apps/portal-bff/prisma/migrations/20260510011453_init_audit_schema/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+-- CreateSchema
+CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS "audit";
+
+-- CreateEnum
+CREATE TYPE "audit"."AuditAudience" AS ENUM ('workforce', 'customer');
+
+-- CreateEnum
+CREATE TYPE "audit"."AuditOutcome" AS ENUM ('success', 'failure', 'denied');
+
+-- CreateTable
+CREATE TABLE "audit"."events" (
+    "id" UUID NOT NULL,
+    "created_at" TIMESTAMPTZ(6) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+    "event_type" TEXT NOT NULL,
+    "audience" "audit"."AuditAudience" NOT NULL,
+    "actor_id_hash" TEXT,
+    "trace_id" TEXT,
+    "subject" TEXT,
+    "outcome" "audit"."AuditOutcome" NOT NULL,
+    "payload" JSONB,
+
+    CONSTRAINT "events_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+
+-- CreateIndex
+CREATE INDEX "events_created_at_idx" ON "audit"."events"("created_at");
+
+-- CreateIndex
+CREATE INDEX "events_event_type_idx" ON "audit"."events"("event_type");
+
+-- CreateIndex
+CREATE INDEX "events_trace_id_idx" ON "audit"."events"("trace_id");
+
+-- ============================================================
+-- Append-only contract per ADR-0013
+-- ============================================================
+-- The schema-level DEFAULT PRIVILEGES set in
+-- infra/local/init/postgres/01-init.sql only fire when audit_owner
+-- creates the object. This migration runs as a privileged migrator
+-- (the same login that owns the public schema), so the table is
+-- initially owned by that user and audit_writer/reader/archiver
+-- have no grants. Re-apply the owner transfer + grants explicitly
+-- so the runtime role contract holds.
+
+ALTER TABLE "audit"."events" OWNER TO audit_owner;
+ALTER TYPE "audit"."AuditAudience" OWNER TO audit_owner;
+ALTER TYPE "audit"."AuditOutcome" OWNER TO audit_owner;
+
+GRANT INSERT ON "audit"."events" TO audit_writer;
+GRANT SELECT ON "audit"."events" TO audit_reader;
+-- audit_archiver needs both DELETE *and* SELECT: per ADR-0013 it
+-- removes rows "older than retention", which means evaluating a
+-- WHERE clause on `created_at`. Postgres requires SELECT on every
+-- column referenced in DELETE's WHERE, even when the row count is
+-- the only thing returned. SELECT here does NOT widen the contract
+-- — UPDATE / TRUNCATE remain ungranted to every role.
+GRANT SELECT, DELETE ON "audit"."events" TO audit_archiver;
+
+-- USAGE on the enum types is needed by every role that touches the
+-- column. Without it, audit_writer's INSERT fails with "permission
+-- denied for type audit.AuditAudience".
+GRANT USAGE ON TYPE "audit"."AuditAudience" TO audit_writer, audit_reader, audit_archiver;
+GRANT USAGE ON TYPE "audit"."AuditOutcome" TO audit_writer, audit_reader, audit_archiver;
+
+-- No GRANT for UPDATE / TRUNCATE to anyone, including audit_owner
+-- at runtime — schema migrations alone amend the table going
+-- forward.

apps/portal-bff/prisma/migrations/migration_lock.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# Please do not edit this file manually
+# It should be added in your version-control system (e.g., Git)
+provider = "postgresql"

apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma

@@ -1,13 +1,84 @@
-// This is your Prisma schema file,
-// learn more about it in the docs: https://pris.ly/d/prisma-schema
-
-// Get a free hosted Postgres database in seconds: `npx create-db`
+// Prisma schema for portal-bff.
+//
+// `multiSchema` preview is enabled because per ADR-0013 the audit log
+// lives in its own `audit` schema with role-based append-only access
+// (audit_owner / audit_writer / audit_reader / audit_archiver). The
+// public schema holds the regular business data; only audit.events
+// lives in audit.
 
 generator client {
-  provider = "prisma-client-js"
+  provider        = "prisma-client-js"
+  previewFeatures = ["multiSchema"]
 }
 
 datasource db {
   provider = "postgresql"
   url      = env("DATABASE_URL")
+  schemas  = ["public", "audit"]
+}
+
+// ============================================================
+// Audit log (per ADR-0013)
+// ============================================================
+//
+// Append-only by Postgres role grants — the schema, roles, and
+// default privileges are provisioned by infra/local/init/postgres/
+// 01-init.sql in dev and the equivalent production manifest. The
+// migration that creates this table re-applies the grants
+// explicitly and ALTERs the table owner to `audit_owner` so the
+// runtime role contract holds even when the migration runs as a
+// privileged migrator account.
+//
+// At runtime, the BFF wraps every INSERT into this table in a
+// transaction that begins with `SET LOCAL ROLE audit_writer`, so
+// even a compromised BFF connection cannot UPDATE / TRUNCATE /
+// DELETE — those grants are not on `audit_writer`.
+
+enum AuditAudience {
+  workforce
+  customer
+
+  @@schema("audit")
+}
+
+enum AuditOutcome {
+  success
+  failure
+  denied
+
+  @@schema("audit")
+}
+
+model AuditEvent {
+  id          String        @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
+  createdAt   DateTime      @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
+  eventType   String        @map("event_type")
+  audience    AuditAudience
+  // Salted hash (LOG_USER_ID_SALT) of the actor's stable id. NULL
+  // when the actor is unauthenticated (e.g. failed login attempt
+  // before resolving an identity). The same salt is used by the
+  // BFF Pino logger so audit and app logs cross-correlate on this
+  // field.
+  actorIdHash String?       @map("actor_id_hash")
+  // W3C trace id (32 hex chars) of the request that produced the
+  // event. Cross-correlates with traces in Jaeger and with Pino
+  // log lines that carry the same `trace_id` field. NULL only if
+  // the event was emitted outside any inbound request (e.g. a
+  // future cron job).
+  traceId     String?       @map("trace_id")
+  // Free-form identifier of what the event is *about* — typically
+  // a domain entity URI like `user:42` or `dossier:xyz`. NULL when
+  // the event is system-wide and has no clear subject.
+  subject     String?
+  outcome     AuditOutcome
+  // Event-specific structured detail. Redaction of PII is the
+  // caller's responsibility; the BFF Pino redact list is the
+  // reference allow-/deny-list.
+  payload     Json?
+
+  @@map("events")
+  @@schema("audit")
+  @@index([createdAt])
+  @@index([eventType])
+  @@index([traceId])
 }

apps/portal-bff/src/app/app.module.ts

@@ -4,9 +4,15 @@ import { AppController } from './app.controller';
 import { AppService } from './app.service';
 import { ObservabilityModule } from '../observability/observability.module';
 import { HealthModule } from '../health/health.module';
+import { AuditModule } from '../audit/audit.module';
 
 @Module({
-  imports: [ObservabilityModule, PrismaModule.forRoot({ isGlobal: true }), HealthModule],
+  imports: [
+    ObservabilityModule,
+    PrismaModule.forRoot({ isGlobal: true }),
+    AuditModule,
+    HealthModule,
+  ],
   controllers: [AppController],
   providers: [AppService],
 })

apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.module.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { AuditWriter } from './audit.service';
+
+/**
+ * Provides the AuditWriter to the rest of the BFF. Imported globally
+ * by AppModule so any feature module can inject it without an extra
+ * import. The actual append-only contract is enforced by the
+ * Postgres role grants set up in the audit-schema migration — see
+ * apps/portal-bff/prisma/migrations/*_init_audit_schema.
+ */
+@Module({
+  providers: [AuditWriter],
+  exports: [AuditWriter],
+})
+export class AuditModule {}

apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import { trace } from '@opentelemetry/api';
+import { ClsService } from 'nestjs-cls';
+import { PrismaService } from 'nestjs-prisma';
+import { Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
+import { AuditWriter } from './audit.service';
+import type { AuditEventInput } from './audit.types';
+
+interface AuditEventCreateCall {
+  data: {
+    eventType: string;
+    audience: 'workforce' | 'customer';
+    outcome: 'success' | 'failure' | 'denied';
+    subject: string | null;
+    actorIdHash: string | null;
+    traceId: string | null;
+    payload: Prisma.InputJsonValue | typeof Prisma.JsonNull;
+  };
+}
+
+interface MockTx {
+  $executeRawUnsafe: jest.Mock;
+  auditEvent: { create: jest.Mock };
+}
+
+interface MockPrisma {
+  $transaction: jest.Mock;
+  tx: MockTx;
+}
+
+function buildMocks(): { prisma: MockPrisma; cls: { get: jest.Mock } } {
+  const tx: MockTx = {
+    $executeRawUnsafe: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(0),
+    auditEvent: { create: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) },
+  };
+  const prisma: MockPrisma = {
+    tx,
+    $transaction: jest.fn(async (fn: (tx: MockTx) => Promise<unknown>) => fn(tx)),
+  };
+  const cls = { get: jest.fn() };
+  return { prisma, cls };
+}
+
+async function createSubject(): Promise<{
+  writer: AuditWriter;
+  prisma: MockPrisma;
+  cls: { get: jest.Mock };
+}> {
+  const { prisma, cls } = buildMocks();
+  const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
+    providers: [
+      AuditWriter,
+      { provide: PrismaService, useValue: prisma },
+      { provide: ClsService, useValue: cls },
+    ],
+  }).compile();
+
+  return { writer: moduleRef.get(AuditWriter), prisma, cls };
+}
+
+const baseInput: AuditEventInput = {
+  eventType: 'auth.login',
+  audience: 'workforce',
+  outcome: 'success',
+  subject: 'user:42',
+};
+
+describe('AuditWriter', () => {
+  it('locks the transaction to audit_writer before INSERTing', async () => {
+    const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+    await writer.recordEvent(baseInput);
+
+    expect(prisma.$transaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(prisma.tx.$executeRawUnsafe).toHaveBeenCalledWith('SET LOCAL ROLE audit_writer');
+    // SET ROLE must precede the INSERT, otherwise the runtime
+    // privilege check happens with the wrong role.
+    const setRoleOrder = prisma.tx.$executeRawUnsafe.mock.invocationCallOrder[0];
+    const createOrder = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.invocationCallOrder[0];
+    expect(setRoleOrder).toBeLessThan(createOrder);
+  });
+
+  it('passes the input fields through to the create call', async () => {
+    const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+    await writer.recordEvent({
+      ...baseInput,
+      payload: { route: '/auth/login', clientId: 'spa' },
+    });
+
+    const call = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as AuditEventCreateCall;
+    expect(call.data.eventType).toBe('auth.login');
+    expect(call.data.audience).toBe('workforce');
+    expect(call.data.outcome).toBe('success');
+    expect(call.data.subject).toBe('user:42');
+    expect(call.data.payload).toEqual({ route: '/auth/login', clientId: 'spa' });
+  });
+
+  it('records Prisma.JsonNull when no payload is provided', async () => {
+    const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+    await writer.recordEvent(baseInput);
+
+    const call = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as AuditEventCreateCall;
+    expect(call.data.payload).toBe(Prisma.JsonNull);
+  });
+
+  it('reads actorIdHash from CLS when not passed explicitly', async () => {
+    const { writer, prisma, cls } = await createSubject();
+    cls.get.mockReturnValue('hash-from-cls');
+
+    await writer.recordEvent(baseInput);
+
+    expect(cls.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('actorIdHash');
+    const call = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as AuditEventCreateCall;
+    expect(call.data.actorIdHash).toBe('hash-from-cls');
+  });
+
+  it('prefers an explicit actorIdHash over the CLS-resolved one', async () => {
+    const { writer, prisma, cls } = await createSubject();
+    cls.get.mockReturnValue('hash-from-cls');
+
+    await writer.recordEvent({ ...baseInput, actorIdHash: 'hash-from-input' });
+
+    const call = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as AuditEventCreateCall;
+    expect(call.data.actorIdHash).toBe('hash-from-input');
+  });
+
+  it('stores actorIdHash = null when neither input nor CLS has one', async () => {
+    const { writer, prisma, cls } = await createSubject();
+    cls.get.mockReturnValue(undefined);
+
+    await writer.recordEvent(baseInput);
+
+    const call = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as AuditEventCreateCall;
+    expect(call.data.actorIdHash).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('captures the active OTel trace id', async () => {
+    const fakeSpan = { spanContext: () => ({ traceId: 'abc123', spanId: 'def', traceFlags: 0 }) };
+    const getActiveSpanSpy = jest.spyOn(trace, 'getActiveSpan').mockReturnValue(fakeSpan as never);
+
+    try {
+      const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+      await writer.recordEvent(baseInput);
+
+      const call = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as AuditEventCreateCall;
+      expect(call.data.traceId).toBe('abc123');
+    } finally {
+      getActiveSpanSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('stores traceId = null when no span is active', async () => {
+    const getActiveSpanSpy = jest.spyOn(trace, 'getActiveSpan').mockReturnValue(undefined);
+
+    try {
+      const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+      await writer.recordEvent(baseInput);
+
+      const call = prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as AuditEventCreateCall;
+      expect(call.data.traceId).toBeNull();
+    } finally {
+      getActiveSpanSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('propagates the underlying error — no catch-and-swallow', async () => {
+    const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+    const dbError = new Error('permission denied for table events');
+    prisma.tx.auditEvent.create.mockRejectedValueOnce(dbError);
+
+    await expect(writer.recordEvent(baseInput)).rejects.toThrow(
+      'permission denied for table events',
+    );
+  });
+});

apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { trace } from '@opentelemetry/api';
+import { ClsService } from 'nestjs-cls';
+import { PrismaService } from 'nestjs-prisma';
+import { Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
+import type { AuditEventInput } from './audit.types';
+
+/**
+ * AuditWriter — single entry point for ADR-0013 audit-log writes.
+ *
+ * Contract
+ * --------
+ * - **Append-only at the database level.** Every write runs inside a
+ *   transaction whose first statement is `SET LOCAL ROLE
+ *   audit_writer`. That role only has `INSERT` on `audit.events`
+ *   (per the migration that created the table); `UPDATE`, `DELETE`,
+ *   `TRUNCATE` all fail at the Postgres level even if the BFF
+ *   connection is otherwise privileged. The role is reset
+ *   automatically at transaction end.
+ *
+ * - **Fail loud, never swallow.** Per ADR-0013 §"Blocking writes":
+ *   no audit ⇒ no action. Callers must propagate the rejection up
+ *   so the requested action does not proceed when its audit trail
+ *   cannot be written. The service throws the underlying Prisma
+ *   error unchanged; do not wrap it in a catch-and-log block.
+ *
+ * - **trace_id and actor_id_hash are auto-resolved.** trace_id is
+ *   read from the active OTel span context (so the audit row joins
+ *   with the BFF request span and the Pino log lines on the same
+ *   request). actor_id_hash is read from the CLS context populated
+ *   by future auth guards (ADR-0009 / ADR-0010); v1 stores `null`
+ *   when no actor is established. Callers can override either by
+ *   passing them on `AuditEventInput`.
+ */
+@Injectable()
+export class AuditWriter {
+  constructor(
+    private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
+    private readonly cls: ClsService,
+  ) {}
+
+  async recordEvent(input: AuditEventInput): Promise<void> {
+    const traceId = trace.getActiveSpan()?.spanContext().traceId ?? null;
+    const actorIdHash =
+      input.actorIdHash ?? this.cls.get<string | undefined>('actorIdHash') ?? null;
+
+    await this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      // Lock the connection to audit_writer for the duration of this
+      // transaction. SET LOCAL is reset at COMMIT/ROLLBACK so the
+      // pool's next consumer sees the original role.
+      await tx.$executeRawUnsafe(`SET LOCAL ROLE audit_writer`);
+
+      await tx.auditEvent.create({
+        data: {
+          eventType: input.eventType,
+          audience: input.audience,
+          outcome: input.outcome,
+          subject: input.subject ?? null,
+          actorIdHash,
+          traceId,
+          payload: this.toJsonInput(input.payload),
+        },
+      });
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Prisma's `Json` field accepts `Prisma.JsonNull` (null literal in
+  // SQL JSONB) or a serialisable value; explicit `undefined` skips
+  // the column. Map `payload` accordingly.
+  private toJsonInput(
+    payload: AuditEventInput['payload'],
+  ): Prisma.InputJsonValue | typeof Prisma.JsonNull {
+    if (payload === undefined) return Prisma.JsonNull;
+    return payload as Prisma.InputJsonValue;
+  }
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/**
+ * Public type surface for the audit module — kept narrow so the
+ * generated Prisma types do not leak through the rest of the BFF.
+ */
+
+export type AuditAudience = 'workforce' | 'customer';
+export type AuditOutcome = 'success' | 'failure' | 'denied';
+
+export interface AuditEventInput {
+  /**
+   * Free-form categorical identifier. Convention: lower-case dotted
+   * verb-on-noun, e.g. `auth.login`, `dossier.update`. We keep it
+   * free-form in v1; the catalogue is formalised when we have N
+   * stable event types in production.
+   */
+  eventType: string;
+
+  audience: AuditAudience;
+  outcome: AuditOutcome;
+
+  /**
+   * What the event is about — typically a domain entity URI like
+   * `user:42` or `dossier:xyz`. Optional when the event is
+   * system-wide and has no clear subject.
+   */
+  subject?: string;
+
+  /**
+   * Event-specific structured detail. **Caller-redacted PII** —
+   * the audit module does not run a redact pass; it is the writer's
+   * responsibility. Mirror of the Pino redact list in scope.
+   */
+  payload?: Record<string, unknown>;
+
+  /**
+   * Override of the auto-resolved actor id hash. Normally left
+   * undefined — the service reads from the CLS context (set by
+   * future auth interceptors per ADR-0009 / ADR-0010). Pass this
+   * only when emitting events from a context where CLS is not
+   * populated (background jobs, future cron).
+   */
+  actorIdHash?: string;
+}

docs/decisions/0013-audit-trail-separated-postgres-append-only.md

@@ -156,14 +156,25 @@ Hooks for **admin actions** and **sensitive data access** are designed-in: the w
 
 ### Confirmation
 
-- `apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma` enables `multiSchema` and declares the `audit` schema; the `AuditEvent` model and `AuditOutcome` enum live in it.
-- Three Postgres roles exist: `audit_writer` (INSERT only on `audit.events`), `audit_reader` (SELECT only), `audit_archiver` (DELETE only, on rows older than the configured retention). The schema migration includes the explicit `REVOKE UPDATE, DELETE, TRUNCATE FROM PUBLIC` on `audit.events` and the targeted grants.
-- `apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.module.ts` provides an `AuditService` with one typed method per event family (`signIn`, `signInFailed`, `signOut`, `sessionExpired`, `sessionRevoked`, `tokenValidationFailed`, `mfaAssertionFailed`, `authzDeny`, plus dormant `adminAction` and `sensitiveDataAccess`).
-- `AuditService` connects via `AUDIT_DATABASE_URL` as `audit_writer`; a startup probe asserts that the role can `INSERT` and cannot `UPDATE` (a deliberate failing UPDATE during boot is rejected, the BFF starts; if it succeeds, the BFF refuses to start).
-- The auth controller, token-validation interceptor, MFA guard, sessions module, and authorization guards each call `AuditService` on the relevant outcomes. Tests assert one audit row per event.
-- The retention purge runs daily; failure raises an alert and emits `audit.retention.purge` with `outcome = failure`.
-- The same `LOG_USER_ID_SALT` is used by app logs and by audit; an integration test asserts that the same user produces the same `actor_id_hash` in both streams.
-- `AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS < 30` and missing required env vars prevent BFF startup.
+**Wired in the foundation PR:**
+
+- `apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma` enables the `multiSchema` preview, declares the `audit` schema alongside `public`, and carries the `AuditEvent` model with `AuditAudience` (`workforce | customer`) and `AuditOutcome` (`success | failure | denied`) enums.
+- The migration `prisma/migrations/*_init_audit_schema/migration.sql` creates `audit.events`, `ALTER`s table + enum types to be owned by `audit_owner`, and re-applies the role grants explicitly: `INSERT` to `audit_writer`, `SELECT` to `audit_reader`, `SELECT, DELETE` to `audit_archiver` (SELECT is needed for archiver to evaluate the `created_at` predicate of "delete older than retention"). No grant of `UPDATE` or `TRUNCATE` to anyone — including the migrator's own login at runtime; only fresh schema migrations amend the table.
+- The roles themselves and the schema with default privileges are provisioned earlier by `infra/local/init/postgres/01-init.sql` (dev) — production replicates the same SQL via the future on-prem infrastructure ADR.
+- `apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.service.ts` exposes a single `AuditWriter.recordEvent(input)` method. Every write runs in a transaction whose first statement is `SET LOCAL ROLE audit_writer`, so the runtime contract holds even if the BFF connection is otherwise privileged. `trace_id` is auto-resolved from the active OTel span; `actor_id_hash` is read from CLS or accepted as an explicit override (placeholder until ADR-0009 / ADR-0010 land their guards). Failures propagate — no catch-and-swallow, per "blocking writes: no audit ⇒ no action".
+- BFF connects via the shared `DATABASE_URL` (the role switch is per-transaction). A separate `AUDIT_DATABASE_URL` connection pool is the production hardening, deferred — see "wired as features land" below.
+- Smoke-tested end to end against the local-dev Postgres: `audit_writer` INSERTs successfully, fails on `UPDATE` and `DELETE`; `audit_archiver` SELECTs + DELETEs successfully.
+
+**Wired as the corresponding features land:**
+
+- One typed method per event family on `AuditWriter` — `signIn`, `signInFailed`, `signOut`, `sessionExpired`, `sessionRevoked`, `tokenValidationFailed`, `mfaAssertionFailed`, `authzDeny`, `adminAction`, `sensitiveDataAccess` — added as the matching feature ships (ADR-0009 / ADR-0010 / ADR-0011 / future authz). v1 keeps the surface narrow with the single `recordEvent` so events can be emitted today (e.g. by the auth flow once it lands) while the typed catalogue accretes on a real basis.
+- `AUDIT_DATABASE_URL` separate connection (a distinct pool with `audit_writer`-only login credentials) — defense-in-depth that locks down what an at-runtime SQL injection can do further. v1 mitigates with `SET LOCAL ROLE` at the cost of sharing the pool with public-schema reads/writes; v2 splits.
+- Startup self-test probe — a deliberate failing `UPDATE` against `audit.events` during boot, asserting it is rejected; if it succeeds, the BFF refuses to start. Lands with the connection split above.
+- Retention purge job invoking the `audit_archiver` role daily via cron, emitting `audit.retention.purge` with `outcome = failure` on error. Operational concern — phase-3b infra ADR.
+- Auth controller, MFA guard, sessions module, and authorization guards each call `AuditWriter` on the relevant outcomes. Tests assert one audit row per event.
+- Integration test verifying that the same user produces the same `actor_id_hash` in both Pino logs and audit rows (same `LOG_USER_ID_SALT`, same hashing path) — wired with the auth + LOG_USER_ID_SALT enforcement.
+- `AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS < 30` and missing required env vars prevent BFF startup — wired with the retention job.
+- Live-DB integration tests asserting the role contract (UPDATE/TRUNCATE rejected at runtime) — Testcontainers harness, separate PR.
 
 ## Pros and Cons of the Options