apf_portal/apps/portal-bff/.env.example

# BFF environment template
# Copy to .env (which is gitignored) and fill in actual values for local development.
# Production values are managed by the platform's secret manager (see future infrastructure ADR).

# Postgres connection (per ADR-0006)
# Local dev default: dockerised Postgres on port 5432, schema 'public'.
# Username / password / db must match infra/local/.env (POSTGRES_USER /
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD / POSTGRES_DB) — those are the source of truth,
# this is the BFF view of the same connection.
#
# IMPORTANT — URL encoding. The password is part of the URL userinfo
# segment, so any of these characters must be URL-encoded:
#     @ → %40    # → %23    : → %3A    / → %2F    ? → %3F
#     % → %25    & → %26    = → %3D    + → %2B    ; → %3B
# i.e. if your POSTGRES_PASSWORD is "p@ss#1", DATABASE_URL must read
# "postgresql://portal:p%40ss%231@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"
# The BFF aborts at boot with a clear error if it detects an unencoded
# special character (see apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-database-url.ts).
DATABASE_URL="postgresql://portal:portal_dev_change_me@localhost:5432/portal_dev?schema=public"

# Observability (per ADR-0012)
# All OTEL_* keys are honoured by the OpenTelemetry SDK directly — see
# apps/portal-bff/src/observability/tracing.ts for the bootstrap.
# Pino log level: 'info' in prod, 'debug' in dev (default if unset).
LOG_LEVEL=debug
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=portal-bff
OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION=dev
# Default endpoint targets the Collector provisioned in
# infra/local/dev.compose.yml. The /v1/traces suffix is required by
# the HTTP/Protobuf transport.
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4318/v1/traces
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL=http/protobuf
# v1 samples 100 % at the app; tail sampling is delegated to the
# Collector (per ADR-0012). Override only for spike investigations.
OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER=always_on

# Identity / Entra ID app registration (per ADR-0008 / ADR-0009)
# Values come from the project's Entra application registration in the
# Azure Admin Center → App registrations → APF Portal. The four
# *_INSTANCE_URL / *_TENANT_ID / *_CLIENT_ID / *_CLIENT_SECRET keys
# are mandatory; the BFF refuses to boot without them (see
# apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts).
#
# ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL is the Microsoft login endpoint — usually
# https://login.microsoftonline.com/. The authority used by MSAL is
# `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}${ENTRA_TENANT_ID}` for single-tenant flows,
# or `${ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL}organizations` / `common` for multi-tenant
# (per ADR-0008's dual-audience design). v1 uses the tenant-scoped
# authority; the multi-tenant switch lands when External ID activation
# is needed.
#
# ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET is the high-value secret of this set. Never
# commit a real value. Production manages it via the deploy platform's
# secret manager (future infrastructure ADR).
ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL=https://login.microsoftonline.com/
ENTRA_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
ENTRA_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=replace_with_real_value
# Redirect URIs registered in Entra alongside the same client id.
# User portal — `/api/auth/callback` is the OIDC return URL; the
# post-logout URL is where Entra sends the browser after RP-initiated
# logout (typically the SPA landing page).
ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback
ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4200/
# Admin portal — distinct callback per ADR-0020 §"Sessions — distinct
# from `portal-shell`" so Entra routes the response to the matching
# session. Both `ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI` and `ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI`
# must be registered in the same Entra app registration's
# "Redirect URIs" list. Distinct post-logout URL routes admin
# sign-outs to the admin SPA's landing page (port 4300 in dev — see
# apps/portal-admin/project.json `serve.options.port`).
ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/admin/auth/callback
ENTRA_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4300/

# Authorization model (per ADR-0025). Points at the JSON file that
# maps tenant-private Entra security-group GUIDs to the closed
# catalogue of `apf-role-*` slugs. The BFF loads it at boot through
# `EntraGroupToRoleResolver` (libs/shared/auth). Unset means the
# resolver runs empty — sign-in still succeeds but every user gets
# zero functional roles (no `apf-role-*` UI). A WARN is logged at
# boot so an operator can spot the missing config. See
# `infra/test-tenant.entra.example.json` for the schema; copy to
# `infra/test-tenant.entra.json` (gitignored) and fill in the real
# GUIDs from the Entra admin centre.
ENTRA_GROUP_MAP_PATH=infra/test-tenant.entra.json

# Cookie signing secret (per ADR-0009 §"Cookies"). Used to sign the
# transient pre-auth cookie that carries the OIDC `state` + PKCE
# verifier between the /auth/login redirect and the /auth/callback
# round-trip, and (once ADR-0010 ships) the session cookie's
# integrity layer. Mandatory at boot — the BFF aborts if missing or
# obviously weak (less than 32 base64-decoded bytes ≈ 256 bits of
# entropy). Generate a fresh value per environment:
#
#   node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
SESSION_SECRET=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url

# Redis connection (per ADR-0010). The BFF uses `ioredis` for session
# storage (today: just the connection; the express-session +
# connect-redis middleware lands in the next PR).
#
# REDIS_URL — full URL form including auth. Must match `infra/local/.env`
# (REDIS_PASSWORD + REDIS_PORT) when running against the local Compose
# stack. Production wiring uses Sentinel (REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS +
# REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME — future-vars block below) and TLS; the current
# variable supports the dev single-instance shape only.
REDIS_URL=redis://default:redis_dev_change_me@localhost:6379/0

# Session payload encryption (per ADR-0010 §"At-rest encryption").
# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting the session JSON that connect-redis
# writes to Redis, so a Redis dump never carries raw user identities
# / future tokens / claims in plaintext. **Distinct** from
# SESSION_SECRET, which only signs the cookie's session-id — never
# reuse one for the other. Mandatory at boot.
#
#   node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url

# OBO downstream-token cache encryption (per ADR-0014 §"Token cache
# (for OBO)"). AES-256-GCM key for encrypting Entra-issued downstream
# tokens cached in Redis under `obo:{actor_id_hash}:{resource}`.
# **Dedicated key** — must differ from SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY so a
# leak of one does not cascade into the other. The boot validator
# refuses an identical value. Mandatory at boot.
#
#   node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url

# BFF JWKS signing material (per ADR-0014 §"Service strategy"). The
# BFF mints short-lived `X-User-Assertion` JWTs to propagate user
# identity to non-Entra downstreams; downstreams verify the signature
# against `/.well-known/jwks.json`. Both values are mandatory at boot.
#
# Generate an RSA private key:
#   mkdir -p apps/portal-bff/.secrets && \
#   openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \
#     -out apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
#
# RSA-2048 is the minimum the validator accepts; 3072 is the
# default recommendation. EC P-256 / P-384 also accepted.
BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=apps/portal-bff/.secrets/jwks.pem
# Stable key id published in the JWKS + emitted in the JWT `kid`
# header. URL-safe charset only ([A-Za-z0-9_-], 4–128 chars). Bump
# this when rotating to a new key.
BFF_JWKS_KID=bff-2026-05

# Session timeouts (per ADR-0010). Both optional with sensible
# defaults; override only when staging / prod policy diverges.
#   SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — sliding window. Each request
#       extends the cookie's `expires` by this many seconds.
#       Default 1800 (30 min).
#   SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS — hard ceiling. Session is
#       destroyed regardless of activity at this age.
#       Default 43200 (12 h).
# SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=1800
# SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=43200

# Per-environment salt used to pseudonymise the user id before it
# lands in audit rows (per ADR-0013 §"Schema") and in Pino app log
# lines (per ADR-0012 §"User id hashing"). Same value must be used
# on both sides so audit and app logs join on `actor_id_hash`.
#
# Rotation invalidates the join key — old rows / log lines can no
# longer be correlated with the new hash. Treat as long-lived per
# environment. Mandatory at boot.
#
#   node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"
LOG_USER_ID_SALT=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url

# CORS allowlist (per ADR-0009 §"CORS"). Comma-separated list of
# origins (scheme://host[:port]) allowed to call the BFF with
# credentials. The BFF refuses to start without this — silently
# defaulting to localhost is the classic "works in dev, breaks in
# prod" trap.
#
# Local dev: portal-shell on :4200 and portal-admin on :4300 — both
# call the BFF with credentials. Source of truth for the ports:
# `apps/<app>/project.json` `serve.options.port`.
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:4200,http://localhost:4300

# Rate limiting (per ADR-0015 §"DoS mitigation"). Both optional
# with conservative defaults; override per environment when traffic
# patterns demand it. The BFF keys buckets by session id when the
# request is authenticated, by remote IP otherwise — rotating
# sessions doesn't dodge the limit.
#   RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE      — general bucket. Default 120 (~ 2 r/s).
#   RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_PER_MINUTE — stricter bucket on /auth/login and
#                                /auth/callback. Default 10/min, to
#                                slow brute-force / replay loops
#                                without inconveniencing legit users.
# RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=120
# RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_PER_MINUTE=10

# Future env vars introduced by upcoming phases / ADRs:
#
# Auth flow (ADR-0009) — additional keys wired as the routes land:
#   ENTRA_CLIENT_CERT_PATH          (alternative to ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET)
#   ENTRA_ACCEPTED_TENANT_IDS       (CSV; restricts which tenants can sign in
#                                    in the multi-tenant phase — empty means
#                                    "only ENTRA_TENANT_ID is accepted")
#
# Sessions (ADR-0010) — additional keys wired as the layers land:
#   REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS            (CSV `host:port,host:port,…`; prod HA)
#   REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME             (master name in Sentinel; prod HA)
#   REDIS_TLS                       ('true' in prod)
#
# MFA (ADR-0011):
#   MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS           (default 600)
#
# Audit trail (ADR-0013):
#   AUDIT_DATABASE_URL              (separate creds, role 'audit_writer')
#   AUDIT_ARCHIVER_DATABASE_URL     (role 'audit_archiver', for the retention purge job)
#   AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS            (default 365)
#
# Downstream API access (ADR-0014):
#   OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY        — wired
#   BFF_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH       — wired
#   BFF_JWKS_KID                    — wired
#   <SERVICE>_API_BASE_URL          (per integrated downstream — lands with the first integration)
#   <SERVICE>_TIMEOUT_MS            (optional, defaults to 5000 — lands with the first integration)

# AI service relay (ADR-0024) — the BFF dials apf-ai-service over
# native gRPC HTTP/2 and bridges chat streams to SSE for the SPA.
# apf-ai-service runs from its own repo (../apf-ai-service); use
# that repo's docker-compose.yml to bring it up locally, then point
# AI_SERVICE_GRPC_ENDPOINT here at the host-published port. No
# JWT/auth on the wire in v1 — the Principal travels in the proto
# body (per ADR-0024 §"Sub-decision 4 — POC unsigned principal").
AI_SERVICE_GRPC_ENDPOINT=localhost:8080
AI_SERVICE_CLIENT_ID=apf-portal-dev
# Set to 'true' in preprod/prod (h2 + TLS via the edge proxy);
# 'false' in dev for h2c against the local apf-ai-service.
AI_SERVICE_GRPC_TLS=false