apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.service.spec.ts

@@ -316,6 +316,57 @@ describe('AuditWriter — typed event methods', () => {
     });
   });
 
+  describe('mfaRequired()', () => {
+    it('records auth.mfa_required (denied) with reason + freshnessSeconds in payload', async () => {
+      const { writer, prisma, hashUserId } = await createSubject();
+      await writer.mfaRequired({
+        actor: { oid: 'user-oid' },
+        attemptedRoute: 'GET /api/admin/me',
+        reason: 'no-mfa-in-amr',
+        freshnessSeconds: 600,
+      });
+      expect(hashUserId.hash).toHaveBeenCalledWith('user-oid');
+      const row = extractInsertedRow(prisma);
+      expect(row.eventType).toBe('auth.mfa_required');
+      expect(row.audience).toBe('workforce');
+      expect(row.outcome).toBe('denied');
+      expect(row.actorIdHash).toBe('hash(user-oid)');
+      expect(row.subject).toBe('GET /api/admin/me');
+      expect(row.payloadJson).toBe(
+        JSON.stringify({ reason: 'no-mfa-in-amr', freshnessSeconds: 600 }),
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('includes mfaAgeMs in the payload when supplied (stale-session path)', async () => {
+      const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+      await writer.mfaRequired({
+        actor: { oid: 'user-oid' },
+        attemptedRoute: 'POST /api/admin/cms/pages',
+        reason: 'mfa-stale',
+        freshnessSeconds: 600,
+        mfaAgeMs: 720_000,
+      });
+      expect(extractInsertedRow(prisma).payloadJson).toBe(
+        JSON.stringify({ reason: 'mfa-stale', freshnessSeconds: 600, mfaAgeMs: 720_000 }),
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('omits mfaAgeMs from the payload when undefined (no-mfa-verified-at path)', async () => {
+      const { writer, prisma } = await createSubject();
+      await writer.mfaRequired({
+        actor: { oid: 'user-oid' },
+        attemptedRoute: 'GET /api/admin/me',
+        reason: 'no-mfa-verified-at',
+        freshnessSeconds: 600,
+      });
+      const payload = JSON.parse(extractInsertedRow(prisma).payloadJson as string) as Record<
+        string,
+        unknown
+      >;
+      expect(payload).not.toHaveProperty('mfaAgeMs');
+    });
+  });
+
   describe('adminAccessDenied()', () => {
     it('records admin.access_denied with outcome=denied, attempted route as subject, and rolesHeld payload', async () => {
       const { writer, prisma, hashUserId } = await createSubject();

apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.service.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { PrismaService } from 'nestjs-prisma';
 import type {
   AdminAccessDeniedInput,
   AuditEventInput,
+  MfaRequiredInput,
   SignInActor,
   SignInFailedInput,
   SignOutInput,
@@ -114,6 +115,32 @@ export class AuditWriter {
     });
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Typed event: a request was rejected by `RequireMfaGuard` because
+   * the session did not satisfy the route's MFA freshness gate.
+   * Per ADR-0011 §"Step-up MFA — designed-in, dormant", every
+   * step-up challenge emitted by the BFF lands here so auditors can
+   * track the distribution of step-up prompts (and the rate of stale
+   * `mfaVerifiedAt` rejections that would suggest the default
+   * freshness is too tight). `outcome=denied` matches the
+   * `AdminRoleGuard` posture: the user *is* authenticated, the
+   * action is just refused.
+   */
+  async mfaRequired(input: MfaRequiredInput): Promise<void> {
+    await this.recordEvent({
+      eventType: 'auth.mfa_required',
+      audience: 'workforce',
+      outcome: 'denied',
+      actorIdHash: this.hashUserId.hash(input.actor.oid),
+      subject: input.attemptedRoute,
+      payload: {
+        reason: input.reason,
+        freshnessSeconds: input.freshnessSeconds,
+        ...(input.mfaAgeMs !== undefined ? { mfaAgeMs: input.mfaAgeMs } : {}),
+      },
+    });
+  }
+
   /**
    * Typed event: `/api/admin/*` request rejected by `AdminRoleGuard`
    * because the session's `roles` claim does not include `admin`.

apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.types.ts

@@ -100,3 +100,21 @@ export interface AdminAccessDeniedInput {
    */
   rolesHeld: readonly string[];
 }
+
+/** Reason `RequireMfaGuard` rejected a request — fed into the audit payload. */
+export type MfaRequiredReason = 'no-mfa-in-amr' | 'no-mfa-verified-at' | 'mfa-stale';
+
+export interface MfaRequiredInput {
+  actor: { oid: string };
+  /** Canonical "{METHOD} {originalUrl}" of the rejected request. */
+  attemptedRoute: string;
+  reason: MfaRequiredReason;
+  /**
+   * Freshness window (seconds) the guard checked against. Captured
+   * so an auditor can tell apart a 10-min default rejection from a
+   * tighter per-route override.
+   */
+  freshnessSeconds: number;
+  /** Age (ms) of the session's `mfaVerifiedAt` at the moment of rejection — undefined when the session had none. */
+  mfaAgeMs?: number;
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.spec.ts

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ interface SessionStub {
   createdAt?: number;
   absoluteExpiresAt?: number;
   csrfToken?: string;
+  mfaVerifiedAt?: number;
   save: jest.Mock;
   destroy: jest.Mock;
 }
@@ -230,6 +231,27 @@ describe('AuthController.callback', () => {
     expect(res.redirect).toHaveBeenCalledWith(302, ENTRA.postLogoutRedirectUri);
   });
 
+  it('records mfaVerifiedAt on the session (ADR-0011 §"Confirmation")', async () => {
+    const before = Date.now();
+    const { controller } = makeController();
+    const res = makeResStub();
+    const session = makeSessionStub();
+    const req = makeReqStub({
+      signedCookies: { [PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_NAME]: JSON.stringify(PRE_AUTH) },
+      session,
+    });
+
+    await controller.callback(req, res, 'auth-code', PRE_AUTH.state);
+
+    const after = Date.now();
+    expect(session.mfaVerifiedAt).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(before);
+    expect(session.mfaVerifiedAt).toBeLessThanOrEqual(after);
+    // Posted at the same moment as createdAt — the callback grabs
+    // `now` once and writes both fields, so the freshness anchor
+    // and the absolute-timeout anchor share a clock reading.
+    expect(session.mfaVerifiedAt).toBe(session.createdAt);
+  });
+
   it('records createdAt + absoluteExpiresAt on the session (ADR-0010 §"TTL policy")', async () => {
     // Force the ADR-0010 default for this test — apps/portal-bff/.env
     // may have a custom SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS for local

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.ts

@@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ export class AuthController {
       // the SPA's read-only mirror used to echo the value in the
       // X-CSRF-Token header.
       req.session.csrfToken = csrfToken;
+      // MFA freshness anchor per ADR-0011 §"Confirmation". Entra's
+      // CA policy decides whether MFA actually happened — the BFF
+      // does not re-validate factors. The stamp reflects "the
+      // session was just established with whatever assurance Entra
+      // returned"; `RequireMfaGuard` measures freshness against it.
+      // Refreshed by future step-up re-auth flows.
+      req.session.mfaVerifiedAt = now;
       // Force the save before the redirect: express-session writes
       // on response end, but the 302 we're about to emit closes the
       // response before the async store-write would otherwise

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.module.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { AuthController } from './auth.controller';
 import { AuthService } from './auth.service';
 import { ENTRA_CONFIG, type EntraConfig } from './entra-config.token';
 import { MSAL_CLIENT } from './msal-client.token';
+import { RequireMfaGuard } from './require-mfa.guard';
 
 /**
  * Auth module — owns the Entra ID configuration, the MSAL Node
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ import { MSAL_CLIENT } from './msal-client.token';
   controllers: [AuthController],
   providers: [
     AuthService,
+    RequireMfaGuard,
     {
       provide: ENTRA_CONFIG,
       useFactory: () => assertEntraConfig(),
@@ -88,6 +90,6 @@ import { MSAL_CLIENT } from './msal-client.token';
         }),
     },
   ],
-  exports: [ENTRA_CONFIG, MSAL_CLIENT],
+  exports: [ENTRA_CONFIG, MSAL_CLIENT, RequireMfaGuard],
 })
 export class AuthModule {}

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/mfa.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+import { MFA_AMR_VALUES, wasMultiFactor } from './mfa';
+
+describe('MFA_AMR_VALUES', () => {
+  it('covers the documented Entra MFA emission tokens', () => {
+    // Spec assertion against the list per ADR-0011 §"BFF
+    // verification". Changing this list is a deliberate ADR-recorded
+    // decision; the test fails loudly when someone edits the const
+    // without updating the ADR's confirmation block.
+    expect([...MFA_AMR_VALUES]).toEqual(['mfa', 'otp', 'fido', 'wia', 'phr']);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('wasMultiFactor', () => {
+  it.each([
+    [['mfa']],
+    [['otp']],
+    [['fido']],
+    [['wia']],
+    [['phr']],
+    [['pwd', 'mfa']],
+    [['mfa', 'pwd']],
+    [['totp', 'pwd', 'fido']], // unknown token mixed in, fido still counts
+  ])('returns true when amr=%j contains an MFA-class token', (amr) => {
+    expect(wasMultiFactor(amr)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    [[]],
+    [['pwd']],
+    [['pwd', 'sms']], // 'sms' is not in our allow-list (Entra emits 'otp' instead)
+    [['unknown']],
+  ])('returns false when amr=%j carries no MFA-class token', (amr) => {
+    expect(wasMultiFactor(amr)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/mfa.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * `amr` claim values that the BFF treats as evidence of multi-factor
+ * authentication having occurred at sign-in (or step-up). Per
+ * [ADR-0011](../../../../docs/decisions/0011-mfa-enforcement-entra-conditional-access.md)
+ * §"BFF verification" the list is the BFF-side allow-list used by
+ * `@RequireMfa()` to decide whether a session is multi-factored.
+ *
+ * - `mfa`       — generic "multi-factor" indicator Entra emits when a
+ *                 Conditional-Access policy enforced MFA, regardless
+ *                 of factor.
+ * - `otp`       — one-time-password (SMS / authenticator app code).
+ * - `fido`      — FIDO2 / WebAuthn (phishing-resistant; the target).
+ * - `wia`       — Windows Integrated Auth (Hello, Kerberos-bound).
+ * - `phr`       — phishing-resistant authenticator (Entra's umbrella
+ *                 token for fido + cert-bound flows).
+ *
+ * Not exhaustive — the list is reviewed against Microsoft's
+ * documentation on each security-review cadence. Adding a value here
+ * is a deliberate ADR-recorded decision; do not add ad-hoc.
+ *
+ * Sign-in via password alone surfaces as `["pwd"]` (no MFA value)
+ * and is rejected by `@RequireMfa()` even when the session itself
+ * is otherwise valid.
+ */
+export const MFA_AMR_VALUES = ['mfa', 'otp', 'fido', 'wia', 'phr'] as const;
+
+/**
+ * True when at least one entry in the session user's `amr` array is
+ * in {@link MFA_AMR_VALUES}. Used by `RequireMfaGuard` and by the
+ * (deferred) callback-time sanity-check per ADR-0011 §"Confirmation".
+ */
+export function wasMultiFactor(amr: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  const allowed = new Set<string>(MFA_AMR_VALUES);
+  return amr.some((v) => allowed.has(v));
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/require-mfa.decorator.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import { SetMetadata, UseGuards, applyDecorators } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { REQUIRE_MFA_METADATA, RequireMfaGuard } from './require-mfa.guard';
+
+export interface RequireMfaOptions {
+  /**
+   * Override of `MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS` for this specific route.
+   * Useful for surfaces that demand a tighter window than the
+   * global default (e.g. admin entry uses 10 min explicitly per
+   * ADR-0020). When omitted, the guard reads the env value at
+   * resolution time.
+   */
+  freshness?: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `@RequireMfa()` — gates a route on a recent MFA assertion per
+ * [ADR-0011](../../../../docs/decisions/0011-mfa-enforcement-entra-conditional-access.md).
+ *
+ * Behaviour at the guard:
+ *
+ *   1. No session → 401 `unauthenticated`.
+ *   2. `session.user.amr` carries no MFA-class value → 401
+ *      `mfa_required` (SPA interceptor triggers re-auth).
+ *   3. `session.mfaVerifiedAt` missing or older than the freshness
+ *      window → 401 `mfa_required` (step-up).
+ *   4. Otherwise → pass through.
+ *
+ * Composable with `@RequireAdmin()`: when both are applied (admin
+ * entry route per ADR-0020), Nest runs them in registration order.
+ * Always put `@RequireMfa()` *outside* `@RequireAdmin()` so the
+ * freshness check fires only after the user is established as an
+ * admin — keeping the audit log noise-free.
+ *
+ * Per-route override:
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * @RequireMfa({ freshness: 600 })  // 10 min, admin entry
+ * @Get('me')
+ * me() { … }
+ * ```
+ */
+export function RequireMfa(options?: RequireMfaOptions): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator {
+  return applyDecorators(
+    SetMetadata(REQUIRE_MFA_METADATA, options ?? {}),
+    UseGuards(RequireMfaGuard),
+  );
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/require-mfa.guard.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+import { ExecutionContext, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Reflector } from '@nestjs/core';
+import type { Request } from 'express';
+import { AuditWriter } from '../audit/audit.service';
+import { REQUIRE_MFA_METADATA, RequireMfaGuard } from './require-mfa.guard';
+
+interface SessionStub {
+  user?: {
+    oid: string;
+    tid: string;
+    username: string;
+    displayName: string;
+    amr: readonly string[];
+    roles: readonly string[];
+  };
+  mfaVerifiedAt?: number;
+}
+
+function makeRequest(opts: {
+  session?: SessionStub;
+  method?: string;
+  originalUrl?: string;
+}): Request {
+  return {
+    session: opts.session,
+    method: opts.method ?? 'GET',
+    originalUrl: opts.originalUrl ?? '/api/admin/me',
+  } as unknown as Request;
+}
+
+function makeContext(req: Request): ExecutionContext {
+  return {
+    switchToHttp: () => ({ getRequest: <T>() => req as T }),
+    getHandler: () => () => undefined,
+    getClass: () => class {},
+  } as unknown as ExecutionContext;
+}
+
+function makeAuditStub(): jest.Mocked<Pick<AuditWriter, 'mfaRequired'>> {
+  return { mfaRequired: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+}
+
+function makeReflectorStub(metadata?: { freshness?: number }): Reflector {
+  return {
+    getAllAndOverride: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(metadata),
+  } as unknown as Reflector;
+}
+
+const USER = {
+  oid: 'user-oid',
+  tid: 't',
+  username: 'jane@example',
+  displayName: 'Jane',
+  amr: ['pwd', 'mfa'],
+  roles: ['admin'],
+};
+
+describe('RequireMfaGuard', () => {
+  const originalFreshness = process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'];
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (originalFreshness === undefined) {
+      delete process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'];
+    } else {
+      process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = originalFreshness;
+    }
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+  });
+
+  it('throws 401 unauthenticated when there is no session', async () => {
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: undefined }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { code: 'unauthenticated' },
+    });
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('throws 401 unauthenticated when the session has no user', async () => {
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: {} }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(UnauthorizedException);
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('throws 401 mfa_required + audits when amr carries no MFA-class token', async () => {
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(
+      makeRequest({
+        session: { user: { ...USER, amr: ['pwd'] }, mfaVerifiedAt: Date.now() },
+        method: 'POST',
+        originalUrl: '/api/admin/audit/query',
+      }),
+    );
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { code: 'mfa_required' },
+    });
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      actor: { oid: 'user-oid' },
+      attemptedRoute: 'POST /api/admin/audit/query',
+      reason: 'no-mfa-in-amr',
+      freshnessSeconds: 600,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('throws 401 mfa_required + audits when mfaVerifiedAt is missing from the session', async () => {
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: { user: USER /* no mfaVerifiedAt */ } }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { code: 'mfa_required' },
+    });
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      actor: { oid: 'user-oid' },
+      attemptedRoute: 'GET /api/admin/me',
+      reason: 'no-mfa-verified-at',
+      freshnessSeconds: 600,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('throws 401 mfa_required + audits with mfaAgeMs when assertion is stale', async () => {
+    const now = 10_000_000_000;
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    jest.setSystemTime(now);
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const stale = now - 700_000; // 700 s old, default freshness is 600 s
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: { user: USER, mfaVerifiedAt: stale } }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { code: 'mfa_required' },
+    });
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      actor: { oid: 'user-oid' },
+      attemptedRoute: 'GET /api/admin/me',
+      reason: 'mfa-stale',
+      freshnessSeconds: 600,
+      mfaAgeMs: 700_000,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('returns true when MFA assertion is within the freshness window', async () => {
+    const now = 10_000_000_000;
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    jest.setSystemTime(now);
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: { user: USER, mfaVerifiedAt: now - 60_000 } }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).resolves.toBe(true);
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('returns true at the exact freshness boundary (age == freshness)', async () => {
+    const now = 10_000_000_000;
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    jest.setSystemTime(now);
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: { user: USER, mfaVerifiedAt: now - 600_000 } }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).resolves.toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('honours a per-route freshness override (tighter than env default)', async () => {
+    const now = 10_000_000_000;
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    jest.setSystemTime(now);
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    // Default env (600 s) would pass; route asks for 60 s, so a
+    // 5-min-old assertion must be rejected.
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(
+      makeReflectorStub({ freshness: 60 }),
+      audit as unknown as AuditWriter,
+    );
+    const ctx = makeContext(
+      makeRequest({ session: { user: USER, mfaVerifiedAt: now - 5 * 60_000 } }),
+    );
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { code: 'mfa_required' },
+    });
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ reason: 'mfa-stale', freshnessSeconds: 60 }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('honours MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS when set and no per-route override', async () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '120';
+    const now = 10_000_000_000;
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    jest.setSystemTime(now);
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: { user: USER, mfaVerifiedAt: now - 180_000 } }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { code: 'mfa_required' },
+    });
+    expect(audit.mfaRequired).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ freshnessSeconds: 120 }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('propagates audit-write failures (no audit ⇒ no action, per ADR-0013)', async () => {
+    const audit = {
+      mfaRequired: jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('audit_writer denied')),
+    };
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(makeReflectorStub(), audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: { user: { ...USER, amr: ['pwd'] } } }));
+    await expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).rejects.toThrow('audit_writer denied');
+  });
+
+  it('reads the per-route options via the Reflector under the documented metadata key', async () => {
+    const audit = makeAuditStub();
+    const reflector = makeReflectorStub({ freshness: 60 });
+    const guard = new RequireMfaGuard(reflector, audit as unknown as AuditWriter);
+    const ctx = makeContext(makeRequest({ session: { user: USER, mfaVerifiedAt: Date.now() } }));
+    await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+    expect(reflector.getAllAndOverride).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      REQUIRE_MFA_METADATA,
+      expect.any(Array),
+    );
+  });
+});

apps/portal-bff/src/auth/require-mfa.guard.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+import { CanActivate, ExecutionContext, Injectable, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Reflector } from '@nestjs/core';
+import type { Request } from 'express';
+import { AuditWriter } from '../audit/audit.service';
+import type { MfaRequiredReason } from '../audit/audit.types';
+import { readMfaConfig } from '../config/check-mfa-config';
+import { wasMultiFactor } from './mfa';
+import type { RequireMfaOptions } from './require-mfa.decorator';
+
+/**
+ * Reflector metadata key carrying the per-route `RequireMfaOptions`.
+ * Re-exported by the decorator module so the two stay in lockstep.
+ */
+export const REQUIRE_MFA_METADATA = 'auth:require-mfa';
+
+/**
+ * 401 response code emitted on every MFA-step-up rejection. The SPA
+ * interceptor (per ADR-0011 §"Step-up MFA — SPA cooperation") will
+ * pivot on this exact value to distinguish a step-up challenge from
+ * a plain "no session" 401 — and trigger an Entra re-auth round
+ * trip with a claims challenge in a later PR. v1 surfaces the code
+ * without the `WWW-Authenticate` header / MSAL claims blob; both
+ * land when the SPA interceptor is built.
+ */
+const MFA_REQUIRED_CODE = 'mfa_required';
+
+/**
+ * `RequireMfaGuard` — enforces ADR-0011's step-up MFA freshness
+ * window.
+ *
+ * Contract
+ * --------
+ * - **No session → 401 `unauthenticated`.** Same shape as the
+ *   `AdminRoleGuard` 401 branch: no audit row (unauthenticated
+ *   traffic is noise). The user just needs to sign in.
+ *
+ * - **Session with no MFA-class `amr` → 401 `mfa_required`.** The
+ *   session is authenticated but does not reflect an MFA assertion
+ *   at all (password-only sign-in, CA policy mis-skipped MFA, etc.).
+ *   Emits `auth.mfa_required` with `reason=no-mfa-in-amr`.
+ *
+ * - **Session with stale `mfaVerifiedAt` → 401 `mfa_required`.**
+ *   The user did MFA at some point but the assertion is older than
+ *   the freshness window. Emits `auth.mfa_required` with
+ *   `reason=mfa-stale`. The `mfaAgeMs` payload field lets auditors
+ *   see how far past freshness the rejection landed.
+ *
+ * - **Session with no `mfaVerifiedAt` at all → 401 `mfa_required`.**
+ *   Defensive — sessions created before this field was introduced
+ *   would otherwise leak past the guard. Emits
+ *   `auth.mfa_required` with `reason=no-mfa-verified-at`.
+ *
+ * - **Audit-write failures propagate.** Same posture as
+ *   `AdminRoleGuard`: no audit ⇒ no action per ADR-0013.
+ *
+ * Freshness resolution: per-route `RequireMfaOptions.freshness`
+ * wins; otherwise the env-driven `MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS` (default
+ * 600 s, min 60 s — validated by `readMfaConfig`).
+ */
+@Injectable()
+export class RequireMfaGuard implements CanActivate {
+  constructor(
+    private readonly reflector: Reflector,
+    private readonly audit: AuditWriter,
+  ) {}
+
+  async canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): Promise<boolean> {
+    const req = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<Request>();
+    const user = req.session?.user;
+
+    if (!user) {
+      throw new UnauthorizedException({
+        code: 'unauthenticated',
+        message: 'Unauthenticated',
+      });
+    }
+
+    const options = this.resolveOptions(context);
+    const freshnessSeconds = options.freshness ?? readMfaConfig().freshnessSeconds;
+    const route = `${req.method} ${req.originalUrl}`;
+    const now = Date.now();
+
+    if (!wasMultiFactor(user.amr)) {
+      await this.audit.mfaRequired({
+        actor: { oid: user.oid },
+        attemptedRoute: route,
+        reason: 'no-mfa-in-amr',
+        freshnessSeconds,
+      });
+      throw this.mfaChallenge('no-mfa-in-amr');
+    }
+
+    const verifiedAt = req.session?.mfaVerifiedAt;
+    if (verifiedAt === undefined) {
+      await this.audit.mfaRequired({
+        actor: { oid: user.oid },
+        attemptedRoute: route,
+        reason: 'no-mfa-verified-at',
+        freshnessSeconds,
+      });
+      throw this.mfaChallenge('no-mfa-verified-at');
+    }
+
+    const ageMs = now - verifiedAt;
+    if (ageMs > freshnessSeconds * 1000) {
+      await this.audit.mfaRequired({
+        actor: { oid: user.oid },
+        attemptedRoute: route,
+        reason: 'mfa-stale',
+        freshnessSeconds,
+        mfaAgeMs: ageMs,
+      });
+      throw this.mfaChallenge('mfa-stale');
+    }
+
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  private resolveOptions(context: ExecutionContext): RequireMfaOptions {
+    // Method-level metadata wins over class-level — same merge
+    // strategy Nest's built-in guards use. `getAllAndOverride`
+    // returns the first non-undefined match in the lookup order.
+    return (
+      this.reflector.getAllAndOverride<RequireMfaOptions>(REQUIRE_MFA_METADATA, [
+        context.getHandler(),
+        context.getClass(),
+      ]) ?? {}
+    );
+  }
+
+  private mfaChallenge(reason: MfaRequiredReason): UnauthorizedException {
+    // Structured-error envelope per ADR-0021 — the
+    // StructuredErrorFilter expects `code` + `message` on the
+    // exception response body. The `reason` is intentionally NOT
+    // surfaced over the wire: an attacker shouldn't be able to
+    // distinguish a stale session from a no-MFA session by probing.
+    // The audit row carries the reason for forensic use.
+    void reason;
+    return new UnauthorizedException({
+      code: MFA_REQUIRED_CODE,
+      message: 'Fresh multi-factor authentication required',
+    });
+  }
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-mfa-config.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import { readMfaConfig } from './check-mfa-config';
+
+describe('readMfaConfig', () => {
+  const original = process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'];
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (original === undefined) {
+      delete process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'];
+    } else {
+      process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = original;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('defaults to 600 seconds when MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS is unset', () => {
+    delete process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'];
+    expect(readMfaConfig()).toEqual({ freshnessSeconds: 600 });
+  });
+
+  it('defaults to 600 seconds when MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS is the empty string', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '';
+    expect(readMfaConfig()).toEqual({ freshnessSeconds: 600 });
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a positive integer above the minimum', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '1200';
+    expect(readMfaConfig()).toEqual({ freshnessSeconds: 1200 });
+  });
+
+  it('accepts the minimum (60) exactly', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '60';
+    expect(readMfaConfig()).toEqual({ freshnessSeconds: 60 });
+  });
+
+  it('throws when MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS is below the 60 s floor', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '30';
+    expect(() => readMfaConfig()).toThrow(/must be ≥ 60/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS is not a positive integer', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '0';
+    expect(() => readMfaConfig()).toThrow(/positive integer/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS is negative', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '-600';
+    expect(() => readMfaConfig()).toThrow(/positive integer/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS is non-numeric', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = 'soon';
+    expect(() => readMfaConfig()).toThrow(/positive integer/);
+  });
+
+  it('throws when MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS is a decimal', () => {
+    process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'] = '600.5';
+    expect(() => readMfaConfig()).toThrow(/positive integer/);
+  });
+});

apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-mfa-config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/**
+ * Reads + validates the MFA-related env vars at boot.
+ *
+ *   MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS — default 600 (10 min). Window during
+ *     which a session's `mfaVerifiedAt` is considered "fresh enough"
+ *     for routes decorated with `@RequireMfa()`. The decorator can
+ *     override it per-route; the env value is the global default.
+ *
+ * Minimum: 60 s. Anything below would mean the user has to re-MFA
+ * basically on every navigation; the floor catches a misconfigured
+ * `MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS=30` before the BFF starts. ADR-0011's
+ * confirmation list explicitly calls out this floor.
+ *
+ * No upper bound — operators can pick a long window for low-risk
+ * surfaces if they want; the trade-off is theirs to record in their
+ * runbook, not the BFF's to refuse.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_FRESHNESS_SECONDS = 600;
+const MIN_FRESHNESS_SECONDS = 60;
+
+export interface MfaConfig {
+  readonly freshnessSeconds: number;
+}
+
+export function readMfaConfig(): MfaConfig {
+  const raw = process.env['MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS'];
+  if (raw === undefined || raw === '') {
+    return { freshnessSeconds: DEFAULT_FRESHNESS_SECONDS };
+  }
+  const value = Number(raw);
+  if (!Number.isInteger(value) || value <= 0) {
+    throw new Error(`MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS must be a positive integer (got "${raw}").`);
+  }
+  if (value < MIN_FRESHNESS_SECONDS) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `MFA_FRESHNESS_SECONDS must be ≥ ${MIN_FRESHNESS_SECONDS} (got ${value}). ` +
+        `Anything shorter forces re-MFA on every navigation and is almost certainly a misconfiguration.`,
+    );
+  }
+  return { freshnessSeconds: value };
+}

apps/portal-bff/src/session/session.types.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,21 @@ declare module 'express-session' {
      * SPA's read-only mirror; the source of truth lives here.
      */
     csrfToken?: string;
+    /**
+     * Epoch ms of the last MFA assertion captured on this session.
+     * Set at sign-in by the callback (Entra's CA policy is the
+     * authority on whether MFA actually occurred — the BFF just
+     * stamps "now" when it persists a session whose `amr` reflects
+     * MFA). Will be refreshed by future step-up re-auth flows per
+     * ADR-0011.
+     *
+     * Consumed by `RequireMfaGuard` to decide whether the session
+     * is "fresh enough" for routes decorated with `@RequireMfa()`.
+     * Undefined when the session was created before this field
+     * existed — the guard treats undefined as "no recent MFA
+     * assertion" and triggers step-up.
+     */
+    mfaVerifiedAt?: number;
   }
 }