Julien Gautier
7aa2683750
Reduce the apps-profile mode switch (localhost / VSCode tunnel vs
HTTPS hostname) to a single file: infra/local/.env. Today the
toggle requires editing both apps/portal-bff/.env (the four
ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI) and infra/local/.env (NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION).
After this PR, apps/portal-bff/.env stays at its localhost defaults
regardless — native nx serve outside Docker keeps working untouched
— and infra/local/.env carries the entire mode-specific block.
- dev.compose.yml portal-bff service: the four ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI
are added to the environment: block with
${VAR:-localhost-default} interpolation. Compose's environment:
wins over env_file:, so the BFF inside the container sees the
override when set and the localhost default otherwise.
- infra/local/.env.example: the trailing Apps block is restructured
as two clearly-labelled profiles (Mode A — Localhost / DEFAULT;
Mode B — HTTPS hostname, commented template).
- apps/portal-bff/.env.example: comment block above the redirect URI
defaults now explains that they stay at localhost regardless and
points at the compose-level override in infra/local/.env.
- infra/README.md: new "Switching between dev modes — localhost vs
hostname" subsection between "Dockerised app dev mode" and
"HTTPS dev-server setup" with a comparison table and per-mode
step-by-step.
261 lines
13 KiB
Bash
261 lines
13 KiB
Bash
# BFF environment template
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# Copy to .env (which is gitignored) and fill in actual values for local development.
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# Production values are managed by the platform's secret manager (see future infrastructure ADR).
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# Postgres connection (per ADR-0006)
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# Local dev default: dockerised Postgres on port 5432, schema 'public'.
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# Username / password / db must match infra/local/.env (POSTGRES_USER /
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# POSTGRES_PASSWORD / POSTGRES_DB) — those are the source of truth,
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# this is the BFF view of the same connection.
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#
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# IMPORTANT — URL encoding. The password is part of the URL userinfo
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# segment, so any of these characters must be URL-encoded:
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# @ → %40 # → %23 : → %3A / → %2F ? → %3F
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# % → %25 & → %26 = → %3D + → %2B ; → %3B
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# i.e. if your POSTGRES_PASSWORD is "p@ss#1", DATABASE_URL must read
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# "postgresql://portal:p%40ss%231@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
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# The BFF aborts at boot with a clear error if it detects an unencoded
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# special character (see apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-database-url.ts).
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DATABASE_URL="postgresql://portal:portal_dev_change_me@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
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# Observability (per ADR-0012)
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# All OTEL_* keys are honoured by the OpenTelemetry SDK directly — see
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# apps/portal-bff/src/observability/tracing.ts for the bootstrap.
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# Pino log level: 'info' in prod, 'debug' in dev (default if unset).
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LOG_LEVEL=debug
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OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=portal-bff
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OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION=dev
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# Default endpoint targets the Collector provisioned in
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# infra/local/dev.compose.yml. The /v1/traces suffix is required by
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# the HTTP/Protobuf transport.
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OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4318/v1/traces
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OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL=http/protobuf
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# v1 samples 100 % at the app; tail sampling is delegated to the
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# Collector (per ADR-0012). Override only for spike investigations.
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OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER=always_on
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# Identity / Entra ID app registration (per ADR-0008 / ADR-0009)
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# Values come from the project's Entra application registration in the
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# Azure Admin Center → App registrations → APF Portal. The four
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# *_INSTANCE_URL / *_TENANT_ID / *_CLIENT_ID / *_CLIENT_SECRET keys
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# are mandatory; the BFF refuses to boot without them (see
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# apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts).
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#
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# ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL is the Microsoft login endpoint — usually
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# https://login.microsoftonline.com/. The authority used by MSAL is
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# `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}${ENTRA_TENANT_ID}` for single-tenant flows,
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# or `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}organizations` / `common` for multi-tenant
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# (per ADR-0008's dual-audience design). v1 uses the tenant-scoped
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# authority; the multi-tenant switch lands when External ID activation
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# is needed.
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#
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# ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET is the high-value secret of this set. Never
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# commit a real value. Production manages it via the deploy platform's
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# secret manager (future infrastructure ADR).
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ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL=https://login.microsoftonline.com/
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ENTRA_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
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ENTRA_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
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ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=replace_with_real_value
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# Redirect URIs registered in Entra alongside the same client id.
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# User portal — `/api/auth/callback` is the OIDC return URL; the
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# post-logout URL is where Entra sends the browser after RP-initiated
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# logout (typically the SPA landing page).
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#
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# The four `localhost` values below are the **WSL-native default** —
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# browser and BFF on the same host, `http://localhost:*` redirect
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# URIs (which Entra accepts as the only exception to its HTTPS rule).
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# Leave them here in this file regardless of how the docker `apps`
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# profile is being run.
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#
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# For the ADR-0030 dockerised `apps` profile accessed via a
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# hostname (e.g. `https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4200/`), do NOT
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# edit these values — instead override them at the compose level
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# from `infra/local/.env`. Compose's `environment:` block on the
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# `portal-bff` service interpolates each of these four vars at
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# parse time and wins over `env_file:`, so the BFF in the container
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# sees the hostname URIs while native `nx serve` keeps reading
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# this file's localhost defaults. See
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# `infra/README.md` → "Switching between dev modes" for the
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# two-mode toggle.
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ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback
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ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4200/
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# Admin portal — distinct callback per ADR-0020 §"Sessions — distinct
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# from `portal-shell`" so Entra routes the response to the matching
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# session. Both `ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI` and `ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI`
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# must be registered in the same Entra app registration's
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# "Redirect URIs" list. Distinct post-logout URL routes admin
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# sign-outs to the admin SPA's landing page (port 4300 in dev — see
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# apps/portal-admin/project.json `serve.options.port`).
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ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/admin/auth/callback
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ENTRA_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4300/
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# Authorization model (per ADR-0025). Points at the JSON file that
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# maps tenant-private Entra security-group GUIDs to the closed
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# catalogue of `apf-role-*` slugs. The BFF loads it at boot through
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# `EntraGroupToRoleResolver` (libs/shared/auth). Unset means the
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# resolver runs empty — sign-in still succeeds but every user gets
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# zero functional roles (no `apf-role-*` UI). A WARN is logged at
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# boot so an operator can spot the missing config. See
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# `infra/test-tenant.entra.example.json` for the schema; copy to
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# `infra/test-tenant.entra.json` (gitignored) and fill in the real
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# GUIDs from the Entra admin centre.
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ENTRA_GROUP_MAP_PATH=infra/test-tenant.entra.json
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# Test-tenant per-persona Entra `oid` map (per ADR-0026 PR 2).
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# Consumed by `apps/portal-bff/prisma/seed.ts` to upsert Person +
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# User + UserScope rows for the 19 test personas. Distinct from
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# `ENTRA_GROUP_MAP_PATH` which points at the 24 functional-role
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# *group* guids. Unset means `prisma db seed` skips the test-tenant
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# section (no Person/User/UserScope rows seeded — lazy creation at
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# first sign-in still works). See
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# `infra/test-tenant.personas.example.json` for the schema.
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TEST_TENANT_PERSONAS_PATH=infra/test-tenant.personas.json
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# Cookie signing secret (per ADR-0009 §"Cookies"). Used to sign the
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# transient pre-auth cookie that carries the OIDC `state` + PKCE
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# verifier between the /auth/login redirect and the /auth/callback
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# round-trip, and (once ADR-0010 ships) the session cookie's
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# integrity layer. Mandatory at boot — the BFF aborts if missing or
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# obviously weak (less than 32 base64-decoded bytes ≈ 256 bits of
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# entropy). Generate a fresh value per environment:
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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SESSION_SECRET=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# Redis connection (per ADR-0010). The BFF uses `ioredis` for session
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# storage (today: just the connection; the express-session +
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# connect-redis middleware lands in the next PR).
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#
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# REDIS_URL — full URL form including auth. Must match `infra/local/.env`
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# (REDIS_PASSWORD + REDIS_PORT) when running against the local Compose
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# stack. Production wiring uses Sentinel (REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS +
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME — future-vars block below) and TLS; the current
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# variable supports the dev single-instance shape only.
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REDIS_URL=redis://default:redis_dev_change_me@localhost:6379/0
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# Session payload encryption (per ADR-0010 §"At-rest encryption").
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# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting the session JSON that connect-redis
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# writes to Redis, so a Redis dump never carries raw user identities
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# / future tokens / claims in plaintext. **Distinct** from
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# SESSION_SECRET, which only signs the cookie's session-id — never
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# reuse one for the other. Mandatory at boot.
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# OBO downstream-token cache encryption (per ADR-0014 §"Token cache
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# (for OBO)"). AES-256-GCM key for encrypting Entra-issued downstream
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# tokens cached in Redis under `obo:{actor_id_hash}:{resource}`.
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# **Dedicated key** — must differ from SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY so a
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# leak of one does not cascade into the other. The boot validator
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# refuses an identical value. Mandatory at boot.
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# BFF JWKS signing material (per ADR-0014 §"Service strategy"). The
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# BFF mints short-lived `X-User-Assertion` JWTs to propagate user
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# identity to non-Entra downstreams; downstreams verify the signature
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# against `/.well-known/jwks.json`. Both values are mandatory at boot.
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#
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# Generate an RSA private key:
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# mkdir -p apps/portal-bff/.secrets && \
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# openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \
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# -out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
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#
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# RSA-2048 is the minimum the validator accepts; 3072 is the
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# default recommendation. EC P-256 / P-384 also accepted.
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BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
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# Stable key id published in the JWKS + emitted in the JWT `kid`
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# header. URL-safe charset only ([A-Za-z0-9_-], 4–128 chars). Bump
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# this when rotating to a new key.
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BFF_JWKS_KID=bff-2026-05
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# Session timeouts (per ADR-0010). Both optional with sensible
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# defaults; override only when staging / prod policy diverges.
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# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — sliding window. Each request
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# extends the cookie's `expires` by this many seconds.
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# Default 1800 (30 min).
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# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — hard ceiling. Session is
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# destroyed regardless of activity at this age.
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# Default 43200 (12 h).
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# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=1800
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# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=43200
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# Per-environment salt used to pseudonymise the user id before it
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# lands in audit rows (per ADR-0013 §"Schema") and in Pino app log
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# lines (per ADR-0012 §"User id hashing"). Same value must be used
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# on both sides so audit and app logs join on `actor_id_hash`.
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#
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# Rotation invalidates the join key — old rows / log lines can no
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# longer be correlated with the new hash. Treat as long-lived per
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# environment. Mandatory at boot.
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#
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# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
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LOG_USER_ID_SALT=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url
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# CORS allowlist (per ADR-0009 §"CORS"). Comma-separated list of
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# origins (scheme://host[:port]) allowed to call the BFF with
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# credentials. The BFF refuses to start without this — silently
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# defaulting to localhost is the classic "works in dev, breaks in
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# prod" trap.
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#
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# Local dev: portal-shell on :4200 and portal-admin on :4300 — both
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# call the BFF with credentials. Source of truth for the ports:
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# `apps/<app>/project.json` `serve.options.port`.
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CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:4200,http://localhost:4300
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# Rate limiting (per ADR-0015 §"DoS mitigation"). Both optional
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# with conservative defaults; override per environment when traffic
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# patterns demand it. The BFF keys buckets by session id when the
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# request is authenticated, by remote IP otherwise — rotating
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# sessions doesn't dodge the limit.
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# RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE — general bucket. Default 120 (~ 2 r/s).
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# RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_PER_MINUTE — stricter bucket on /auth/login and
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# /auth/callback. Default 10/min, to
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# slow brute-force / replay loops
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# without inconveniencing legit users.
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# RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=120
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# RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_PER_MINUTE=10
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# Future env vars introduced by upcoming phases / ADRs:
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#
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# Auth flow (ADR-0009) — additional keys wired as the routes land:
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# ENTRA_CLIENT_CERT_PATH (alternative to ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET)
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# ENTRA_ACCEPTED_TENANT_IDS (CSV; restricts which tenants can sign in
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# in the multi-tenant phase — empty means
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# "only ENTRA_TENANT_ID is accepted")
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#
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# Sessions (ADR-0010) — additional keys wired as the layers land:
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS (CSV `host:port,host:port,…`; prod HA)
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# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME (master name in Sentinel; prod HA)
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# REDIS_TLS ('true' in prod)
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#
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# MFA (ADR-0011):
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# MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS (default 600)
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#
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# Audit trail (ADR-0013):
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# AUDIT_DATABASE_URL (separate creds, role 'audit_writer')
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# AUDIT_ARCHIVER_DATABASE_URL (role 'audit_archiver', for the retention purge job)
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# AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS (default 365)
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#
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# Downstream API access (ADR-0014):
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# OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY — wired
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# BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH — wired
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# BFF_JWKS_KID — wired
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# <SERVICE>_API_BASE_URL (per integrated downstream — lands with the first integration)
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# <SERVICE>_TIMEOUT_MS (optional, defaults to 5000 — lands with the first integration)
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# AI service relay (ADR-0024) — the BFF dials apf-ai-service over
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# native gRPC HTTP/2 and bridges chat streams to SSE for the SPA.
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# apf-ai-service runs from its own repo (../apf-ai-service); use
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# that repo's docker-compose.yml to bring it up locally, then point
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# AI_SERVICE_GRPC_ENDPOINT here at the host-published port. No
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# JWT/auth on the wire in v1 — the Principal travels in the proto
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# body (per ADR-0024 §"Sub-decision 4 — POC unsigned principal").
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AI_SERVICE_GRPC_ENDPOINT=localhost:8080
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AI_SERVICE_CLIENT_ID=apf-portal-dev
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# Set to 'true' in preprod/prod (h2 + TLS via the edge proxy);
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# 'false' in dev for h2c against the local apf-ai-service.
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AI_SERVICE_GRPC_TLS=false
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