b723dea43adbc03bd773567301a7c418be584c03
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 julien
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1160771061 |
feat(portal-admin): profile page on /profile guarded by authGuard (#150)
## Summary PR 2 of 3 from the user-menu / profile / cross-app-link chantier. Lands a `/profile` page on `portal-admin` so the Profile entry the user menu wired in PR 1 stops 404-ing. Portal-shell already had a demo `/profile` route that fits this slot — left as-is rather than churned. | PR | Périmètre | | --- | --- | | PR 1 ✅ | Shared `UserMenu` dropdown + integration. | | **PR 2 (this one)** | `/profile` page on `portal-admin`; `CurrentUser.roles` typed (the BFF already returns it). | | PR 3 | `/api/me/capabilities` + sidebar role widget + cross-app links. | ## What lands ### New page — [`apps/portal-admin/src/app/pages/profile/`](apps/portal-admin/src/app/pages/profile/) Lazy-loaded at `/profile`, guarded by `authGuard` (from `feature-auth`). Two cards: - **Identity** — displayName, username, Entra `oid`, tenant `tid`. The two ids are monospaced + break-anywhere so they don't push the layout on narrow viewports. - **App roles** — chips listing every Entra app-role claim the session carries (`Portal.Admin` for v1, future business roles once ADR-0011 step-up lands its real consumers). Hidden entirely when the `roles` array is empty so anonymous-then-promoted accounts don't see a "no roles" affordance that doesn't help anyone. The `@if (user())` template guard narrows the type so the page is single-branch — `authGuard` already blocked anonymous traffic upstream. Lazy chunk lands at **5.37 KB raw / 1.57 KB gzip** — comfortably under the per-chunk lazy budget. ### Route — [`apps/portal-admin/src/app/app.routes.ts`](apps/portal-admin/src/app/app.routes.ts) ```ts { path: 'profile', canActivate: [authGuard], loadComponent: () => import('./pages/profile/profile').then((m) => m.ProfilePage), title: profileTitle, } ``` `route.profile.title` added to [`messages.fr.xlf`](apps/portal-admin/src/locale/messages.fr.xlf) (FR target retained for parity with the other route titles, even though portal-admin doesn't expose a locale switcher in v1 per ADR-0020). ### Type — [`libs/feature/auth/src/lib/auth.types.ts`](libs/feature/auth/src/lib/auth.types.ts) ```ts export interface CurrentUser { … /** Optional; present on `/api/admin/auth/me`, omitted on `/api/auth/me`. */ readonly roles?: readonly string[]; } ``` `/api/admin/auth/me` already returns `roles` (PR #129), but `CurrentUser` was discarding it through the typed deserialization. Marking the field optional captures the existing BFF response without surfacing the claim on the user portal — ADR-0009's "curated public view" stays intact on `/api/auth/me`, which simply doesn't populate it. ## Notes for the reviewer - **Why not refresh `portal-shell`'s `/profile` too?** The existing demo page already has the same shape (displayName, username, oid, tid) and is functionally fine. Refreshing for parity would be incidental scope creep against PR 2's goal (unblock the Profile menu entry on the admin surface). PR 3 may revisit when it adds the role display widget. - **Why no `User profile` entry in the admin sidebar?** The user menu already exposes Profile and ADR-0020's v1 sidebar catalogue is "modules", not "self-service shortcuts". Adding a sidebar entry would duplicate the user-menu access path and break the rule that the sidebar maps to admin business modules. - **Why a single English-source page, not FR-translated content?** Same posture as the audit + users pages: per ADR-0020 §"No locale switcher in v1", admin chrome stays in source locale. Route titles are i18n-marked because the prod build's `i18nMissingTranslation=error` policy would fail otherwise — the page body text doesn't need to be. - **Why not show roles on the portal-shell side too?** That's PR 3, gated on the `/api/me/capabilities` design (the user picked the dedicated capabilities endpoint over `roles`-on-user-/me). Adding any role-related rendering here would pre-empt that choice. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-admin` — **50 specs pass** (was 46, +4 for the new `ProfilePage` spec). - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t lint test build --projects=portal-shell,portal-admin,shared-ui,shared-state,feature-auth` — 15/15 tasks green, including the i18n-strict `portal-shell:build:production`. - [ ] Manual smoke — sign in on portal-admin, click the avatar → Profile entry, confirm: identity card populated, App roles card shows `Portal.Admin` (if you have the role assigned), Settings entry of the user menu still greyed with the Soon badge. ## What's next PR 3 lands the cross-app machinery — `GET /api/me/capabilities` endpoint, real role surfacing on the user-portal sidebar widget (`Anonymous` → `Authenticated` / role label, no more hardcode), and the symmetric "Open Portal Admin" / "Open Portal Shell" entries in each app's user menu, gated on the capabilities response. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #150 |
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julien
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6120471b66 |
chore(workspace): tsconfig composite refs + axe-linter false-positive config (#147)
## Summary
Three editor-noise sources flagged by the VS Code TypeScript service + the Deque axe Linter extension, each tamed at the right layer. No runtime behaviour change.
| Source | Fix |
| --- | --- |
| **TS6306** — Referenced project `libs/{shared/ui,shared/state,feature/auth}` must have `composite: true`. Nx 22's lib generator doesn't emit `composite`; modern VS Code TS service flags it. | Add `composite: true` to each lib's `tsconfig.lib.json`, let `nx sync` redirect consumer references in `apps/portal-{shell,admin}/tsconfig.app.json` to point at the `.lib.json` directly. |
| **TS6504** — `moduleResolution: "node"` / `"node10"` deprecated, removed in TS 7.0. Two hits on the BFF tsconfigs. | Add `ignoreDeprecations: "5.0"` on `apps/portal-bff/tsconfig.{app,spec}.json` — the opt-out knob the diagnostic itself suggests. A proper migration to `nodenext`/`node16` is a separate chantier. |
| **axe-core/list (WCAG 1.3.1)** — `<ul>` "must only directly contain `<li>`, `<script>`, or `<template>`" — fires on Angular 17+ `@for` blocks inside lists. Pure static-linter limitation; rendered DOM is fine. | New `.axe-linter.yml` at repo root: `global-disable: [list]`. |
## What lands
### `composite: true` on lib `.lib.json`
[`libs/shared/ui/tsconfig.lib.json`](libs/shared/ui/tsconfig.lib.json), [`libs/shared/state/tsconfig.lib.json`](libs/shared/state/tsconfig.lib.json), [`libs/feature/auth/tsconfig.lib.json`](libs/feature/auth/tsconfig.lib.json) get `composite: true` added. `nx sync` then automatically rewrites consumer references:
```diff
- "path": "../../libs/shared/ui"
+ "path": "../../libs/shared/ui/tsconfig.lib.json"
```
in [`apps/portal-shell/tsconfig.app.json`](apps/portal-shell/tsconfig.app.json) and [`apps/portal-admin/tsconfig.app.json`](apps/portal-admin/tsconfig.app.json). Semantically cleaner — the app references the lib's actual compile config (which produces the `.d.ts` it consumes), not the lib's solution-style root tsconfig.
**Earlier attempt — composite on the solution `tsconfig.json` — silently broke `vitest`**: the Angular Vite plugin chokes on a composite project with `files: []` / `include: []` and falls through, leaving spec files loaded but tests not registered (`"No test suite found in file"`). Moving `composite` to `.lib.json` (the project that actually has inputs) fixes the contract without poking the plugin.
### `ignoreDeprecations: "5.0"`
[`apps/portal-bff/tsconfig.app.json`](apps/portal-bff/tsconfig.app.json) and [`apps/portal-bff/tsconfig.spec.json`](apps/portal-bff/tsconfig.spec.json) — silences `Option 'moduleResolution=node10' is deprecated and will stop functioning in TypeScript 7.0`. The diagnostic suggests `"6.0"` as the value, but TS 5.9 (our pinned version) only accepts `"5.0"`; using `"6.0"` results in `TS5103: Invalid value for '--ignoreDeprecations'` and breaks every spec. `"5.0"` is the current-gen accepted value.
The deprecation is real — TS 7.0 will drop both `"node"` and `"node10"` `moduleResolution` modes. The migration target is `moduleResolution: "nodenext"` paired with matching `module: "nodenext"`, but that interacts non-trivially with Nest's CommonJS pipeline and the BFF's import semantics. Out of scope for a drive-by fix; we'll handle it as a dedicated chantier when TS 7.0 lands on the roadmap.
### `.axe-linter.yml`
New file at repo root:
```yaml
global-disable:
- list
```
The Deque axe Linter VS Code extension reads `.axe-linter.yml` at workspace root. The `list` rule (WCAG 1.3.1) fires false positives on Angular 17+ control-flow syntax — `@for (item of list; ...) { <li>… }` looks like a non-`<li>` child of `<ul>` to a static HTML scanner. The Angular compiler erases those tokens at build time; the rendered DOM is compliant. CI accessibility coverage is provided by `axe-playwright` per [ADR-0016 §"Tooling"](docs/decisions/0016-accessibility-baseline-wcag-aa-targeted-aaa.md) — it runs against the rendered DOM and is unaffected by this disable.
## Notes for the reviewer
- **Why not `composite: true` on every lib?** Per CLAUDE.md "no premature abstractions" — `libs/shared/{tokens,util}` are not currently referenced by any `tsconfig.app.json`, so they don't trigger TS6306. Adding `composite` to them would be future-proofing without a current consumer. When a consumer reference is added, the same one-line fix lands then.
- **Why not migrate `moduleResolution` properly?** The BFF runs on Nest's CommonJS pipeline; `nodenext` brings stricter ESM resolution (`.js` extensions in imports, package `exports` map enforcement) that ripples through. Not a 5-minute change. The `ignoreDeprecations` knob is the textbook defer mechanism for exactly this case.
- **Why disable `list` globally rather than per-file?** The rule's false-positive pattern (`<ul><@for>` / `<ol><@for>`) applies workspace-wide; we use `@for` consistently across `portal-shell` + `portal-admin`. Per-file disables would multiply as new templates land. axe-playwright remains the authoritative check on the rule.
## Test plan
- [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t lint test build --projects=portal-shell,portal-admin,portal-bff,shared-ui,shared-state,feature-auth` — 18/18 tasks pass. **517 specs green** across the affected projects.
- [x] `pnpm nx sync:check` — workspace in sync after the changes; running `sync` again is a no-op.
- [ ] Editor smoke — reopen the workspace in VS Code: the TS6306 errors on lib `tsconfig.json` files should be gone, the two `moduleResolution=node10` deprecation lines on BFF tsconfigs should be silenced, and the `list` rule under `sidebar.html` (`portal-admin`) should no longer surface.
---------
Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #147
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julien
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71a098b154 |
fix(feature-auth): use AUTH_PATH_PREFIX to skip the /me endpoint in the 401 interceptor (#135)
## Summary Regression introduced by PR #134 / merged minutes ago: opening portal-admin while anonymous fires the bootstrap `/admin/auth/me` → 401 → `bffUnauthorizedInterceptor` triggers `AuthService.refresh()` → which re-fires `/admin/auth/me` → 401 → tight loop that exhausts the BFF's 120/min rate limiter in seconds. The user lands on a `rate_limited` error instead of the "Sign in" panel. ## Root cause [`bffUnauthorizedInterceptor`](libs/feature/auth/src/lib/bff-unauthorized.interceptor.ts) deliberately skips the `/me` endpoint to avoid the loop (the bootstrap `/me` legitimately 401s when anonymous). But the skip target was **hardcoded** to `${bffBaseUrl}/auth/me`: ```ts !req.url.startsWith(`${bffBaseUrl}/auth/me`) ``` When portal-admin overrides `AUTH_PATH_PREFIX` to `/admin/auth` (per PR #134), the bootstrap URL becomes `${bffBaseUrl}/admin/auth/me`, which does **not** start with `${bffBaseUrl}/auth/me`. The interceptor treats it as a regular protected route, calls `refresh()`, and we're off to the races. The reported log shows the rate-limit counter dropping `remaining=3 → 2 → 1 → 0` over four `/me` calls within ~25 ms, all 401. ## Fix Derive the skip URL from `AUTH_PATH_PREFIX` (which the interceptor already has access to via DI — same module as the AuthService): ```ts const meUrl = `${bffBaseUrl}${pathPrefix}/me`; … !req.url.startsWith(meUrl) ``` Same behaviour for portal-shell (the default `/auth` factory keeps the skip URL at `/auth/me`), correct behaviour for portal-admin (`/admin/auth/me`), and any future surface that picks a different prefix inherits the fix automatically. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test feature-auth` — **30 specs pass** (was 29; +1 regression spec asserting that no follow-up `/me` is issued after a bootstrap 401 when the prefix is `/admin/auth`). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean. - [ ] Manual: `pnpm nx serve portal-admin`, visit `http://localhost:4300/`, observe the BFF log — exactly **one** `/admin/auth/me` request (the bootstrap), 401, no follow-up, no rate-limit hit. The home page renders the "No admin session detected" + Sign in button. ## Notes for the reviewer - The bug pattern is symmetric: any future host that overrides `AUTH_PATH_PREFIX` would have hit the same trap. Making the skip target derive from the token is the structural fix; the regression spec pins it. - portal-shell tests still pass without changes — the default factory returns `/auth`, so the existing fixtures continue exercising `${bffBaseUrl}/auth/me` as the skip target. - No SPA-side changes needed in portal-shell or portal-admin app code. The fix is entirely inside the lib. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #135 |
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julien
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40741ce326 |
feat(portal-admin): spa auth wiring + admin shell skeleton (#134)
## Summary Phase-3a step per [ADR-0020](docs/decisions/0020-portal-admin-app.md) §"Confirmation" item 4 (entry route + admin shell). Wires the existing [`feature-auth`](libs/feature/auth) library against the distinct admin OIDC routes (`/api/admin/auth/*`) the BFF exposes since PR #129, ships a lean header/sidebar/footer chrome with an "Admin" badge so an internal user can never mistake the surface for portal-shell, and gives the landing page a self-test panel that confirms the auth chain end-to-end as soon as an `admin` Entra role gets assigned. ## What lands ### Lib change — `AUTH_PATH_PREFIX` injection token [`libs/feature/auth`](libs/feature/auth/src/lib/auth.config.ts) gains one injection token. AuthService composes URLs as `${bffBaseUrl}${pathPrefix}/{me,login,logout}` instead of hard-coding `/auth/...`. Default factory returns `/auth`, so portal-shell-shaped consumers keep working without an explicit provider — no churn on existing call sites. Admin hosts override with `/admin/auth`. The interceptors (`bffCredentialsInterceptor`, `csrfInterceptor`, `bffUnauthorizedInterceptor`) are **unchanged** — they only care about the BFF base URL, not the path prefix. ### portal-admin wiring - [environment.ts](apps/portal-admin/src/environments/environment.ts) — same shape as portal-shell, same BFF base URL (both SPAs talk to one BFF per ADR-0020 §"Where does the admin app live"). Same CSRF cookie name in v1. - [app.config.ts](apps/portal-admin/src/app/app.config.ts) — `HttpClient` with the standard interceptor chain (credentials → csrf → unauthorized), `AUTH_BFF_BASE_URL` from env, `AUTH_PATH_PREFIX = '/admin/auth'`, `AUTH_CSRF_COOKIE_NAME` from env. ### Admin shell - **[AdminHeader](apps/portal-admin/src/app/components/header/header.ts)** — APF wordmark + persistent "Admin" badge + auth widget. No global search / notifications / help cluster: admins land on tabular workloads, not a discovery dashboard (ADR-0020 §"UX style is data-dense"). - **[AdminSidebar](apps/portal-admin/src/app/components/sidebar/sidebar.ts)** — static menu listing the four ADR-0020 v1 modules. Audit log is a live router link (target of the next PR); the others are `aria-disabled` placeholders with a "Soon" badge so the navigation shape is visible even before they ship. - **[AdminFooter](apps/portal-admin/src/app/components/footer/footer.ts)** — copyright + persistent "Admin surface" tag. Stays in view for long workloads where the header has scrolled off. ### Home — auth self-test panel [apps/portal-admin/src/app/pages/home/](apps/portal-admin/src/app/pages/home/): - Signed-in: shows `displayName`, `username`, `tenant`, `oid` in a monospaced detail list. - Anonymous: "No admin session detected" + a "Sign in via Entra" button that delegates to `AuthService.login()` → 302 through `/api/admin/auth/login`. - Error: "Could not reach the BFF" + retry button. - Roadmap list quoting ADR-0020's v1 catalogue. ## Known limitations (v1, documented) - **CSRF cookie shared between surfaces.** Both portals issue `portal_csrf` on session creation. A user with both portals open will see overwrites on the second sign-in; mutating actions on the first surface will then 403 until refresh. Splitting to `portal_admin_csrf` is a follow-up if the pattern becomes common. - **Shell chrome strings are plain English.** The admin app's `$localize` plumbing is wired (matches portal-shell), but adding markers to the shell here would require regenerating `messages.fr.xlf` and `i18nMissingTranslation=error` fails the prod build on every gap. Full admin i18n is its own follow-up. - **`LayoutStateService` not yet consumed.** No collapse toggle in v1. Theme preference still threads through because both apps read the same `localStorage` key — toggle in portal-shell, see it honoured in portal-admin. - **`ci:perf` only runs against portal-shell.** Admin perf budgets are enforced at build time by `apps/portal-admin/project.json` (`maximumError == maximumWarning` per ADR-0020's relaxed thresholds: 500 KB initial JS / 1.5 MB initial total). Adding admin to `pnpm ci:perf`'s gzip + Lighthouse chain is a follow-up. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test feature-auth` — **29 specs pass** (was 28; +1 for the `AUTH_PATH_PREFIX` override). - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-admin` — **15 specs pass** (was 1; +14: AdminHeader 5, AdminSidebar 3, AdminFooter 2, Home 4, App 1 expanded). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean. - [x] Gzip-budget script run manually against `dist/apps/portal-admin/browser`: 86.65 KB initial / 300 KB budget, 4.46 KB CSS / 150 KB budget, 2.15 KB largest lazy / 100 KB per-chunk budget. Both `en` + `fr` bundles checked thanks to PR #133's multi-locale detection. - [ ] e2e — pending an Entra `admin` role assignment. Once available: `pnpm nx serve portal-admin`, visit `http://localhost:4300`, see "No admin session detected", click "Sign in via Entra", complete the round-trip, land back on `/` with the signed-in payload + `portal_admin_session` cookie set. ## Notes for the reviewer - `AdminHeader` is intentionally narrower than `Header` from portal-shell — no shared base class. The two are likely to evolve in different directions (admin-specific banner with system-status badges, audit-trail link, etc.) and a premature abstraction would be expensive to undo. - `AdminSidebar`'s "Soon" badge is a deliberate signal — without it, an admin who clicked a placeholder link and got a route-not-found would assume the app is broken. The badge sets expectations. - All shell components use `:host-context(.dark)` for dark-mode SCSS instead of `:host(.dark)` — same pattern as portal-shell, since the `.dark` class lives on `<html>` outside the component's view encapsulation. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #134 |
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julien
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5bbe2304ff |
feat(portal-bff): helmet + env-driven CORS allowlist + double-submit CSRF (#122)
## Summary Phase-2 security baseline that the `main.ts` placeholder note has been advertising since the auth/session work began. Three independent middlewares + their SPA counterparts, all mounted in a single PR because they only become meaningful together. ### Helmet on the BFF `helmet()` with three overrides matching our specific shape: - **HSTS only in production** — dev runs on plain HTTP, HSTS is just noise. - **`crossOriginResourcePolicy: 'cross-origin'`** — the SPA on its own origin reads JSON from the BFF; the default `same-origin` would block it. - **CSP disabled in non-production** — the BFF doesn't render HTML, so CSP on JSON responses is mostly inert, but Helmet's default CSP triggers noisy `connect-src` violations in browser devtools that we don't need. Everything else is Helmet defaults: `X-Frame-Options=SAMEORIGIN`, `X-Content-Type-Options=nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy=no-referrer`, `X-Powered-By` removed, etc. ### CORS allowlist, env-driven `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` env (comma-separated) is now **mandatory** at boot. The BFF refuses to start without it via `readCorsAllowlist()` — same boot-time validator family as `assertSessionSecret` etc. The previous hardcoded `http://localhost:4200` fallback is gone; getting CORS wrong silently is the kind of "works in dev, breaks in prod" trap the validator is specifically designed to catch. `X-CSRF-Token` is now in the allowed headers. ### Double-submit CSRF - BFF mints a 256-bit `csrfToken` at session creation (`/auth/callback`), stored on `req.session.csrfToken` and mirrored to a JS-readable cookie (`__Host-portal_csrf` prod / `portal_csrf` dev). The cookie is the SPA's read-only view; the server-side session is the source of truth. - `createCsrfMiddleware` (mounted after the session middleware in `main.ts`) compares the `X-CSRF-Token` header with `req.session.csrfToken` using `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. Skips: - safe methods (`GET / HEAD / OPTIONS`), - anonymous requests (no `req.session.user`), - `/api/auth/login` and `/api/auth/callback` (those mint the token themselves). - Mismatch → `403 {"error":"csrf"}` with a structured Pino warn. - SPA's `csrfInterceptor` reads the cookie via `document.cookie` and copies its value into `X-CSRF-Token` on every mutating BFF request. The header is omitted on `GET / HEAD / OPTIONS` (BFF skips them anyway) and on non-BFF origins. - Logout and the absolute-timeout middleware both clear the CSRF cookie alongside the session cookie. ## Notable choices **Session-bound double-submit, not pure cookie-vs-header.** A naive "compare cookie with header" check is defeated when an attacker can plant a cookie (subdomain takeover, etc.). Comparing the header to the server-side session-stored token instead means the attacker would also need to be the authenticated user — which is what CSRF defense is supposed to prevent in the first place. **No CSRF for anonymous mutating routes (v1).** None exist today; we don't have an unauthenticated POST endpoint anywhere. Generating a CSRF token for anonymous sessions would conflict with `saveUninitialized: false` on express-session and add complexity we don't need yet. Anonymous public-form CSRF defenses (site-key, captcha) land if and when those routes ship. **`SameSite=Lax`, not `Strict`, on the CSRF cookie.** Matches the session cookie's policy so the two travel together on the SPA→BFF cross-origin same-site fetch (different ports = different origin, same registrable domain). The double-submit pattern is what gives the protection; `SameSite=Lax` is a belt-and-braces layer. **`csrfInterceptor` runs after `bffCredentialsInterceptor` and before `bffUnauthorizedInterceptor` in the chain.** Order: credentials first (set `withCredentials`), then CSRF (set the header), then unauthorized handling (catch 401s). Forward order, no surprises. **`CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` has no localhost fallback.** I considered keeping the fallback for ergonomics but it makes the BFF silently misconfigured if someone forgets the env. The error message points straight at the file to edit. ## Out of scope (next PRs) - Rate limiting + structured error filter (still in the phase-2 to-do). - CSP fine-tuning when we have actual HTML pages (portal-shell + portal-admin static serving). - CSRF token rotation on idle-extension (today the token lives the session's lifetime; refreshing on each request would invalidate in-flight mutations). ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t test --projects=portal-bff,feature-auth,portal-shell` clean env → **177 + 28 + 34 = 239/239 pass** (was 144 + 19 + 34 = 197 before; +42 specs across CSRF middleware, CSRF cookie helpers, CORS allowlist parser, csrfInterceptor, and extended auth.controller / absolute-timeout coverage). - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t lint build --projects=portal-bff,feature-auth,portal-shell` → clean. - [x] **CI clean-env repro** (lesson from prior PRs): every env var unset (including new `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`) → tests still pass. The BFF refuses to boot without `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, which is the intended behaviour. - [x] Prettier-clean. - [ ] Manual smoke against running BFF: - [ ] Sign in → `__Host-portal_csrf` (prod) / `portal_csrf` (dev) cookie set, value matches `audit.events.payload->>actorIdHash`-style traceability via `req.session.csrfToken` in Redis. - [ ] Hit a future POST route from the SPA → request carries `X-CSRF-Token`, BFF accepts. - [ ] Forge a POST without the header (curl) → 403 `{"error":"csrf"}`. - [ ] Sign out → both cookies cleared. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #122 |
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julien
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177f2f20c0 |
feat(portal-shell): authGuard + BFF http interceptors + /profile demo route (#117)
## Summary Brings the SPA auth track to the level of polish the BFF surface deserves. After #113/#114, the header reflects sign-in state — but the SPA had no protected routes and no global handling of session-state drift. This PR adds three building blocks (one guard, two interceptors) plus one demo consumer. - **`authGuard`** (`CanActivateFn`) — gates routes on `AuthService.state`. Waits out the bootstrap `loading` state, allows when `authenticated`, redirects through `auth.login()` (full-page navigation to the BFF's `/auth/login` → Entra round-trip) when `anonymous` or `error`. - **`bffCredentialsInterceptor`** — flips `withCredentials: true` on every request whose URL starts with `AUTH_BFF_BASE_URL`. Replaces the per-call flag we had on `/me` (#114) with a single point of truth. Future BFF calls inherit it automatically — no chance of forgetting it. - **`bffUnauthorizedInterceptor`** — calls `AuthService.refresh()` when a BFF route (other than `/auth/me` itself) answers 401. Keeps the SPA's auth state in sync after server-side session destruction (absolute-timeout, manual revoke, idle-TTL expiry). - **`/profile`** demo route — first real consumer of the guard. Lazy-loaded component that renders the curated `CurrentUser` payload (display name, username, oid, tid). Exercises the full loop end-to-end: guard waits on /me → BFF answers → SPA renders. ## Notable choices **Lazy `AuthService` resolution in the 401 interceptor.** A naive `inject(AuthService)` at the top of the interceptor caused a circular-construction error: `AuthService`'s own constructor fires the bootstrap `/me`, which goes through the interceptor chain, which tries to inject `AuthService` while it's still being constructed. The fix is to inject the parent `Injector` and resolve `AuthService` lazily inside `catchError` — by the time a 401 actually fires, construction is done. Standard Angular pattern for "interceptor depends on a service that uses HttpClient". **`/auth/me` is excluded from the 401 refresh trigger.** The interceptor's whole job is to catch session-state drift; `/me` is the probe `AuthService.refresh()` itself uses. Without the exclusion, a 401 from /me would call `refresh()` → another /me → another 401 → infinite loop. **On `error` state, the guard still redirects to `/auth/login`.** Could have shown a "can't reach the server" page on the protected route, but the BFF-side login screen surfaces diagnostics more usefully (Entra's own error path) than a generic SPA outage page would. **Per-call `withCredentials: true` removed from `AuthService.refresh()`.** The interceptor now applies it uniformly. The spec that pinned the per-call flag is also gone — that contract moved to `bff-credentials.interceptor.spec.ts` where it belongs. **`profileTitle` + 6 new i18n message ids.** `route.profile.title`, `profile.heading`, `profile.intro`, `profile.field.{displayName,username,oid,tid}` shipped in `messages.fr.xlf` with FR translations. ## Out of scope (next PRs) - A real user-profile feature (settings, preferences, etc.) — `/profile` is just an auth-loop fixture today. - Showing the auth-loading state on protected routes (currently the guard blocks navigation; the user sees the previous route until /me resolves). Acceptable for v1. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test feature-auth` → **19/19 pass** (was 8; +11 across `auth.guard.spec.ts`, `bff-credentials.interceptor.spec.ts`, `bff-unauthorized.interceptor.spec.ts`). - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-shell` → **34/34 pass** (was 32; +2 for the Profile component). - [x] `pnpm nx lint feature-auth portal-shell` → clean. - [x] `pnpm nx build portal-shell` → clean. Bundle: main 492 kB raw / 131 kB transfer (well under the 300 KB gzip budget per ADR-0017). - [x] **CI clean-env repro** (lesson from #115/#116): `env -u REDIS_URL -u SESSION_* ... pnpm exec nx run-many -t test` → 123 + 19 + 34 = **176/176 pass**. - [ ] Manual smoke against running BFF: - [ ] Anonymous → visit `/profile` → redirect to `/auth/login` → Entra → callback → SPA lands at `/profile` with identity card filled in. - [ ] Trigger an absolute-timeout (set `SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=5` in BFF `.env`, wait) → next BFF call returns 401 → header flips to "Sign in". --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #117 |
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julien
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0e4f0fc611 |
fix(portal-shell): send withCredentials on /me so the session cookie crosses SPA→BFF in dev (#114)
## Summary Manual smoke after PR #113 surfaced a dev-only bug: after `/auth/callback` the BFF correctly sets the `portal_session` cookie and redirects to the SPA, but the SPA's next call to `/api/auth/me` comes back **401 with no `cookie:` header at all**. The user lands "back at the portal" but the header still shows "Sign in". **Root cause.** Angular's `HttpClient` via `withFetch()` inherits `fetch`'s default `credentials: 'same-origin'`. In dev, `localhost:4200` (SPA) → `localhost:3000` (BFF) is cross-origin (different ports), so the browser drops the session cookie on the way out. SameSite=Lax is a red herring: both URLs share the registrable domain, so the cookie is still same-site — what was missing was opting the fetch into credentials. **Fix.** Per-call `withCredentials: true` on the /me request. Only /me needs cookies today; login/logout are full-page navigations through `window.location`, which the browser hydrates with cookies regardless. A global `HttpInterceptor` will be the right abstraction once other authenticated BFF endpoints exist — premature for one consumer. **BFF side was already correct.** `enableCors({ credentials: true })` in `main.ts`. Nothing to change. A new spec pins `withCredentials === true` on the /me request so a future refactor can't silently drop the flag and reintroduce the bug. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test feature-auth` → **9/9 pass** (was 8 before; +1 spec pinning the credentials flag). - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-shell` → **32/32 pass**. - [x] `pnpm nx lint feature-auth portal-shell` → clean. - [x] `pnpm nx build portal-shell` → clean. - [ ] Manual smoke against the running BFF: anonymous landing → click "Sign in" → Entra → callback → SPA lands with avatar + display name in the header (the very last step that failed before this fix). --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #114 |
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julien
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9a9faf9a31 |
feat(portal-shell): wire SPA auth state to BFF /me + header login/logout widget (#113)
## Summary First user-visible piece of the auth track. The portal-shell SPA now consumes the BFF auth surface (`/api/auth/me`, `/api/auth/login`, `/api/auth/logout`) and the header reflects sign-in state. - `libs/feature/auth` ships an `AuthService` that fetches `/auth/me` on first injection, holds a signal-backed `AuthState` (`loading` / `anonymous` / `authenticated` / `error`) and exposes `currentUser` + `isLoading` computed signals plus `login()` / `logout()` / `refresh()` methods. - The header's right-side widget renders four states: a sign-in button when anonymous, the user avatar (initials, `JD` for "Jane Doe") + display name + sign-out button when authenticated, a loading dot before `/me` resolves, and a "Can't reach the server" chip on non-401 failures. - `login()` / `logout()` go through an injected `AUTH_NAVIGATOR` token whose default calls `window.location.assign(url)`. Specs override it with `vi.fn()` — no `window.location` mocking required. ## Notable choices **Auto-bootstrap on construction, not via `provideAppInitializer`.** The service fires `/me` from its constructor (unawaited) so consuming components transition through the explicit `loading` state. Blocking app boot on the round-trip would push the first paint behind the network call — bad for TTFB, especially on slow links. The header handles `loading` as a first-class state. **Discriminated `AuthState` over flat fields.** A single source of truth (`state()`) with four `kind`s lets templates `switch` and narrow automatically. `currentUser` and `isLoading` are computed conveniences but never out of sync with `state`. **`AUTH_BFF_BASE_URL` + `AUTH_NAVIGATOR` injection tokens.** Decouples the lib from the host's `environment.ts` shape and keeps tests free of `window.location` redefinition (which jsdom resists across multiple specs in the same file — first redefine works, second throws "Cannot redefine property"). The host wires both in `app.config.ts`. **Curated public user type.** `CurrentUser` mirrors the BFF's `/me` response (`oid`, `tid`, `username`, `displayName`) — no `amr`, no internal claims. The shape lives in `auth.types.ts` so feature code can import it without depending on Angular HTTP details. **Distinct `error` state.** A network failure / 5xx surfaces a different UI than "not signed in" — "Can't reach the server" chip vs. sign-in button. Avoids the trap of treating any `/me` failure as "anonymous". ## Out of scope (next PRs) - Route guards (protecting routes from anonymous users). For now the header is the only consumer. - Auto-refresh of the session before idle timeout. - HTTP interceptor that redirects to `/auth/login` on a 401 from any other BFF call. - Per-locale styling polish on the new header strings. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test feature-auth` → **8/8 pass**. - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-shell` → **32/32 pass** (was 27 before). - [x] `pnpm nx lint portal-shell feature-auth` → clean. - [x] `pnpm nx build portal-shell` → main bundle 488 kB raw / 129.94 kB transfer; well under the 300 kB gzip budget from ADR-0017. - [ ] Manual smoke once the BFF is up: - [ ] Anonymous landing → header shows "Sign in". - [ ] Click "Sign in" → BFF /login → Entra → callback → SPA lands with avatar + display name in the header. - [ ] Click "Sign out" → BFF /logout → Entra logout → back at SPA, header back to "Sign in". --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #113 |
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 Julien Gautier
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8de19320c5 |
chore: generate shared and feature libs with module boundaries per ADR-0003
Generate the four phase-4 libraries: - libs/shared/tokens (project name shared-tokens) - plain TS lib via @nx/js:library; will host the a11y design tokens (palette, contrast tiers, spacing, motion) once Tailwind lands in phase 5; consumable by both apps; tagged scope:shared, type:shared. - libs/shared/util (shared-util) - plain TS lib for cross-cutting utility code; tagged scope:shared, type:shared. - libs/shared/ui (shared-ui) - Angular standalone library that will host the spartan-ng components copy-pasted in phase 5; Angular-only so tagged scope:portal-shell, type:shared. unitTestRunner= vitest-analog because vitest-angular requires a buildable lib. - libs/feature/auth (feature-auth) - placeholder Angular standalone feature lib to demonstrate the type:feature pattern; tagged scope:portal-shell, type:feature. @nx/enforce-module-boundaries depConstraints replaced (root eslint.config.mjs) with the rules from ADR-0003: scope:portal-shell -> scope:portal-shell, scope:shared scope:portal-bff -> scope:portal-bff, scope:shared scope:shared -> scope:shared type:app -> type:feature, type:shared type:feature -> type:feature, type:shared type:shared -> type:shared This forbids portal-shell from importing portal-bff code (and vice versa) and prevents shared libs from depending on feature libs. Project names follow the convention of ADR-0003 (feature-<name> / shared-<scope>) by passing --name explicitly to the generator; the Nx 22 default takes only the last directory segment. Sanity check: pnpm nx run-many -t lint and -t test pass for the 8 projects (4 apps/e2e + 4 libs). Side effects from the generators: tsconfig.base.json paths populated with the lib import aliases; nx.json gains vite/playwright plugin entries; .gitignore picks up vitest.config.*.timestamp* (Vitest temp files); package.json gains @analogjs/vitest-angular and related devDeps; pnpm-lock.yaml regenerated. Two eslint-disable comments in portal-bff-e2e support files were trimmed by lint --fix - those files already lint clean without the directive. |