apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/downstream.module.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { RedisModule } from '../redis/redis.module';
 import { BFF_SIGNING_KEY, buildBffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
 import { DownstreamTokenCache } from './downstream-token-cache.service';
 import { OBO_CACHE_KEY } from './downstream.token';
-import { JwksController } from './jwks.controller';
+import { JwksPublisher } from './jwks.publisher';
 import { OboStrategy } from './strategies/obo.strategy';
 import { SignedAssertionStrategy } from './strategies/signed-assertion.strategy';
 
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ import { SignedAssertionStrategy } from './strategies/signed-assertion.strategy'
  */
 @Module({
   imports: [AuthModule, RedisModule],
-  controllers: [JwksController],
   providers: [
     {
       provide: OBO_CACHE_KEY,
@@ -51,7 +50,13 @@ import { SignedAssertionStrategy } from './strategies/signed-assertion.strategy'
     DownstreamTokenCache,
     OboStrategy,
     SignedAssertionStrategy,
+    JwksPublisher,
   ],
-  exports: [OboStrategy, SignedAssertionStrategy, DownstreamTokenCache],
+  // `JwksPublisher` is exported so `main.ts` can resolve it from the
+  // Nest container and wire it into an Express-direct `GET
+  // /.well-known/jwks.json` handler. The handler bypasses Nest's
+  // path-to-regexp-based router because v8 doesn't cleanly route a
+  // leading-dot segment to a bare-root URL.
+  exports: [OboStrategy, SignedAssertionStrategy, DownstreamTokenCache, JwksPublisher],
 })
 export class DownstreamModule {}

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/jwks.controller.ts

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-import { Controller, Get, Inject } from '@nestjs/common';
-import type { JWK } from 'jose';
-import { BFF_SIGNING_KEY, type BffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
-
-/**
- * `GET /.well-known/jwks.json` — publishes the BFF's public key
- * material so downstream services can verify `X-User-Assertion`
- * JWTs minted by `SignedAssertionStrategy` per
- * [ADR-0014](../../../../docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md)
- * §"Service strategy".
- *
- * v1 publishes a single key. When the rotation chantier ships,
- * `keys` will hold both the current and the previous public JWKs
- * so a downstream that cached the previous one keeps verifying
- * during the cut-over window. The shape is JWKS-canonical so
- * existing JOSE clients on the downstream side just point at the
- * URL and work.
- *
- * **Routing** — the controller's `@Controller('.well-known/jwks.json')`
- * combined with `main.ts`'s `setGlobalPrefix('api', { exclude:
- * [/^\.well-known/] })` lands the route at the bare-root path
- * (`/.well-known/jwks.json`), which is where the well-known URI
- * convention places it (RFC 8615).
- *
- * **No auth / no CSRF.** Public by design — the JWKS is the
- * downstream's verification anchor; gating it would defeat the
- * purpose. The double-submit CSRF middleware already exempts GET
- * methods so the route comes out clean.
- */
-@Controller('.well-known/jwks.json')
-export class JwksController {
-  constructor(@Inject(BFF_SIGNING_KEY) private readonly key: BffSigningKey) {}
-
-  @Get()
-  jwks(): { keys: readonly JWK[] } {
-    return { keys: [this.key.publicJwk] };
-  }
-}

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/jwks.publisher.spec.ts

@@ -1,37 +1,37 @@
 import { createPrivateKey, generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto';
 import { buildBffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
-import { JwksController } from './jwks.controller';
+import { JwksPublisher } from './jwks.publisher';
 
-async function makeController() {
+async function makePublisher() {
   const { privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
   const key = await buildBffSigningKey({
     privateKey: createPrivateKey(privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' })),
     kid: 'bff-2026-05',
     alg: 'RS256',
   });
-  return { controller: new JwksController(key), key };
+  return { publisher: new JwksPublisher(key), key };
 }
 
-describe('JwksController', () => {
+describe('JwksPublisher', () => {
   it('returns a JWKS-shaped object with the single configured public key', async () => {
-    const { controller, key } = await makeController();
-    const res = controller.jwks();
+    const { publisher, key } = await makePublisher();
+    const res = publisher.jwks();
     expect(Array.isArray(res.keys)).toBe(true);
     expect(res.keys).toHaveLength(1);
     expect(res.keys[0]).toBe(key.publicJwk);
   });
 
-  it('the served key carries the kid + alg + use=sig the publisher derived', async () => {
-    const { controller } = await makeController();
-    const [jwk] = controller.jwks().keys;
+  it('the served key carries the kid + alg + use=sig the signing-key derived', async () => {
+    const { publisher } = await makePublisher();
+    const [jwk] = publisher.jwks().keys;
     expect(jwk?.kid).toBe('bff-2026-05');
     expect(jwk?.alg).toBe('RS256');
     expect(jwk?.use).toBe('sig');
   });
 
   it('does NOT leak private RSA components (d/p/q/dp/dq/qi) over the wire', async () => {
-    const { controller } = await makeController();
-    const [jwk] = controller.jwks().keys;
+    const { publisher } = await makePublisher();
+    const [jwk] = publisher.jwks().keys;
     expect(jwk?.d).toBeUndefined();
     expect(jwk?.p).toBeUndefined();
     expect(jwk?.q).toBeUndefined();

apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/jwks.publisher.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { JWK } from 'jose';
+import { BFF_SIGNING_KEY, type BffSigningKey } from './bff-signing-key';
+
+/**
+ * Builds the JWKS payload served at `/.well-known/jwks.json` per
+ * [ADR-0014](../../../../docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md)
+ * §"Service strategy". v1 returns a single public key; the rotation
+ * chantier extends `keys` to a window of currently-valid material
+ * so a downstream that cached a previous JWK keeps verifying during
+ * cut-over.
+ *
+ * **Why a service, not a `@Controller`.** Path-to-regexp v8 (used
+ * by Nest 11) parses controller paths through a grammar that does
+ * not cleanly route a leading-dot segment like `.well-known/...`
+ * to a bare-root URL — the original `@Controller('.well-known/jwks.json')`
+ * + `setGlobalPrefix('api', { exclude: ... })` combination landed
+ * the route at neither `/api/.well-known/jwks.json` nor
+ * `/.well-known/jwks.json`. We sidestep the whole class of bug by
+ * registering the JWKS handler at the Express layer in `main.ts`
+ * (before Nest's router) and letting this service produce the
+ * payload. The Nest DI graph still owns the BFF signing key — only
+ * the route wiring lives outside.
+ *
+ * **No auth / no CSRF.** Public by design — the JWKS is the
+ * downstream's verification anchor; gating it would defeat the
+ * purpose. The CSRF middleware exempts GET, and the route is
+ * mounted ahead of the rate limiter so a hammered JWKS endpoint
+ * can't lock the rest of the BFF out — discovery endpoints are
+ * meant to be polled.
+ */
+@Injectable()
+export class JwksPublisher {
+  constructor(@Inject(BFF_SIGNING_KEY) private readonly key: BffSigningKey) {}
+
+  jwks(): { keys: readonly JWK[] } {
+    return { keys: [this.key.publicJwk] };
+  }
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // OpenTelemetry auto-instrumentations and is silently un-traced.
 import './observability/tracing';
 
-import { RequestMethod, ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { NestFactory } from '@nestjs/core';
 import cookieParser from 'cookie-parser';
 import helmet from 'helmet';
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { assertSessionSecret } from './config/check-session-secret';
 import { createRateLimitMiddleware, readRateLimitConfig } from './security/rate-limit.middleware';
 import { CSRF_MIDDLEWARE } from './security/security.token';
 import { StructuredErrorFilter } from './security/structured-error.filter';
+import { JwksPublisher } from './downstream/jwks.publisher';
 import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from 'express';
 import {
   ADMIN_SESSION_MIDDLEWARE,
@@ -191,14 +192,27 @@ async function bootstrap() {
   app.use(app.get<RequestHandler>(CSRF_MIDDLEWARE));
 
   const globalPrefix = 'api';
-  // `/.well-known/*` is reserved by RFC 8615 for bare-root metadata
-  // endpoints. The BFF's JWKS controller (ADR-0014 signed-assertion
-  // strategy) lives at `/.well-known/jwks.json` so downstream
-  // services pointing at the standard location find it. Excluding
-  // the prefix lets Nest's router resolve the route at the root.
-  app.setGlobalPrefix(globalPrefix, {
-    exclude: [{ path: '.well-known/jwks.json', method: RequestMethod.GET }],
+  app.setGlobalPrefix(globalPrefix);
+
+  // JWKS endpoint at the RFC 8615 bare-root path. Wired at the
+  // Express layer rather than as a Nest `@Controller` because
+  // path-to-regexp v8 (Nest 11's router) does not cleanly route a
+  // leading-dot segment like `.well-known/jwks.json` to a bare-root
+  // URL — the previous Nest-side attempt with `setGlobalPrefix`
+  // `exclude` landed the route at neither `/api/.well-known/jwks.json`
+  // nor `/.well-known/jwks.json` (both 404'd). Express's own
+  // routing accepts the leading dot verbatim, and the Nest DI
+  // container still owns the underlying `JwksPublisher` service.
+  //
+  // Public by design (no session, no CSRF) — the JWKS is the
+  // downstream's verification anchor; gating it defeats the
+  // purpose. Mounted before `app.listen()` so the route is live
+  // by the time the BFF reports ready.
+  const jwksPublisher = app.get(JwksPublisher);
+  app.getHttpAdapter().get('/.well-known/jwks.json', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
+    res.json(jwksPublisher.jwks());
   });
+
   const port = process.env['PORT'] ?? 3000;
   await app.listen(port);