# `infra/` Infrastructure-as-code artefacts for the project. Separate from application code and from documentation: this folder contains the recipes and configs that the team and ops use to stand up running infrastructure (CI runners, future local-dev databases, future on-prem deploy assets). | Subject | File / Folder | ADR / Reference | | -------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Self-hosted CI runners (Gitea Actions) | [`ci-runners.compose.yml`](ci-runners.compose.yml) | [ADR-0015 §"Runners"](../docs/decisions/0015-cicd-gitea-actions.md) | | Shared `act_runner` configuration | [`runner-config.yaml`](runner-config.yaml) | [ADR-0015 §"Runners"](../docs/decisions/0015-cicd-gitea-actions.md) | | CI runners convenience script | [`ci-runners.sh`](ci-runners.sh) | See "Convenience script" below | | Runtime state of the runners | `data/` (git-ignored after `.gitignore`) | — | | Env-vars template for the runners | `.env.example` (`.env` is git-ignored) | — | | Local-dev runtime stack | [`local/`](local/) | [ADR-0006](../docs/decisions/0006-persistence-postgresql-prisma.md), [ADR-0010](../docs/decisions/0010-session-management-redis.md), [ADR-0012](../docs/decisions/0012-observability-pino-opentelemetry.md), [ADR-0013](../docs/decisions/0013-audit-trail-separated-postgres-append-only.md) | | Entra group GUID → role slug map | [`test-tenant.entra.example.json`](test-tenant.entra.example.json) (`*-tenant.entra.json` is git-ignored) | [ADR-0025 §"Sources of truth — Entra-side configuration"](../docs/decisions/0025-authorization-model-privileges-roles-scopes.md) | Future folders / files that will land here as the corresponding ADRs ship: - **`prod/`** — On-prem deploy manifests (HA Postgres, Redis Sentinel, OTel collector + backend, secret manager). Triggered by the on-prem infrastructure ADR (phase 3b). --- ## CI runners — `ci-runners.compose.yml` Three self-hosted [`act_runner`](https://gitea.com/gitea/act_runner) instances, registered with the project's Gitea organisation, labelled `self-hosted` + `on-prem` (the labels referenced by every job in `.gitea/workflows/*`). Three matches the floor recommended by [ADR-0015 §"Runners"](../docs/decisions/0015-cicd-gitea-actions.md) — one runner is enough to validate the pipeline; two leave no slack; three keep CI flowing if one runner is down for upgrade or maintenance. ### First-time registration ```bash cd infra/ # 1. Generate a registration token in Gitea. # Site Administration → Actions → Runners → "Create new Runner" # (or, for org-scoped runners: Organisation Settings → Actions → Runners). # The token is one-time and short-lived; don't lose it. # 2. Configure .env (which is git-ignored). cp .env.example .env $EDITOR .env # Set GITEA_INSTANCE_URL (https, no trailing slash) and # GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN. # 3. Pre-pull the job images and bring the runners up. The script # chains the two — see "Job image pinning and pre-pull" below # for the rationale. ./ci-runners.sh up --prepull # 4. Verify in Gitea: the three runners appear as online with the # self-hosted, on-prem labels. If a runner doesn't come online, # inspect its logs: ./ci-runners.sh logs runner-1 ``` After the first successful boot, each runner stores its credentials under `data/runner-N/.runner`. The registration token is no longer needed and **should be removed** from `.env`. Subsequent restarts (`./ci-runners.sh restart …` or direct `docker compose restart …`) authenticate from the persisted credential. ### Convenience script — `ci-runners.sh` [`ci-runners.sh`](ci-runners.sh) is a thin wrapper around `docker compose -f ci-runners.compose.yml ...` for the everyday verbs. Two reasons to use it: 1. **Hides the compose-file path** on every command. `./ci-runners.sh up` instead of `docker compose -f ci-runners.compose.yml up -d`. 2. **`rotate` automates the rolling restart** the "Operational tips" below recommend: runner-1 → wait → runner-2 → wait → runner-3, so the CI pipeline always has at least N-1 runners online while you push a config change. | Command | Effect | | ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | `./ci-runners.sh up` | Bring the three runner containers up | | `./ci-runners.sh up --prepull` | Pre-pull the job images (`act-22.04` + `:full-22.04`) on the host first | | `./ci-runners.sh down` | Stop and remove the containers (preserves `data/runner-N/.runner` credentials) | | `./ci-runners.sh restart ` | Restart one runner | | `./ci-runners.sh rotate` | Rolling restart of every runner with a 15 s pause between each | | `./ci-runners.sh status` | `docker compose ps` for the runner services | | `./ci-runners.sh logs [runner]` | Follow logs (one runner or all of them) | | `./ci-runners.sh pull-images` | Pre-pull / refresh the job images (idempotent) | Anything not matching one of the named verbs is passed through to `docker compose -f ci-runners.compose.yml ...`. Run `./ci-runners.sh help` for the full reference. For the destructive `down -v` (wipes `data/`, forces re-registration with a fresh Gitea token), the script intentionally **doesn't** offer a verb — invoke `docker compose -f ci-runners.compose.yml down -v` directly so the path is explicit at the typing level. ### Operational tips - **Rotation of one runner at a time** — to upgrade the image or change config, run `./ci-runners.sh rotate` (or restart manually one by one — `./ci-runners.sh restart runner-1`, wait, …) so the CI pipeline is never starved. - **Logs** — `./ci-runners.sh logs runner-N` (or `docker compose logs -f --tail=100 runner-N`) for a single runner; jobs being executed appear here. - **Disk pressure** — the runner caches each job's container image in `/var/lib/docker` on the host. On a small host, prune periodically (`docker system prune -af` while no job is running). - **Adding a fourth runner** — copy any `runner-N` block in the compose file, increment the suffix in `container_name`, `GITEA_RUNNER_NAME`, and the `data/` mount path. Add the new name to the `RUNNERS=(…)` array at the top of `ci-runners.sh` so `rotate` and `restart` learn about it. Then `./ci-runners.sh up` (or `docker compose up -d`). The runner registers using the same `GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN` (which must be regenerated if it has expired). ### Security — Docker socket exposure The compose mounts `/var/run/docker.sock` into each runner so jobs can spawn containers. **This grants the runner root-equivalent access to the host's Docker daemon.** A malicious workflow could spawn arbitrary containers, mount host paths, escalate privileges. Mitigations: - **Trust boundary:** only register the runners against repositories controlled by the org. Gitea's runner-registration UI lets you scope a runner to an organisation, a single repository, or instance-wide. Prefer the narrowest scope. - **Dedicated host:** run these containers on a host that does not also run production services or hold sensitive data. The runner host is in the trust boundary of any developer who can push to a repo it serves. - **No host filesystem mounts beyond the docker socket:** the compose intentionally does not mount `/`, `/etc`, or any project source. Workflows that need data on the host must do so via Docker volumes. - **Future hardening (out of scope of v1):** migrate to **rootless Docker** on the runner host, or to a **DinD (Docker-in-Docker) sidecar** so the runner cannot escape into the host daemon. Decided when the org's RSSI confirms the security posture, or when the runner host is shared with anything else of value. ### Cache server `act_runner` ships a built-in GitHub-Actions-cache-compatible server, used by `actions/setup-node@v6` (`cache: 'pnpm'`), `actions/cache`, and similar. The default behaviour does **not** work in our compose-based setup: the runner container is on the compose-defined `apf-portal-act-runners` bridge, while jobs spawned through the mounted `/var/run/docker.sock` come up on Docker's anonymous `bridge` network — the cache server binds inside the runner on a random port, advertises an IP on the runners' bridge, and the job can't reach it. The symptom is a ~2 min `ETIMEDOUT` at the start (restore) and end (save) of every job that opts into caching. The fix is in [`runner-config.yaml`](runner-config.yaml): `container.network: apf-portal-act-runners` instructs `act_runner` to attach every job container to the same compose-defined bridge as the runners. Job → runner is now an internal-network DNS hop, the advertised cache URL is reachable, and `cache: 'pnpm'` works end-to-end. The `cache: 'pnpm'` flag is enabled on every `actions/setup-node` step in `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` and `.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml`. The blast-radius trade-off is bounded: every container on `apf-portal-act-runners` is one of our runner containers (plus the jobs they spawn), all of which already have full docker-socket access. Sharing a network does not widen what a malicious workflow can already do; it just lets jobs reach the cache server. If the cache ever needs to be disabled (debugging cache-hit issues, etc.), set `cache.enabled: false` in `runner-config.yaml` and `./ci-runners.sh rotate`. ### `act_runner` image pinning The compose pins `gitea/act_runner:0.2.13`. Update the pin deliberately, not via `:latest`: 1. Read the act_runner [release notes](https://gitea.com/gitea/act_runner/releases) for breaking changes. 2. Edit the three image references (`runner-1`, `runner-2`, `runner-3`). 3. Commit on a feature branch with a `chore(deps):` Conventional Commits subject. 4. Roll one runner at a time (rotation tip above). The matching CI workflows refer to runner _labels_ (not images), so a runner-image upgrade does not affect `.gitea/workflows/*`. ### Job image pinning and pre-pull `act_runner` runs each job inside a container whose image is selected by the runner's _labels_. Two images are in use: | Label | Image | Used by | | ---------------------- | -------------------------------- | ---------------------------------- | | `self-hosted` | `catthehacker/ubuntu:act-22.04` | `check`, `scan`, `commits`, `a11y` | | `on-prem` | `catthehacker/ubuntu:act-22.04` | (alias of `self-hosted`) | | (per-job `container:`) | `catthehacker/ubuntu:full-22.04` | `perf` (Lighthouse needs Chrome) | [`runner-config.yaml`](runner-config.yaml) sets `container.force_pull: false`. Without that, act_runner re-issues a `docker pull` at the start of every single job (~10–30 s of registry round-trip even when every layer is already cached), which both wastes wall-clock and contradicts our policy of upgrading job images deliberately rather than implicitly via `:latest`. The trade-off: the host Docker daemon must already hold the images locally. Pre-pull them once after a fresh runner host install: ```bash docker pull catthehacker/ubuntu:act-22.04 docker pull catthehacker/ubuntu:full-22.04 ``` Upgrading to a newer tag is a deliberate three-step process: 1. Edit `GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS` (in [`ci-runners.compose.yml`](ci-runners.compose.yml)) and / or the per-job `container.image:` (in `.gitea/workflows/*`) to the new tag. 2. On the runner host, `docker pull ` so the image is locally available before the next CI job starts. 3. Commit on a feature branch with a `chore(deps):` Conventional Commits subject; one of `chore(deps): upgrade CI job image to ...`. Old, no-longer-referenced images can be reaped during the periodic `docker system prune -af` (see "Disk pressure" above). --- ## Local-dev stack — `local/` A Docker Compose recipe spinning up the runtime services the BFF and ADRs assume — Postgres, Redis, OpenTelemetry Collector — plus optional viewers / tooling (pgweb, Jaeger UI, Caddy serve-static) gated behind Compose profiles. Designed to start in a single command on a contributor's WSL2 / Linux / macOS host. | File | Role | | -------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | [`local/dev.sh`](local/dev.sh) | Convenience wrapper around `docker compose` — see "Convenience script" below | | [`local/dev.compose.yml`](local/dev.compose.yml) | Service definitions: postgres, redis, otel-collector, plus pgweb / jaeger / caddy / the `apps` dev servers behind profiles | | [`local/Dockerfile.dev`](local/Dockerfile.dev) | Dev-only image (Node 24 + corepack) shared by the three `apps`-profile dev servers (ADR-0030) | | [`local/dev-entrypoint.sh`](local/dev-entrypoint.sh) | Entrypoint for the `apps` services: BFF runs `prisma generate` + `migrate deploy`, then each runs `nx serve` | | [`local/.env.example`](local/.env.example) | Credentials + ports template (copy to `.env`, which is git-ignored) | | [`local/init/postgres/01-init.sql`](local/init/postgres/01-init.sql) | Bootstrap SQL for ADR-0013: audit roles + schema, applied on first boot only | | [`local/otel-collector.yaml`](local/otel-collector.yaml) | Collector pipeline: OTLP receivers → batch → debug exporter (always) + forward to Jaeger when active | | [`local/Caddyfile`](local/Caddyfile) | Reverse-proxy config for the `serve-static` profile — per-locale SPA fallback + smart `/` redirect (ADR-0019) | ### First-time setup ```bash # 1. Configure local secrets (copy template, edit, do not commit). cp infra/local/.env.example infra/local/.env $EDITOR infra/local/.env # Set strong dev values for POSTGRES_PASSWORD and REDIS_PASSWORD # (defaults in the template are placeholders that the compose # rejects with `must be set in infra/local/.env` if left as-is). # 2. Bring up the core stack (postgres + redis + otel-collector). ./infra/local/dev.sh up # 3. (Optional) Activate viewers / tooling when needed: ./infra/local/dev.sh up dbtools # adds pgweb ./infra/local/dev.sh up observability # adds Jaeger UI ./infra/local/dev.sh up serve-static # adds caddy serving the prod build ./infra/local/dev.sh up all # core + every profile # 4. Verify health. ./infra/local/dev.sh status ``` ### Convenience script — `dev.sh` [`local/dev.sh`](local/dev.sh) is a thin wrapper around `docker compose -f dev.compose.yml ...` with two reasons to exist: 1. **Hides the Compose-profile gotcha.** `docker compose down` only operates on services whose profile is currently active — anything started under `--profile X` keeps running unless the same flag is on `down`. The script always passes every profile in scope on teardown / status / log commands, so profile-gated services (pgweb, Jaeger) are never accidentally orphaned. 2. **Ergonomic verbs** for the common workflows. `./dev.sh up all`, `./dev.sh stop pgweb`, `./dev.sh logs otel-collector`, etc. Run `./infra/local/dev.sh help` for the full reference. Cheat-sheet: | Command | Effect | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `./infra/local/dev.sh up` | Core only (postgres + redis + otel-collector) | | `./infra/local/dev.sh up all` | Core + dbtools + observability + apps (full dev stack). serve-static is excluded — it would collide with apps on port 4200 | | `./infra/local/dev.sh up dbtools` | Core + pgweb | | `./infra/local/dev.sh up observability` | Core + Jaeger | | `./infra/local/dev.sh up serve-static` | Core + Caddy serving `dist/.../browser/` per ADR-0019 | | `./infra/local/dev.sh up apps` | Core + the three Nx dev servers in Docker (ADR-0030) | | `./infra/local/dev.sh down` | Tear down the whole stack (every profile in scope) | | `./infra/local/dev.sh down -v` | Tear down + wipe named volumes (incl. audit-roles bootstrap) | | `./infra/local/dev.sh stop pgweb` | Stop one service (containers stay around) | | `./infra/local/dev.sh status` | `docker compose ps`, with every profile visible | | `./infra/local/dev.sh logs otel-collector` | Follow logs | | `./infra/local/dev.sh exec postgres psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB"` | Run a command inside a service | Anything not matching one of the named verbs is passed through to `docker compose -f dev.compose.yml ...` (with every profile flagged in), so you keep the full Compose surface available — `./dev.sh config`, `./dev.sh top`, `./dev.sh inspect …`, etc. If you prefer to call `docker compose` directly, every example below shows the raw command alongside the script form. ### Dockerised app dev mode — `apps` profile (ADR-0030) The `apps` profile runs the three Nx dev servers **in Docker**, so a contributor can bring up the whole stack without installing Node / pnpm natively: ```bash ./infra/local/dev.sh up apps # infra + portal-bff:3000 + portal-shell:4200 + portal-admin:4300 ``` How it works (see [ADR-0030](../docs/decisions/0030-dockerised-dev-mode.md)): - A single [`Dockerfile.dev`](local/Dockerfile.dev) (Node 24 + corepack) backs all three services — one image, one install for the monorepo. - The repo is bind-mounted for hot reload; `node_modules` and the Nx cache live in named volumes (`apf-portal-app-node-modules`, `apf-portal-app-nx-cache`) so the container's native modules are never shadowed by the host's. - A one-shot `apps-deps` service runs `pnpm install` once into the shared volume; the three servers gate on its completion, avoiding a three-way install race. - The BFF entrypoint runs `prisma generate` + `prisma migrate deploy` before serving. **Prerequisite — the BFF still needs its secrets.** No native toolchain is required, but `apps/portal-bff/.env` (Entra / session / jwks config) must exist, same as native dev (`cp apps/portal-bff/.env.example apps/portal-bff/.env` then fill it). The host-specific URLs (`DATABASE_URL` / `REDIS_URL` / OTel endpoint) are overridden automatically to the Compose service names — you don't edit those for the container. SPA-only work (`up portal-shell`) doesn't need the BFF env. **Port note.** The SPA dev servers default to 4200 / 4300 — 4200 is the same port the `serve-static` profile uses. Don't run `apps` and `serve-static` together, or set `SHELL_PORT` in `infra/local/.env`. The three dev modes (native `nx serve`, devcontainer, this `apps` profile) and when to use each are summarised in [docs/setup/01-dev-debian-vm-setup.md](../docs/setup/01-dev-debian-vm-setup.md). ### HTTPS dev-server setup — remote-browser access via a hostname By default the dev-servers serve plain HTTP — fine when the browser is on the same host as the BFF (`http://localhost:4200/`), which is also the only HTTP origin Entra accepts as a redirect URI. The moment you access the SPA over a **hostname** (e.g. `apf-portal.dev.local`, useful when the browser sits on a workstation and the stack runs on a shared / per-dev VM), Entra refuses the `http:` redirect URI and the dev-servers must terminate TLS. The setup is one-time per dev: 1. **Install [mkcert](https://github.com/FiloSottile/mkcert)** on your workstation (the machine where the browser runs) and bootstrap its local CA: ```bash # Debian / WSL Ubuntu: sudo apt install -y libnss3-tools # macOS: # brew install mkcert nss # Windows (PowerShell, choco): # choco install mkcert mkcert -install ``` 2. **Generate the cert** for the hostname you registered in your `/etc/hosts` and in Entra. From the repo root on your workstation: ```bash mkdir -p .secrets mkcert -key-file .secrets/dev-tls.key -cert-file .secrets/dev-tls.pem \ apf-portal.dev-jg.local # ← replace with YOUR hostname ``` `.secrets/` is git-ignored; the bind-mount in the `apps` profile (the repo at `/workspace`) makes the files visible inside the containers at the path the `https` configuration expects. 3. **Update `apps/portal-bff/.env`** so the BFF tells Entra the matching HTTPS URIs — see the redirect-URI block in [`apps/portal-bff/.env.example`](../apps/portal-bff/.env.example) for the override pattern. The same URIs must be registered in your Entra app registration's "Redirect URIs" list (the BFF only sends one of them per auth request; Entra validates it is on the list). 4. **Enable the `https` Nx serve configuration** for the compose dev-servers by adding to `infra/local/.env`: ```env NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https ``` The compose command resolves `--configuration=${NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION:-development}` at parse time, so the SPAs pick up the `https` config defined in `apps/portal-shell/project.json` and `apps/portal-admin/project.json`. The BFF stays HTTP behind the proxy — only the public origin is HTTPS. 5. `./infra/local/dev.sh up apps` → browser opens `https://apf-portal.dev-jg.local:4200/`. No cert warning (mkcert's CA is trusted by the workstation after step 1). Native `nx serve` (WSL / localhost) is **unaffected** — it keeps using the `development` configuration by default, no SSL required, and the `localhost` URIs registered in Entra still work. When real DNS + corp-CA-signed certs arrive, the hostname can be reused as-is (Entra registrations are literal strings — they don't care who signs the cert). Drop the cert files back into `.secrets/` and remove the mkcert step. ### Team mkcert CA on `vm-gitlab` — sharing the trust root The previous section is the **solo flow** (one dev mints their own CA, certs only trusted by their own workstation). It does not let a teammate browse another dev's VM without a certificate warning — every dev has their own private CA, none of which the others trust. For a multi-dev team the canonical pattern is one shared CA held on `vm-gitlab`. The CA private key (`rootCA-key.pem`) stays on `vm-gitlab` — never copied to any workstation; only the public `rootCA.pem` is distributed to each developer's Windows trust store, and the R&D Lead mints per-VM certs on `vm-gitlab` when a new VM (or new developer) joins. Browsing any dev VM from any workstation then "just works" — green padlock, no warning. This subsection assumes the per-dev workstation procedure of "HTTPS dev-server setup" above is what every developer will do **once**, with the rootCA.pem they receive from this shared CA. #### Initial setup on `vm-gitlab` (one-time, by the R&D Lead) ```bash # 1. Install mkcert on vm-gitlab (no service to run — mkcert is one-shot). sudo curl -fsSL https://dl.filippo.io/mkcert/latest?for=linux/amd64 \ -o /usr/local/bin/mkcert sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/mkcert # 2. Create the shared CAROOT, root-only. sudo mkdir -p /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca sudo chown root:root /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca sudo chmod 700 /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca # 3. Generate the CA into that CAROOT. (`-install` here just touches # the local trust store of vm-gitlab — cosmetic for an infra VM, # no harm.) sudo CAROOT=/srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca mkcert -install # 4. Verify. sudo ls -la /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca/ # → rootCA.pem (-rw-r--r--), rootCA-key.pem (-rw-------, root only) ``` After this, the CA exists and is owned by `root` on `vm-gitlab`. Developers never touch it directly. #### Minting a cert for a dev VM (R&D Lead, on `vm-gitlab`) Repeat once per VM hostname (`apf-portal.dev-jg.local`, `apf-portal.dev-vc.local`, `apf-portal.dev.local`, …). Replace `` and the SSH/scp target accordingly: ```bash sudo CAROOT=/srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca mkcert \ -key-file /tmp/-tls.key \ -cert-file /tmp/-tls.pem \ apf-portal..local # Sanity check. sudo openssl x509 -in /tmp/-tls.pem -noout -subject -issuer # subject CN must be apf-portal..local; issuer the mkcert CA name. # Ship to the target VM, renaming to the path the `https` Nx serve # configuration expects (.secrets/dev-tls.{key,pem}). sudo scp /tmp/-tls.key :~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/dev-tls.key sudo scp /tmp/-tls.pem :~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/dev-tls.pem # Wipe the staging copies. sudo rm /tmp/-tls.* ``` The certificate is good for ~2 years (mkcert default). When it nears expiry, regenerate with the same command and re-`scp` — the dev-server picks up the new files on next restart. #### Onboarding a new developer A new teammate needs **three things**: a copy of `rootCA.pem` (public, low-sensitivity), a per-VM cert minted by the R&D Lead, and the same hosts-file + `.env` configuration every dev follows. **R&D Lead side** — on `vm-gitlab`: ```bash # Hand off the public CA cert to the new dev via a secure channel # (1Password shared vault, Bitwarden, direct scp). Never plain e-mail. sudo cat /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca/rootCA.pem ``` Then mint that dev's per-VM cert (see "Minting a cert for a dev VM" above) and ship it to their VM's `~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/`. **New developer side** — on their Windows workstation: ```powershell # 1. Install mkcert (only to get the `-install` command — no need to # generate certs on the workstation). choco install mkcert -y # 2. Drop the rootCA.pem they received into the local CAROOT path. $caroot = mkcert -CAROOT Copy-Item "C:\path\to\rootCA.pem" "$caroot\rootCA.pem" # NB: only rootCA.pem — they do NOT receive rootCA-key.pem. # 3. Register the team CA in their Windows trust store. mkcert -install # Confirm the Windows security dialog. Their machine now trusts every # cert minted by the team CA on vm-gitlab. ``` Then they: - Edit `C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts` (admin) and add the entries for every VM they want to reach (their own + the others as needed): ``` 10.100.201.20 apf-portal.dev-vc.local 10.100.201.21 apf-portal.dev-jg.local 10.100.201.22 apf-portal.dev.local ``` - Edit `apps/portal-bff/.env` on their VM so the four `ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI` values point at `https://apf-portal.:{4200,4300}/...` (the matching URIs are already registered Entra-side — no action there). - Set `NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https` in `infra/local/.env` on their VM. - `./infra/local/dev.sh down && ./infra/local/dev.sh up apps`. Total onboarding budget: ~5 min of R&D Lead time on `vm-gitlab` (mint + transfer) + ~10 min of work on the new dev's workstation + VM. No SSH access to `vm-gitlab` is granted to developers — only the R&D Lead operates the CA. #### Operational notes - **Departures.** mkcert has no CRL; revoking trust on a former dev's machine isn't actionable from the CA side. The risk surface is what that dev could have signed before leaving — and they only ever had the public `rootCA.pem`, never the private key, so they cannot have signed anything in your trust circle. No action required when a dev leaves. - **CA rotation.** Rare (audit, suspected compromise, annual hygiene). Regenerate the CA on `vm-gitlab`, re-mint every VM's cert, redistribute the new `rootCA.pem` to each dev. Each dev re-imports + re-`mkcert -install`. No `.env` or Entra change. - **Per-VM cert rotation.** Same pattern as initial mint — regenerate, scp, `dev.sh restart portal-shell portal-admin`. No client-side action. - **Migration to a corp-signed CA.** When the infra team issues an internal-CA-signed cert (already trusted by every domain-joined workstation, no mkcert step), drop those files into `.secrets/dev-tls.{key,pem}` and remove the team mkcert CA from each dev's trust store. Entra registrations are unchanged — they reference hostname + port, not the issuer. ### Service endpoints (defaults) | Service | Host port | Purpose | | ---------------------------- | --------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Postgres | 5432 | DB connection — `postgres://portal:@localhost:5432/portal_dev` | | Redis | 6379 | Sessions, OBO cache (per ADR-0010 / ADR-0014) | | OTel Collector gRPC | 4317 | `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` for the BFF and the SPA | | OTel Collector HTTP | 4318 | OTLP/HTTP variant | | pgweb (profile) | 8081 | http://localhost:8081 — Postgres GUI | | Jaeger UI (profile) | 16686 | http://localhost:16686 — trace explorer | | Caddy serve-static (profile) | 4200 | http://localhost:4200/ — production build with per-locale routing (`/fr/`, `/en/`) + smart `/` redirect, per ADR-0019. Run `pnpm exec nx build portal-shell --configuration=production` first or the proxy will 404 everything. | All ports are overridable via `.env` if the host machine has conflicts. ### Operational tips - **Persistence** — state lives in named Docker volumes (`apf-portal-postgres-data`, `apf-portal-redis-data`). Survives `docker compose down`. Use `docker compose -f dev.compose.yml down -v` to wipe (also wipes the audit-roles bootstrap, which re-runs on the next fresh boot). - **Profile symmetry** — `dev.sh down` (and `status`, `logs`, …) always include every profile in scope, so profile-gated services are caught. If you bypass the script and call `docker compose down` directly, you must pass the same `--profile` flags as on `up`, otherwise pgweb and Jaeger keep running silently. Either pass them again, or `export COMPOSE_PROFILES=dbtools,observability` in your shell or `infra/local/.env`. - **Bootstrap re-run** — the SQL in `local/init/postgres/` only runs on a **fresh** Postgres data volume. To replay after editing the file, `down -v` (loses all dev data) or run the SQL manually with `docker compose exec postgres psql -U portal -d portal_dev -f /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/01-init.sql`. - **Logs** — `docker compose -f dev.compose.yml logs -f ` to follow a single service. `otel-collector` is the loudest — its `debug` exporter prints every span / metric / log it receives. - **Image upgrades** — same policy as the runner image (deliberate, not via `:latest`). Renovate's docker-compose manager will surface bumps automatically once the dashboard rule allows them. ### Production parity This stack is **dev-only**. The corresponding production layout (HA Postgres, Redis Sentinel cluster, OTel Collector with a real backend, secret manager) lives in the future on-prem-infrastructure ADR — see `prod/` placeholder below. --- ## Entra group map — `test-tenant.entra.example.json` Pure JSON object keyed on Entra security-group GUID (lower-case), valued by an `apf-role-` slug from the ADR-0025 functional-role catalogue. The BFF loads it at boot through `EntraGroupToRoleResolver` (from `shared-auth`) and uses it on every sign-in to translate the `groups` claim into the 24-entry catalogue's role slugs. The 24 entries below cover the entire v1 catalogue — including `partenaire`, which ships empty in the test tenant by design but is kept in the schema so a typo or omission fails the parser at boot rather than silently dropping the role. ### Provisioning a real file ```bash cp infra/test-tenant.entra.example.json infra/test-tenant.entra.json # Then for each role replace the placeholder GUID with the real one # from Entra: # Microsoft Entra admin centre → Groups → → Object ID. # Point the BFF at the file via apps/portal-bff/.env: # ENTRA_GROUP_MAP_PATH=infra/test-tenant.entra.json ``` The real file (`infra/-tenant.entra.json`) is git-ignored because the group GUIDs are tenant-private — leaking them does not authorize anything by itself, but it does reveal the tenant's internal authorization topology. Each environment (test / preprod / prod) carries its own file; the slugs are stable across environments, the GUIDs are not. If `ENTRA_GROUP_MAP_PATH` is unset, the resolver runs with an empty map: every user signs in successfully but receives an empty `roles[]` (and consequently no `apf-role-*` UI). The BFF logs a WARN at boot so an operator can spot the missing config; this is a deliberate fail-soft posture so a fresh dev environment is not blocked by an Entra-side dependency. Validation rules enforced at boot by `parseEntraGroupMap` (in `libs/shared/auth/`): - keys must look like a GUID (`8-4-4-4-12` hex); - values must be members of `FUNCTIONAL_ROLES`; - the same GUID cannot map to two different slugs (case-insensitive). A malformed file crashes the BFF at startup. The error message names the offending key / value. --- ## Future infra concerns — placeholders These are listed here so a contributor knows where to expect related files; they don't exist yet. | File | Purpose | Triggered by | | --------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | | `prod/*` | On-prem deployment manifests (k8s, Compose, or whatever the on-prem infra ADR settles on) | The on-prem infrastructure ADR (phase 3b) | | `runbooks/*.md` | Operational runbooks (incident response, secret rotation, runner upgrade procedure, …) | First incident, or when ops cadence justifies them |