Julien Gautier
44deeab35d
The bootstrap SQL ended with:
GRANT audit_owner, audit_writer, audit_reader, audit_archiver TO portal;
which assumed POSTGRES_USER is `portal`. The compose file (and the
.env.example) document POSTGRES_USER as overridable — anyone who
changed it to something else (e.g. `apf_portal`) hit:
ERROR: role "portal" does not exist
psql: .../01-init.sql:48: ERROR: role "portal" does not exist
`current_user` resolves at script execution to whoever is running
the init SQL — that is, the superuser Postgres just created from
POSTGRES_USER, regardless of its name. Use it instead of hard-coding
`portal`.
Recovery for anyone hit by the original bug:
cd infra/local
docker compose -f dev.compose.yml down -v # wipes the
# half-initialised
# postgres-data volume
docker compose -f dev.compose.yml up -d # bootstrap re-runs
# cleanly
58 lines
2.7 KiB
SQL
58 lines
2.7 KiB
SQL
-- Bootstrap SQL for local-dev Postgres, applied on FIRST boot only
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-- (Postgres image runs files in /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d once,
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-- when the data volume is empty).
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--
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-- Implements the role + schema layout from ADR-0013 (Audit trail,
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-- separated Postgres schema, append-only by Postgres role grants).
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-- Production deployment manifests (future infrastructure ADR) will
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-- replicate the same layout with real service accounts; in dev the
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-- default `portal` user (created automatically from POSTGRES_USER)
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-- is the schema owner, and the audit roles are granted to it for
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-- testing role-based access patterns locally.
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------- Audit roles
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-- NOLOGIN: these are permission containers, not login users. The BFF
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-- connects as a login user that has been GRANTed the role.
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CREATE ROLE audit_owner NOLOGIN;
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CREATE ROLE audit_writer NOLOGIN;
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CREATE ROLE audit_reader NOLOGIN;
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CREATE ROLE audit_archiver NOLOGIN;
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------- Audit schema
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-- Owned by audit_owner so DEFAULT PRIVILEGES below take effect for
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-- every future table created under the schema (Prisma migration etc.).
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CREATE SCHEMA audit AUTHORIZATION audit_owner;
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GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA audit TO audit_writer, audit_reader, audit_archiver;
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------- Append-only contract
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-- ADR-0013 §"Append-only by role grants":
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-- audit_writer → INSERT only
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-- audit_reader → SELECT only
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-- audit_archiver → DELETE only (used to prune past retention)
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-- nobody → UPDATE, TRUNCATE
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ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE audit_owner IN SCHEMA audit
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GRANT INSERT ON TABLES TO audit_writer;
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ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE audit_owner IN SCHEMA audit
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GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO audit_reader;
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ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE audit_owner IN SCHEMA audit
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GRANT DELETE ON TABLES TO audit_archiver;
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-- ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dev convenience
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-- The dev superuser (created by Postgres from POSTGRES_USER, default
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-- `portal` but overridable in infra/local/.env) bypasses these grants
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-- anyway, but granting the audit roles explicitly lets us test
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-- role-based access with `SET ROLE audit_writer;` etc. from a psql
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-- session against the dev DB.
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--
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-- `current_user` resolves at script execution time to whoever is
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-- running the init SQL — i.e. the superuser created from POSTGRES_USER,
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-- whatever its name happens to be. Hard-coding `portal` here was
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-- wrong: it broke any setup where the contributor changed
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-- POSTGRES_USER in their .env.
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--
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-- Production never grants all four roles to one user.
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GRANT audit_owner, audit_writer, audit_reader, audit_archiver TO current_user;
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