check-log-user-id-salt';
 import { assertOboCacheEncryptionKey } from './config/check-obo-cache-encryption-key';
@@ -64,6 +65,13 @@ assertLogUserIdSalt();
 // identical value as defense in depth against copy-paste accidents.
 assertOboCacheEncryptionKey();
 
+// BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH + BFF_JWKS_KID — signing material for
+// the ADR-0014 signed-assertion strategy. Reads the PEM file once
+// here so a missing / unreadable / weak key fails the boot rather
+// than the first downstream call. The same parsed config is
+// re-used by `DownstreamModule`'s factory at app construction.
+assertJwksConfig();
+
 async function bootstrap() {
   // `bufferLogs: true` holds early-bootstrap log lines until the
   // Pino-based Logger is wired in below, so we don't lose anything
@@ -183,7 +191,14 @@ async function bootstrap() {
   app.use(app.get<RequestHandler>(CSRF_MIDDLEWARE));
 
   const globalPrefix = 'api';
-  app.setGlobalPrefix(globalPrefix);
+  // `/.well-known/*` is reserved by RFC 8615 for bare-root metadata
+  // endpoints. The BFF's JWKS controller (ADR-0014 signed-assertion
+  // strategy) lives at `/.well-known/jwks.json` so downstream
+  // services pointing at the standard location find it. Excluding
+  // the prefix lets Nest's router resolve the route at the root.
+  app.setGlobalPrefix(globalPrefix, {
+    exclude: [{ path: '.well-known/jwks.json', method: RequestMethod.GET }],
+  });
   const port = process.env['PORT'] ?? 3000;
   await app.listen(port);
 

package.json

@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@
     "express-session": "^1.19.0",
     "helmet": "^8.1.0",
     "ioredis": "^5.10.1",
+    "jose": "^6.2.3",
     "lucide-angular": "^1.0.0",
     "nestjs-cls": "^6.2.0",
     "nestjs-pino": "^4.6.1",

pnpm-lock.yaml

@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ importers:
       ioredis:
         specifier: ^5.10.1
         version: 5.10.1
+      jose:
+        specifier: ^6.2.3
+        version: 6.2.3
       lucide-angular:
         specifier: ^1.0.0
         version: 1.0.0(@angular/common@21.2.12(@angular/core@21.2.12(@angular/compiler@21.2.12)(rxjs@7.8.2)(zone.js@0.16.2))(rxjs@7.8.2))(@angular/core@21.2.12(@angular/compiler@21.2.12)(rxjs@7.8.2)(zone.js@0.16.2))