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apf_portal/apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.service.spec.ts
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julien 0464ce3ac8
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feat(portal-bff): close the auth loop — callback persists session, /me, RP-initiated /logout (#112)
## Summary

Closes the OIDC loop end-to-end on the BFF side:

- `/auth/callback` now writes the resolved `AuthenticatedUser` into `req.session.user` and waits for `req.session.save()` before redirecting, so the SPA reaches the landing page with a populated session.
- `GET /auth/me` returns the curated public view of the session user (`oid`, `tid`, `username`, `displayName`) or `401 {"error": "unauthenticated"}`. `amr` and other internal claims stay server-side.
- `GET /auth/logout` destroys the BFF session (Redis `DEL`), clears the session cookie, and 302s to Entra's `/oauth2/v2.0/logout` so the IdP-side session is killed too — RP-initiated logout per ADR-0009.

Scope intentionally stops here: the absolute-timeout interceptor (12 h hard ceiling) and the `user_sessions:{userId}` secondary index land in dedicated follow-ups.

## Notable choices

**`req.session.save()` is awaited before the redirect.** Express-session writes to its store on response end; emitting the 302 closes the response before `connect-redis` finishes the write, so without an explicit await the browser can race the SPA into requesting `/me` against a missing key. Awaiting `save()` is the documented fix.

**Logout via `GET`.** Matches `/login` (also `GET`) and keeps the UX a plain anchor / top-level navigation. The CSRF surface is mitigated by `SameSite=Lax` on the session cookie — cross-site subresource requests (`<img src>`, `fetch`) don't carry it. A dedicated CSRF middleware lands with phase-2 security; if we want POST-only logout earlier, easy follow-up.

**`/me` strips `amr`.** The session payload mirrors `AuthenticatedUser` (used internally by the future `@RequireMfa()` guard, ADR-0011), but the SPA only ever needs the curated subset. Mapping happens in the controller — no leak by default.

**Logout URL skips `id_token_hint`.** ADR-0009 mentions it for single-account logout UX, but v1 doesn't persist the `id_token` in the session yet (the encrypted `tokens` blob lands with downstream API support per ADR-0014). Without `id_token_hint`, Entra shows an account picker — the conservative default until token persistence ships.

**Cookie name in logout.** Uses `sessionCookieName()` from `session/session-cookie.ts` so logout clears the same cookie the middleware sets — `__Host-portal_session` in prod, `portal_session` in dev.

## Out of scope (next PRs)

- Absolute-timeout interceptor (12 h hard ceiling, ADR-0010).
- `user_sessions:{userId}` secondary index for admin "logout everywhere".
- Persisting the `id_token` / `access_token` / `refresh_token` blob in the encrypted session (ADR-0014 dependency).
- CSRF middleware (phase-2 security).
- Renaming `ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI` if we want a distinct post-login redirect target — for now both flows land on the same SPA URL.

## Test plan

- [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` → **110/110 pass** (was 99 before this PR; +11 specs across `auth.controller.spec.ts` and `auth.service.spec.ts`).
- [x] `pnpm nx lint portal-bff` → clean.
- [x] `pnpm nx build portal-bff` → webpack compiled successfully.
- [x] Prettier-clean on all touched files.
- [ ] Manual end-to-end smoke test:
  - [ ] `/api/auth/login` → Entra → back at `/api/auth/callback` → session cookie set, redirect to SPA.
  - [ ] `/api/auth/me` → 200 JSON when authenticated, 401 when anonymous.
  - [ ] `/api/auth/logout` → Redis key gone, cookie cleared, lands at SPA via Entra logout.

---------

Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #112
2026-05-12 19:46:38 +02:00

198 lines
7.7 KiB
TypeScript

import type { AuthenticationResult, ConfidentialClientApplication } from '@azure/msal-node';
import { PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_TTL_MS } from './auth.cookie';
import { AuthCodeFlowException } from './auth.errors';
import { AuthService, type PreAuthPayload } from './auth.service';
import type { EntraConfig } from './entra-config.token';
const ENTRA: EntraConfig = {
instanceUrl: 'https://login.microsoftonline.com/',
tenantId: 'aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee',
clientId: '11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555',
clientSecret: 's3cret',
redirectUri: 'http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback',
postLogoutRedirectUri: 'http://localhost:4200/',
authority: 'https://login.microsoftonline.com/aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee',
};
interface ServiceFixture {
service: AuthService;
getAuthCodeUrl: jest.Mock;
acquireTokenByCode: jest.Mock;
}
function makeService(overrides?: { acquireTokenByCode?: jest.Mock }): ServiceFixture {
const getAuthCodeUrl = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('https://entra.example/authorize?…');
const acquireTokenByCode =
overrides?.acquireTokenByCode ??
jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeAuthResult({ amr: ['pwd', 'mfa'] }));
const msalStub = {
getAuthCodeUrl,
acquireTokenByCode,
} as unknown as ConfidentialClientApplication;
return { service: new AuthService(msalStub, ENTRA), getAuthCodeUrl, acquireTokenByCode };
}
function makeAuthResult(
claims: Partial<{
amr: string[];
oid: string;
tid: string;
name: string;
preferred_username: string;
}>,
): AuthenticationResult {
return {
idTokenClaims: {
oid: claims.oid ?? 'user-oid',
tid: claims.tid ?? ENTRA.tenantId,
name: claims.name ?? 'Jane Doe',
preferred_username: claims.preferred_username ?? 'jane.doe@apf.example',
amr: claims.amr ?? ['pwd', 'mfa'],
},
account: { username: 'jane.doe@apf.example', name: 'Jane Doe' },
} as unknown as AuthenticationResult;
}
const PRE_AUTH_OK: PreAuthPayload = {
state: 'state-nonce',
codeVerifier: 'verifier-secret',
createdAt: 1_000_000,
};
describe('AuthService.beginAuthCodeFlow', () => {
it('builds the auth URL with the configured redirect, OIDC scopes, S256 challenge', async () => {
const { service, getAuthCodeUrl } = makeService();
await service.beginAuthCodeFlow();
expect(getAuthCodeUrl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const arg = getAuthCodeUrl.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(arg['redirectUri']).toBe(ENTRA.redirectUri);
expect(arg['scopes']).toEqual(['openid', 'profile', 'email']);
expect(arg['codeChallengeMethod']).toBe('S256');
expect(typeof arg['codeChallenge']).toBe('string');
expect(typeof arg['state']).toBe('string');
});
it('returns the pre-auth payload with state + codeVerifier matching what MSAL was called with', async () => {
const { service, getAuthCodeUrl } = makeService();
const { preAuthPayload } = await service.beginAuthCodeFlow();
const arg = getAuthCodeUrl.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(preAuthPayload.state).toBe(arg['state']);
expect(preAuthPayload.codeVerifier).not.toBe(arg['codeChallenge']);
expect(preAuthPayload.createdAt).toBeLessThanOrEqual(Date.now());
});
it('generates a fresh state + verifier on every call', async () => {
const { service } = makeService();
const a = await service.beginAuthCodeFlow();
const b = await service.beginAuthCodeFlow();
expect(a.preAuthPayload.state).not.toBe(b.preAuthPayload.state);
expect(a.preAuthPayload.codeVerifier).not.toBe(b.preAuthPayload.codeVerifier);
});
});
describe('AuthService.completeAuthCodeFlow', () => {
it('returns the authenticated user on the happy path', async () => {
const { service, acquireTokenByCode } = makeService();
const user = await service.completeAuthCodeFlow(
'auth-code',
PRE_AUTH_OK.state,
PRE_AUTH_OK,
PRE_AUTH_OK.createdAt + 1_000,
);
expect(acquireTokenByCode).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
code: 'auth-code',
codeVerifier: PRE_AUTH_OK.codeVerifier,
redirectUri: ENTRA.redirectUri,
scopes: ['openid', 'profile', 'email'],
});
expect(user).toEqual({
oid: 'user-oid',
tid: ENTRA.tenantId,
username: 'jane.doe@apf.example',
displayName: 'Jane Doe',
amr: ['pwd', 'mfa'],
});
});
it('throws state-mismatch when the query state differs from the cookie state', async () => {
const { service } = makeService();
await expect(
service.completeAuthCodeFlow('code', 'other-state', PRE_AUTH_OK, PRE_AUTH_OK.createdAt),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ failure: { kind: 'state-mismatch' } });
});
it('throws flow-expired when the cookie is older than the TTL', async () => {
const { service } = makeService();
const now = PRE_AUTH_OK.createdAt + PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_TTL_MS + 1;
await expect(
service.completeAuthCodeFlow('code', PRE_AUTH_OK.state, PRE_AUTH_OK, now),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ failure: { kind: 'flow-expired' } });
});
it('returns the user even when the ID token has no `amr` claim (Entra optional)', async () => {
const acquireTokenByCode = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeAuthResult({ amr: [] }));
const { service } = makeService({ acquireTokenByCode });
const user = await service.completeAuthCodeFlow(
'code',
PRE_AUTH_OK.state,
PRE_AUTH_OK,
PRE_AUTH_OK.createdAt,
);
// `amr` flows through as an empty array; MFA enforcement is
// Conditional Access's job per ADR-0011, not this code path.
expect(user.amr).toEqual([]);
expect(user.oid).toBe('user-oid');
});
it('throws token-exchange-failed when MSAL throws', async () => {
const acquireTokenByCode = jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('AADSTS70008'));
const { service } = makeService({ acquireTokenByCode });
await expect(
service.completeAuthCodeFlow('code', PRE_AUTH_OK.state, PRE_AUTH_OK, PRE_AUTH_OK.createdAt),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
failure: { kind: 'token-exchange-failed', cause: 'AADSTS70008' },
});
});
it('throws token-exchange-failed when MSAL returns null', async () => {
const acquireTokenByCode = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null);
const { service } = makeService({ acquireTokenByCode });
await expect(
service.completeAuthCodeFlow('code', PRE_AUTH_OK.state, PRE_AUTH_OK, PRE_AUTH_OK.createdAt),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(AuthCodeFlowException);
});
it('throws token-exchange-failed when oid claim is missing', async () => {
const acquireTokenByCode = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
idTokenClaims: { tid: ENTRA.tenantId, amr: ['mfa'] },
account: { username: '', name: '' },
} as unknown as AuthenticationResult);
const { service } = makeService({ acquireTokenByCode });
await expect(
service.completeAuthCodeFlow('code', PRE_AUTH_OK.state, PRE_AUTH_OK, PRE_AUTH_OK.createdAt),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
failure: { kind: 'token-exchange-failed', cause: /oid/ },
});
});
});
describe('AuthService.buildLogoutUrl', () => {
it('targets the v2.0 logout endpoint on the configured authority', () => {
const { service } = makeService();
const url = new URL(service.buildLogoutUrl());
expect(url.origin + url.pathname).toBe(`${ENTRA.authority}/oauth2/v2.0/logout`);
});
it('includes the post_logout_redirect_uri query param', () => {
const { service } = makeService();
const url = new URL(service.buildLogoutUrl());
expect(url.searchParams.get('post_logout_redirect_uri')).toBe(ENTRA.postLogoutRedirectUri);
});
it('does not pass id_token_hint (v1 does not persist the id_token yet)', () => {
const { service } = makeService();
const url = new URL(service.buildLogoutUrl());
expect(url.searchParams.has('id_token_hint')).toBe(false);
});
});