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2 Commits
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aca9e8d155 |
feat(portal-bff): user directory upserted at sign-in (#140)
## Summary
First PR of the **portal-admin User-list chantier** per [ADR-0020](docs/decisions/0020-portal-admin-app.md) §"v1 scope — User list (read-only)". Ships the **write side** only:
1. A new `public.users` table that holds the BFF's local cache of identities seen sign in to either portal-shell or portal-admin.
2. A `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn(user)` upsert called from `SessionEstablisher.establish` after the blocking audit write.
The read side (`GET /api/admin/users` + the admin viewer SPA screen) lands in two follow-up PRs of the same chantier.
## Schema
[`prisma/schema.prisma`](apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma) gains a `User` model in the `public` schema:
| Column | Type | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `oid` | TEXT, PK | Entra's stable per-user identifier inside the tenant. Per-tenant uniqueness is sufficient for v1's single-workforce-tenant design (ADR-0008). |
| `tid` | TEXT | Tenant id. Updated on every upsert because a dual-audience future may legitimately change it. |
| `audience` | TEXT | `'workforce'` \| `'customer'`. Hardcoded to `workforce` in v1 per ADR-0008's simplification; will read from session/claims when External ID activates. |
| `username` | TEXT | Updated on every upsert (Entra-side rename possible). |
| `display_name` | TEXT | Same. |
| `first_seen_at` | TIMESTAMPTZ | Set once at first sign-in via DEFAULT NOW(); **never overwritten** thereafter. Enables "users since <date>" without joining anything. |
| `last_seen_at` | TIMESTAMPTZ | Updated on every upsert. Enables "most recently active" without scanning `audit.events`. |
Indexes:
- `last_seen_at DESC` — admin default sort.
- `username` — prefix filtering.
Migration in [`prisma/migrations/20260514192014_users_directory/`](apps/portal-bff/prisma/migrations/20260514192014_users_directory/migration.sql).
## [`UserDirectoryService`](apps/portal-bff/src/users/user-directory.service.ts)
```ts
async recordSignIn(entry): Promise<void> {
try {
await prisma.user.upsert({
where: { oid },
create: { oid, tid, audience, username, displayName },
update: { tid, audience, username, displayName, lastSeenAt: new Date() },
});
} catch (err) {
// logged, never propagated
}
}
```
**Best-effort write.** Catches its own errors, logs a Pino warn (`user_directory.record_sign_in_failed`), returns `undefined`. The directory is a convenience for admin browsing, not a security boundary — a Postgres hiccup must not lock a user out of sign-in. ADR-0013's "no audit ⇒ no action" applies to the audit module only.
## [`SessionEstablisher`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/session-establisher.service.ts) wiring
The directory call lands right after the existing audit emission:
```ts
await this.audit.signIn({ actor: user, sessionId: req.sessionID }); // blocking per ADR-0013
await this.userDirectory.recordSignIn({ ...user, audience: 'workforce' }); // best-effort
this.logger.log(...);
```
Two invariants the tests pin:
1. **Audit-first**: when `audit.signIn` throws, `userDirectory.recordSignIn` is NOT called. The directory never holds a row for a sign-in the audit log doesn't carry.
2. **Awaited**: an admin who just signed in sees themselves on the user list immediately — no race between the upsert and the response.
## Module wiring
[`UsersModule`](apps/portal-bff/src/users/users.module.ts) is declared `@Global()` so `SessionEstablisher` (which lives in `AuthModule`) injects `UserDirectoryService` without forcing `AuthModule` to import `UsersModule`. The directory is a true cross-cutting concern: one writer (the auth callback) and one future reader (the admin endpoint).
Wired into [`AppModule`](apps/portal-bff/src/app/app.module.ts) alongside the other v1 modules. `auth.module.spec.ts` updated to also import `UsersModule` in its slice-of-graph compile (otherwise the test fails to resolve the new `SessionEstablisher` dep).
## Notes for the reviewer
- The directory write **awaits** (not fire-and-forget). The cost is one round-trip per sign-in on the response-critical path; the benefit is the no-race property called out above. If sign-in p95 becomes an issue we can revisit (e.g. background job) but the simpler shape is correct first.
- `firstSeenAt` is intentionally absent from the `update` payload. The Prisma upsert's `update` block is precisely what changes on conflict; omitting the field leaves it untouched at the column level (Postgres-side default doesn't refire on UPDATE).
- The model lives in `public`, not in a dedicated `identity` or `cms` schema. ADR-0020 enumerates `cms.*` for editorial data and `audit.*` for the audit ledger but doesn't require a separate schema for user-directory data. We can promote it to its own schema later if a role-isolation need emerges; the migration would be a `ALTER TABLE users SET SCHEMA …`.
- `audit.events.actor_id_hash` is **not** stored on `public.users`. A future admin endpoint that joins sign-in counts from `audit.events` can compute the hash on-the-fly via `HashUserIdService` — keeping the salted-hash invariant from ADR-0013 intact (the salt stays inside the audit module).
## Test plan
- [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **365 specs pass** (was 358; +7: UserDirectoryService 4, SessionEstablisher integration 3).
- [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean (the pre-existing rate-limit warnings + one unused-eslint-disable from PR #137 are unrelated).
- [x] Prisma `migrate diff` confirms the model matches the migration SQL.
- [ ] e2e — after merge: sign in via portal-shell or portal-admin, expect a row in `public.users` with the right `oid` / `last_seen_at`; sign in again, expect the same row's `last_seen_at` to advance and `first_seen_at` to stay put.
## What's next
The chantier sequence:
1. **This PR** — write side: schema + service + sign-in upsert.
2. **PR 2** — BFF `GET /api/admin/users` (paginated + filterable, gated by `@RequireAdmin`, emits `admin.users.query` audit).
3. **PR 3** — portal-admin `/users` screen (table + filter form), promote the sidebar entry from "Soon" badge to live link.
---------
Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #140
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fed905edc5 |
feat(portal-bff): distinct admin session + /api/admin/auth flow (#129)
## Summary
Phase-3a step per [ADR-0020](docs/decisions/0020-portal-admin-app.md) §"Sessions — distinct from `portal-shell`". Wires a second `express-session` middleware on `/api/admin/*` carrying `__Host-portal_admin_session` over Redis prefix `session:admin:`, and ships the parallel `/api/admin/auth/{login,callback,me,logout}` flow that populates it. Signing in to one surface no longer signs the user into the other — Entra SSO at the IdP level still preserves the click-through.
## What lands
### Session middlewares — path-routed dispatch
| Token | Cookie | Redis prefix | Bound to |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `SESSION_MIDDLEWARE` | `portal_session` / `__Host-portal_session` | `session:` | every path **except** `/api/admin/*` |
| `ADMIN_SESSION_MIDDLEWARE` | `portal_admin_session` / `__Host-portal_admin_session` | `session:admin:` | `/api/admin/*` only |
Implemented via a `buildSessionMiddleware(redis, logger, opts)` factory in [session.module.ts](apps/portal-bff/src/session/session.module.ts) — the TTL policy, encryption key, signing secret, session-id entropy, and serializer error-handling all come from the same source. Only the cookie name + Redis key prefix differ.
The dispatch in [main.ts](apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts) is a tiny `(req, res, next) => req.path.startsWith('/api/admin') ? adminSession(...) : userSession(...)`. Running both middlewares unconditionally would have the second overwrite `req.session` from the first, collapsing the two surfaces.
### Distinct admin auth flow
[`AdminAuthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-auth.controller.ts) mounts `/api/admin/auth/{login,callback,me,logout}`. Structurally identical to [`AuthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.ts) but passes `adminRedirectUri` / `adminPostLogoutRedirectUri` and clears the admin session cookie on logout. `me` exposes the `roles` claim (admin SPA needs it for conditional UI); the user-portal `me` intentionally still doesn't.
### Shared `SessionEstablisher` (no controller duplication)
[`SessionEstablisher`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/session-establisher.service.ts) encapsulates the session lifecycle so both controllers stay thin:
- `establish({ user, req, res, surface })` — mints CSRF, populates `user / createdAt / absoluteExpiresAt / csrfToken / mfaVerifiedAt`, saves, sets the CSRF cookie, registers in `user_sessions` index, emits `auth.sign_in` audit (blocking), logs with the `surface` tag.
- `destroy({ actor, req })` — when `actor` is set, removes from index + emits `auth.sign_out`; always destroys the session with Redis-hiccup tolerance.
No code duplicated between the two surfaces — the only per-surface differences are the redirect URIs (passed in) and the cookie names cleared on logout (controller-local).
### Entra config gains two URIs
`EntraConfig` adds `adminRedirectUri` + `adminPostLogoutRedirectUri`, validated at boot in [check-entra-config.ts](apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts). The validator **refuses to start** when `ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI === ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI` — that misconfiguration would silently collapse the two surfaces into one session. Both URIs must be registered on the same Entra app registration's "Redirect URIs" list.
### `AuthService` API change
`beginAuthCodeFlow(redirectUri)`, `completeAuthCodeFlow(code, state, preAuth, redirectUri, now?)`, and `buildLogoutUrl(postLogoutRedirectUri)` now take their URI as a parameter. Callers (user-portal vs admin-portal controllers) pick which set to pass.
## Required ops action before this PR can run locally
Two new mandatory env vars. The BFF refuses to start without them.
```env
ENTRA_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:3000/api/admin/auth/callback
ENTRA_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=http://localhost:4201/
```
The example values land in [apps/portal-bff/.env.example](apps/portal-bff/.env.example) for reference. The corresponding Entra app registration also needs `/api/admin/auth/callback` added to its "Redirect URIs" list before any admin sign-in works end-to-end.
## Notes for the reviewer
- The user-portal callback's post-login redirect still targets `postLogoutRedirectUri` (existing quirk where the post-auth and post-logout landing happen to be the same URL). The admin callback mirrors the pattern for `adminPostLogoutRedirectUri`. Splitting these into dedicated post-login URIs is a separate ADR/PR.
- `AdminModule` now imports `AuthModule` to consume `AuthService`, `SessionEstablisher`, and `ENTRA_CONFIG`. `AuditWriter` and `RequireMfaGuard` come through transitively.
- Existing `AuthController` spec assertions are preserved through the refactor by constructing a **real** `SessionEstablisher` in the test fixture with the same audit / index / logger mocks. No behavioural assertion was removed — the inline session-state-setting logic is now exercised through the establisher.
- The pre-existing docstring in `check-entra-config.ts` line 11-16 still says "the two redirect URIs are mandatory once the OIDC routes ship (next PR)" — stale, the routes have shipped. Not touched in this PR to keep the diff focused; can be a one-line doc PR later.
## Test plan
- [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **278 specs pass** (was 253; +25: admin cookie 3, session-establisher 11, admin auth controller 9, entra config 2).
- [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean (the pre-existing `_res` / `_next` warnings in `rate-limit.middleware.ts` are unrelated).
- [x] Entra config validator: both URIs required, both URL-validated, equality refused.
- [x] Path-dispatch verified by routing — `/api/admin/me` and `/api/admin/auth/*` see the admin session; everything else sees the user session.
- [ ] e2e — pending env var update + Entra registration update to add the admin redirect URI. Once both are in place: sign in via `/api/auth/login`, see `portal_session` cookie; clear cookies; sign in via `/api/admin/auth/login`, see `portal_admin_session` cookie; verify `/api/admin/me` works on the admin session and `/api/auth/me` works on the user session — neither sees the other's session.
---------
Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #129
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