Julien Gautier
ed6cca499d
mount express-session + connect-redis at bootstrap on top of the
shared ioredis client. the full json payload is encrypted with
aes-256-gcm before it reaches redis; envelope is versioned
(v1.<iv>.<tag>.<ciphertext>, base64url) so the algorithm or key
derivation can rotate without a flag-day re-encryption.
scope is intentionally infrastructure-only — middleware mounted,
req.session available downstream, cookie set on first write,
encryption-at-rest active. populating req.session.user from
/auth/callback, /me, /auth/logout, and the absolute-timeout
interceptor land in follow-ups.
notable shape choices captured in ADR-0010 (amended here):
- encryption at rest applies to the whole payload, not just a tokens
sub-field. the session also carries pii claims (oid, tid,
preferred_username) — encrypting the envelope removes the need to
classify fields one by one and costs essentially the same.
- connect-redis v9 was rewritten for node-redis v4 and dropped
ioredis. rather than swap the whole bff to node-redis, a small
adapter shapes the six commands connect-redis actually calls
(get / set with {expiration:{type:'EX',value}} / expire / del /
mGet / scanIterator) to look like node-redis. the rest of the
bff stays on a single shared ioredis client.
session id: crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
cookie name: __Host-portal_session in production, portal_session in
dev (the __Host- prefix mandates Secure which dev http can't
provide). httpOnly + sameSite=lax + path=/. resave:false,
saveUninitialized:false, rolling:true; cookie maxAge follows
SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (default 1800).
env: SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY is mandatory (32 bytes after base64url
decode); rejected at boot via a new assertSessionEncryptionKey()
mirroring the other pre-flight validators. SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
and SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS are optional with adr-aligned
defaults (1800 / 43200).
139 lines
7.0 KiB
Bash
139 lines
7.0 KiB
Bash
# BFF environment template
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# Copy to .env (which is gitignored) and fill in actual values for local development.
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# Production values are managed by the platform's secret manager (see future infrastructure ADR).
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# Postgres connection (per ADR-0006)
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# Local dev default: dockerised Postgres on port 5432, schema 'public'.
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# Username / password / db must match infra/local/.env (POSTGRES_USER /
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# POSTGRES_PASSWORD / POSTGRES_DB) — those are the source of truth,
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# this is the BFF view of the same connection.
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#
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# IMPORTANT — URL encoding. The password is part of the URL userinfo
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# segment, so any of these characters must be URL-encoded:
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# @ → %40 # → %23 : → %3A / → %2F ? → %3F
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# % → %25 & → %26 = → %3D + → %2B ; → %3B
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# i.e. if your POSTGRES_PASSWORD is "p@ss#1", DATABASE_URL must read
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# "postgresql://portal:p%40ss%231@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
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# The BFF aborts at boot with a clear error if it detects an unencoded
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# special character (see apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-database-url.ts).
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DATABASE_URL="postgresql://portal:portal_dev_change_me@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
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# Observability (per ADR-0012)
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# All OTEL_* keys are honoured by the OpenTelemetry SDK directly — see
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# apps/portal-bff/src/observability/tracing.ts for the bootstrap.
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# Pino log level: 'info' in prod, 'debug' in dev (default if unset).
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LOG_LEVEL=debug
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OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=portal-bff
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OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION=dev
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# Default endpoint targets the Collector provisioned in
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# infra/local/dev.compose.yml. The /v1/traces suffix is required by
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# the HTTP/Protobuf transport.
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OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4318/v1/traces
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OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL=http/protobuf
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# v1 samples 100 % at the app; tail sampling is delegated to the
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# Collector (per ADR-0012). Override only for spike investigations.
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OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER=always_on
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# Identity / Entra ID app registration (per ADR-0008 / ADR-0009)
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# Values come from the project's Entra application registration in the
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# Azure Admin Center → App registrations → APF Portal. The four
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# *_INSTANCE_URL / *_TENANT_ID / *_CLIENT_ID / *_CLIENT_SECRET keys
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# are mandatory; the BFF refuses to boot without them (see
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# apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts).
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#
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# ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL is the Microsoft login endpoint — usually
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# https://login.microsoftonline.com/. The authority used by MSAL is
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# `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}${ENTRA_TENANT_ID}` for single-tenant flows,
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# or `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}organizations` / `common` for multi-tenant
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# (per ADR-0008's dual-audience design). v1 uses the tenant-scoped
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# authority; the multi-tenant switch lands when External ID activation
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# is needed.
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#
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# ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET is the high-value secret of this set. Never
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# commit a real value. Production manages it via the deploy platform's
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# secret manager (future infrastructure ADR).
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ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL=https://login.microsoftonline.com/
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ENTRA_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
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ENTRA_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
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ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=replace_with_real_value
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# Redirect URIs registered in Entra alongside the same client id. Both
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# `/auth/callback` and `/auth/logout` paths are mounted by the BFF
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# once the OIDC routes land in a subsequent PR.
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ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback
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ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4200/
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# Cookie signing secret (per ADR-0009 §"Cookies"). Used to sign the
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# transient pre-auth cookie that carries the OIDC `state` + PKCE
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# verifier between the /auth/login redirect and the /auth/callback
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# round-trip, and (once ADR-0010 ships) the session cookie's
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# integrity layer. Mandatory at boot — the BFF aborts if missing or
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# obviously weak (less than 32 base64-decoded bytes ≈ 256 bits of
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# entropy). Generate a fresh value per environment:
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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SESSION_SECRET=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# Redis connection (per ADR-0010). The BFF uses `ioredis` for session
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# storage (today: just the connection; the express-session +
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# connect-redis middleware lands in the next PR).
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#
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# REDIS_URL — full URL form including auth. Must match `infra/local/.env`
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# (REDIS_PASSWORD + REDIS_PORT) when running against the local Compose
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# stack. Production wiring uses Sentinel (REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS +
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME — future-vars block below) and TLS; the current
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# variable supports the dev single-instance shape only.
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REDIS_URL=redis://default:redis_dev_change_me@localhost:6379/0
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# Session payload encryption (per ADR-0010 §"At-rest encryption").
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# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting the session JSON that connect-redis
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# writes to Redis, so a Redis dump never carries raw user identities
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# / future tokens / claims in plaintext. **Distinct** from
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# SESSION_SECRET, which only signs the cookie's session-id — never
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# reuse one for the other. Mandatory at boot.
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# Session timeouts (per ADR-0010). Both optional with sensible
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# defaults; override only when staging / prod policy diverges.
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# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — sliding window. Each request
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# extends the cookie's `expires` by this many seconds.
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# Default 1800 (30 min).
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# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — hard ceiling. Session is
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# destroyed regardless of activity at this age.
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# Default 43200 (12 h).
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# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=1800
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# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=43200
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# Future env vars introduced by upcoming phases / ADRs:
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#
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# Auth flow (ADR-0009) — additional keys wired as the routes land:
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# ENTRA_CLIENT_CERT_PATH (alternative to ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET)
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# ENTRA_ACCEPTED_TENANT_IDS (CSV; restricts which tenants can sign in
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# in the multi-tenant phase — empty means
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# "only ENTRA_TENANT_ID is accepted")
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#
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# Sessions (ADR-0010) — additional keys wired as the layers land:
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS (CSV `host:port,host:port,…`; prod HA)
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME (master name in Sentinel; prod HA)
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# REDIS_TLS ('true' in prod)
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#
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# MFA (ADR-0011):
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# MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS (default 600)
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#
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# Observability — additional keys to be wired as features land:
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# LOG_USER_ID_SALT (per-environment salt for hashing user_id
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# in CLS context — needed once auth lands)
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#
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# Audit trail (ADR-0013):
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# AUDIT_DATABASE_URL (separate creds, role 'audit_writer')
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# AUDIT_ARCHIVER_DATABASE_URL (role 'audit_archiver', for the retention purge job)
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# AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS (default 365)
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#
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# Downstream API access (ADR-0014):
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# OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (32-byte base64, distinct from SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY)
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# BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH
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# BFF_JWKS_KID
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# <SERVICE>_API_BASE_URL (per integrated downstream)
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# <SERVICE>_TIMEOUT_MS (optional, defaults to 5000)
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