13 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
julien	ee51efb688	feat(portal): /api/me/capabilities + cross-app menu links + real role label (#151) ... ## Summary PR 3 of 3 — final piece of the user-menu / profile / cross-app chantier. Closes the loop with the BFF capabilities endpoint, symmetric cross-app entries in both user menus, and a real role label in place of the hardcoded "Anonymous" widget on the portal-shell sidebar. | PR | Périmètre | | --- | --- | | PR 1 ✅ | Shared `UserMenu` dropdown + integration. | | PR 2 ✅ | `/profile` pages on both apps. | | **PR 3 (this one)** | `GET /api/me/capabilities` + real sidebar role label + cross-app menu entries. | ## What lands ### BFF — `GET /api/me/capabilities` New [`MeModule`](apps/portal-bff/src/me/me.module.ts) wiring a single endpoint: ```ts GET /api/me/capabilities → { canAccessAdmin: boolean } ``` Resolved against the user-portal session ([`portal_session`](apps/portal-bff/src/me/me.controller.ts) — the path-routed session middleware in `main.ts` already maps `/api/me/*` to that session). Returns 401 if no session is present, consistent with `/api/auth/me`. 5 specs cover the four state combinations + a regression-fence asserting the curated view never leaks the raw `roles` array. ### ADR-0009 amendment [`docs/decisions/0009-auth-flow-oidc-pkce-msal-node.md`](docs/decisions/0009-auth-flow-oidc-pkce-msal-node.md) — new **"Curated public view"** section codifies the design stance the user picked when we agreed the staging: > The `/auth/me` payload exposes a deliberately narrow projection of the session: `oid`, `tid`, `username`, `displayName`. **The raw `roles` claim is _not_ part of `/auth/me`** — it stays server-side […]. The SPA derives binary UX hints from a dedicated companion endpoint […]. The shape is intentional: the SPA can never reconstruct the raw role names from the curated view, so introducing additional internal-only roles […] does not widen the SPA-side surface. The routes table grows a row for `/me/capabilities`. ### Portal-shell — capabilities-driven UI - **New service** [`CapabilitiesService`](apps/portal-shell/src/app/services/capabilities.service.ts) (app-local, not in `feature-auth` — the admin app has its own roles channel via `/api/admin/auth/me` and would never use this). Signals: `capabilities`, `canAccessAdmin`. Fires `GET /me/capabilities` reactively via an `effect` that watches `auth.currentUser()`. Anonymous sessions short-circuit to the all-false default without a fetch — the BFF would 401 anyway. - **Header** ([`header.ts`](apps/portal-shell/src/app/components/header/header.ts)) — `userMenuItems` is now a `computed`. Profile + Settings stay unconditional; **"Open Portal Admin"** appears only when `canAccessAdmin()` flips true, with `href = environment.adminAppUrl`. Per ADR-0020 the two SPAs live on distinct origins, so this is a raw cross-origin anchor, not a routerLink. - **Sidebar** ([`sidebar.ts`](apps/portal-shell/src/app/components/sidebar/sidebar.ts) + [`sidebar.html`](apps/portal-shell/src/app/components/sidebar/sidebar.html)) — the hardcoded `Role: Anonymous` widget is replaced by a derived computed: - `Anonymous` when no session. - `Administrator` when `canAccessAdmin()` is true. - `User` otherwise (signed-in, no admin). The aria-label gains a `role` placeholder so screen readers hear the live value. ### Portal-admin — symmetric cross-app entry - **Header** ([`header.ts`](apps/portal-admin/src/app/components/header/header.ts)) — adds an unconditional `Open Portal Shell` row pointing at `environment.shellAppUrl`. Anyone able to reach portal-admin can reach portal-shell, so no capabilities check needed; admins always benefit from a one-click jump back to the end-user surface. ### Environments `adminAppUrl` and `shellAppUrl` added to the respective [`environment.ts`](apps/portal-shell/src/environments/environment.ts) files (dev defaults: `:4300` for admin, `:4200` for shell). Per-env siblings (staging / prod) will override the host once they exist, per ADR-0018. ### i18n | Key | EN source | FR target | | --- | --- | --- | | `header.userMenu.openAdmin` | Open Portal Admin | Ouvrir Administration APF Portal | | `sidebar.role.administrator` | Administrator | Administrateur | | `sidebar.role.user` | User | Utilisateur | | `sidebar.role.aria` | reshaped with `{role}` placeholder | reshaped likewise | Admin-side strings stay in English source per ADR-0020. ## Notes for the reviewer - **Why `CapabilitiesService` in the app, not in `feature-auth`?** Only `portal-shell` will ever call `/api/me/capabilities` — the admin SPA hits `/api/admin/auth/me` which already returns `roles`. Putting the service in `feature-auth` would publish a tree-shakable `providedIn: 'root'` injectable that ships in both bundles. Keeping it app-local makes the boundary explicit. - **Why a `computed` for `userMenuItems` rather than mutating an array in an `effect`?** Signals + computed = single source of truth. The shared `UserMenu` re-renders automatically when the items list changes (whenever capabilities flips). Less ceremony than maintaining a `WritableSignal<UserMenuItem[]>`. - **Why the `flushPendingEffects` test helper?** Zoneless apps rely on the signals scheduler to dispatch `effect()` callbacks via micro-task scheduling. `fixture.detectChanges() + whenStable()` once is not enough: the chain is `meReq.flush()` → `_state.set()` → effect scheduled → effect fires → `http.get()` queued. The helper loops 4× to give the scheduler enough rounds to settle before `expectOne(CAPABILITIES_URL)` looks up the request. - **Why no test for the dev URL values?** `environment.ts` is config that gets swapped at build time per ADR-0018; the values themselves are environmental. Asserting the dev value in a test would lock in a port (4200/4300) that's separately configured in `project.json`. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **401 specs pass** (was 396, +5 for `MeController`). - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-shell` — **40 specs pass** (was 35, +5: 3 sidebar role-label + 2 header admin-link). - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t lint test build --projects=portal-shell,portal-admin,portal-bff,shared-ui,shared-state,feature-auth` — 18/18 tasks green, including the i18n-strict `portal-shell:build:production`. - [ ] Manual smoke (with a `Portal.Admin`-assigned account): - Sign in on portal-shell → sidebar reads `Role: Administrator`, user menu lists `Open Portal Admin` at the bottom (right above the Sign-out separator), clicking the link opens `localhost:4300`. - Sign in on portal-admin → user menu lists `Open Portal Shell`, clicking opens `localhost:4200`. - Sign in on portal-shell with a non-admin account → sidebar reads `Role: User`, `Open Portal Admin` is absent. - Sign out → sidebar reads `Role: Anonymous`, the menu collapses to its anonymous-state Sign-in button. ## What's next Chantier closed. The user-menu shape is now stable; further entries (notifications inbox, theme override, locale switcher inside the menu rather than the footer) plug into the existing `items` API without re-shaping the component. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #151	2026-05-15 16:11:26 +02:00
julien	1513ad327c	feat(portal-bff): openapi spec + scalar api reference UI (dev-only) (#143) ... ## Summary Adds an OpenAPI 3 spec + a [Scalar API Reference](https://scalar.com/) UI to `portal-bff`, dev-only. The BFF previously had no way to *see* its HTTP surface short of grepping for `@Get` / `@Post`; this PR generates the spec from the existing Nest controllers via [`@nestjs/swagger`](https://docs.nestjs.com/openapi/introduction) and renders it through Scalar — a modern alternative to the classic Swagger UI (single-page, fast, dark-mode native, better typography). ## What lands ### Two new dev-only routes | Route | What it serves | | --- | --- | | `GET /api/openapi.json` | Raw OpenAPI 3 document. External tools (Bruno / Insomnia / Postman) import from here. | | `GET /api/docs` | Scalar API Reference HTML page. Loads the JSON spec at render time and renders the full endpoint catalogue with a "Try it" panel. | Both routes are gated behind `process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production'` in [`setupOpenApi`](apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.ts) — production deployments don't need the docs surface, and publishing it would hand an attacker a curated map of every authenticated endpoint + every DTO shape. If a future ops use-case wants the spec in prod (internal gateway, contract testing), the gate is one line away from an opt-in `OPENAPI_PUBLISH=true` env knob. ### Core implementation — [`apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.ts) Two exported helpers: - **`buildOpenApiDocument(app)`** — wraps Nest's `DocumentBuilder` + `SwaggerModule.createDocument`. Sets title, description (mentions the CSRF caveat — see below), version, and registers **two** cookie security schemes: - `portal_session` for the user-portal surface ([ADR-0009](docs/decisions/0009-auth-flow-oidc-pkce-msal-node.md)). - `portal_admin_session` for the admin-portal surface ([ADR-0020](docs/decisions/0020-portal-admin-app.md)). No `@ApiBearerAuth` is declared — the BFF never exposes a bearer-auth surface (SPA never holds tokens per ADR-0009; downstream OBO tokens are server-side only per ADR-0014). - **`setupOpenApi(app, globalPrefix)`** — short-circuits in production, otherwise binds the two routes via the Express adapter directly (`app.getHttpAdapter().get(...)` and `app.use(...)`). The OpenAPI JSON is a static asset and Scalar is a vanilla Express middleware — wrapping either in a Nest controller would add zero value and an extra layer of indirection. Wired into bootstrap at [`apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts:220`](apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts#L220), immediately after the JWKS endpoint mount and before `app.listen()`. ### Controllers decorated with `@ApiTags` / `@ApiOperation` / `@ApiCookieAuth` Annotations are cosmetic but make the spec actually browsable. Tag taxonomy: | Controller | Tag | Security | | --- | --- | --- | | [`AppController`](apps/portal-bff/src/app/app.controller.ts) | `app (scaffolding)` | — | | [`HealthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/health/health.controller.ts) | `health` | — | | [`AuthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.ts) | `auth (user portal)` | `portal_session` on `/me` + `/logout` | | [`AdminAuthController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-auth.controller.ts) | `auth (admin portal)` | `portal_admin_session` on `/me` + `/logout` | | [`AdminController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin.controller.ts) | `admin (self-test)` | class-level `portal_admin_session` | | [`AdminAuditController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-audit.controller.ts) | `admin (audit log)` | class-level `portal_admin_session` | | [`AdminUsersController`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-users.controller.ts) | `admin (user directory)` | class-level `portal_admin_session` | `@ApiOperation({ summary: … })` added on every route — populates the one-line description Scalar shows in its left-rail TOC. ### Deps + Jest - `@nestjs/swagger ^11` (matches the Nest 11 major already pinned) and `@scalar/nestjs-api-reference` added to the workspace root. - [`jest.config.cts`](apps/portal-bff/jest.config.cts) — widened `transformIgnorePatterns` from `/node_modules/(?!.*jose)/` to `/node_modules/(?!.*(jose|@scalar/))/`. `@scalar/client-side-rendering` (a transitive dep) ships ESM-only; without this widening the spec suite fails to load the module under ts-jest. ## Notes for the reviewer - **Why two cookie schemes rather than one?** Scalar renders a per-endpoint lock icon driven by the security scheme name. Splitting `portal_session` / `portal_admin_session` keeps the indicator semantically truthful — `/api/auth/me` and `/api/admin/auth/me` look identical otherwise. - **CSRF caveat.** Mutating routes (`POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE`) require `X-CSRF-Token` per [ADR-0009](docs/decisions/0009-auth-flow-oidc-pkce-msal-node.md). The header must be set manually in Scalar's "Try it" panel to the value of the `portal_csrf` cookie when exercising those routes. The spec description mentions it; auto-injecting the header from the cookie is a future polish. - **No ADR for this.** `@nestjs/swagger` is the framework's own first-party tooling; Scalar is a thin UI on top of a standard OpenAPI 3 document. Both replaceable without touching the controllers (the `@Api*` annotations are spec-standard). Dev-only, no prod surface — doesn't cross any of the bars that warrant an ADR per [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md). - **Express-layer routing.** Same pattern as the JWKS endpoint (#139): the OpenAPI JSON is a static asset and Scalar a vanilla Express handler, so wiring through Nest's router adds no value. ## Test plan - [x] **5 new specs** in [`apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.spec.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/openapi/openapi.spec.ts) — document shape (openapi version, title, version), both cookie schemes declared, smoke controller route captured in `paths`, production short-circuit (no routes mounted, no `app.use` called), dev mount (JSON at `/api/openapi.json` via the HTTP adapter, Scalar UI at `/api/docs` via `app.use`). - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **396 specs pass** (was 391). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean. - [x] Manual dev smoke: `pnpm nx serve portal-bff`, `curl /api/openapi.json | jq .info` returns title + version, open `/api/docs` in a browser, every controller's routes visible under their tag, lock icons match the cookie scheme on guarded routes. ## What's next — light follow-ups Not blocking this PR; mentioned so they're not lost: - Auto-inject the `X-CSRF-Token` header in Scalar from the `portal_csrf` cookie (custom Scalar config preset). - Promote `@ApiOperation` summaries with multi-line `description`s on the more involved routes (`/api/admin/audit`, `/api/admin/users`). - Annotate DTOs with `@ApiProperty` once the first contract-test consumer arrives — Nest can also pick them up automatically with the `@nestjs/swagger` ts-plugin if we wire it into the Nx build target. Deferred until the spec is consumed by tooling that benefits from the precision. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #143	2026-05-14 20:52:03 +02:00
julien	aca9e8d155	feat(portal-bff): user directory upserted at sign-in (#140) ... ## Summary First PR of the **portal-admin User-list chantier** per [ADR-0020](docs/decisions/0020-portal-admin-app.md) §"v1 scope — User list (read-only)". Ships the **write side** only: 1. A new `public.users` table that holds the BFF's local cache of identities seen sign in to either portal-shell or portal-admin. 2. A `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn(user)` upsert called from `SessionEstablisher.establish` after the blocking audit write. The read side (`GET /api/admin/users` + the admin viewer SPA screen) lands in two follow-up PRs of the same chantier. ## Schema [`prisma/schema.prisma`](apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma) gains a `User` model in the `public` schema: | Column | Type | Notes | | --- | --- | --- | | `oid` | TEXT, PK | Entra's stable per-user identifier inside the tenant. Per-tenant uniqueness is sufficient for v1's single-workforce-tenant design (ADR-0008). | | `tid` | TEXT | Tenant id. Updated on every upsert because a dual-audience future may legitimately change it. | | `audience` | TEXT | `'workforce'` \| `'customer'`. Hardcoded to `workforce` in v1 per ADR-0008's simplification; will read from session/claims when External ID activates. | | `username` | TEXT | Updated on every upsert (Entra-side rename possible). | | `display_name` | TEXT | Same. | | `first_seen_at` | TIMESTAMPTZ | Set once at first sign-in via DEFAULT NOW(); **never overwritten** thereafter. Enables "users since <date>" without joining anything. | | `last_seen_at` | TIMESTAMPTZ | Updated on every upsert. Enables "most recently active" without scanning `audit.events`. | Indexes: - `last_seen_at DESC` — admin default sort. - `username` — prefix filtering. Migration in [`prisma/migrations/20260514192014_users_directory/`](apps/portal-bff/prisma/migrations/20260514192014_users_directory/migration.sql). ## [`UserDirectoryService`](apps/portal-bff/src/users/user-directory.service.ts) ```ts async recordSignIn(entry): Promise<void> { try { await prisma.user.upsert({ where: { oid }, create: { oid, tid, audience, username, displayName }, update: { tid, audience, username, displayName, lastSeenAt: new Date() }, }); } catch (err) { // logged, never propagated } } ``` **Best-effort write.** Catches its own errors, logs a Pino warn (`user_directory.record_sign_in_failed`), returns `undefined`. The directory is a convenience for admin browsing, not a security boundary — a Postgres hiccup must not lock a user out of sign-in. ADR-0013's "no audit ⇒ no action" applies to the audit module only. ## [`SessionEstablisher`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/session-establisher.service.ts) wiring The directory call lands right after the existing audit emission: ```ts await this.audit.signIn({ actor: user, sessionId: req.sessionID }); // blocking per ADR-0013 await this.userDirectory.recordSignIn({ ...user, audience: 'workforce' }); // best-effort this.logger.log(...); ``` Two invariants the tests pin: 1. **Audit-first**: when `audit.signIn` throws, `userDirectory.recordSignIn` is NOT called. The directory never holds a row for a sign-in the audit log doesn't carry. 2. **Awaited**: an admin who just signed in sees themselves on the user list immediately — no race between the upsert and the response. ## Module wiring [`UsersModule`](apps/portal-bff/src/users/users.module.ts) is declared `@Global()` so `SessionEstablisher` (which lives in `AuthModule`) injects `UserDirectoryService` without forcing `AuthModule` to import `UsersModule`. The directory is a true cross-cutting concern: one writer (the auth callback) and one future reader (the admin endpoint). Wired into [`AppModule`](apps/portal-bff/src/app/app.module.ts) alongside the other v1 modules. `auth.module.spec.ts` updated to also import `UsersModule` in its slice-of-graph compile (otherwise the test fails to resolve the new `SessionEstablisher` dep). ## Notes for the reviewer - The directory write **awaits** (not fire-and-forget). The cost is one round-trip per sign-in on the response-critical path; the benefit is the no-race property called out above. If sign-in p95 becomes an issue we can revisit (e.g. background job) but the simpler shape is correct first. - `firstSeenAt` is intentionally absent from the `update` payload. The Prisma upsert's `update` block is precisely what changes on conflict; omitting the field leaves it untouched at the column level (Postgres-side default doesn't refire on UPDATE). - The model lives in `public`, not in a dedicated `identity` or `cms` schema. ADR-0020 enumerates `cms.*` for editorial data and `audit.*` for the audit ledger but doesn't require a separate schema for user-directory data. We can promote it to its own schema later if a role-isolation need emerges; the migration would be a `ALTER TABLE users SET SCHEMA …`. - `audit.events.actor_id_hash` is **not** stored on `public.users`. A future admin endpoint that joins sign-in counts from `audit.events` can compute the hash on-the-fly via `HashUserIdService` — keeping the salted-hash invariant from ADR-0013 intact (the salt stays inside the audit module). ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **365 specs pass** (was 358; +7: UserDirectoryService 4, SessionEstablisher integration 3). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean (the pre-existing rate-limit warnings + one unused-eslint-disable from PR #137 are unrelated). - [x] Prisma `migrate diff` confirms the model matches the migration SQL. - [ ] e2e — after merge: sign in via portal-shell or portal-admin, expect a row in `public.users` with the right `oid` / `last_seen_at`; sign in again, expect the same row's `last_seen_at` to advance and `first_seen_at` to stay put. ## What's next The chantier sequence: 1. **This PR** — write side: schema + service + sign-in upsert. 2. **PR 2** — BFF `GET /api/admin/users` (paginated + filterable, gated by `@RequireAdmin`, emits `admin.users.query` audit). 3. **PR 3** — portal-admin `/users` screen (table + filter form), promote the sidebar entry from "Soon" badge to live link. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #140	2026-05-14 19:30:12 +02:00
julien	d665c66c4e	feat(portal-bff): obo strategy + encrypted downstream token cache (#137) ... ## Summary First half of the **DownstreamApiClient + OBO** chantier per [ADR-0014](docs/decisions/0014-downstream-api-access-obo-pattern.md). Ships the OBO auth strategy and its encrypted-at-rest token cache as testable primitives — explicitly **not** the full `DownstreamApiClientFactory` + cockatiel + audience-pre-check framework. The scope is dictated by ADR-0014 §"Consequences": > *"Bad, because the framework is forward-looking — there is no concrete v1 caller. Risk of drift between framework and real needs. **Mitigated by writing the framework code only in the same iteration as the first concrete integration; until then, this ADR plus mock-driven unit tests on the strategies (OBO, signed-assertion) keep the design honest.**"* The framework gets assembled when the first real downstream integration arrives, with that integration as the validation surface. The next PR in this chantier ships the symmetric signed-assertion strategy + the JWKS endpoint. ## What lands ### [`assertOboCacheEncryptionKey`](apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-obo-cache-encryption-key.ts) Boot validator mirroring `assertSessionEncryptionKey`. AES-256-GCM, 32-byte requirement, placeholder rejection, fail-fast posture. Plus one extra defense in depth: > *Refuses a value identical to `SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY`* — ADR-0014 §"Token cache (for OBO)" mandates dedicated keys; catching the copy-paste regression at boot prevents a silent trust-boundary downgrade. Wired in [`main.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts) alongside the other `assertX()` validators. ### [`DownstreamTokenCache`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/downstream-token-cache.service.ts) Redis-backed cache, key shape `obo:{actorIdHash}:{resource}`. Encrypts each entry via the shared AES-256-GCM helpers from `session-crypto` but under a **dedicated key** (`OBO_CACHE_KEY`). | Path | Behaviour | | --- | --- | | Cache miss | Returns `null`. | | Tampered ciphertext | Returns `null` + Pino warn `downstream.obo_cache.decrypt_failed`. | | Wrong-key ciphertext | Returns `null` (GCM auth-tag mismatch). | | Decrypted but malformed shape | Returns `null` + Pino warn. | | Redis read failure | Returns `null` + Pino warn `downstream.obo_cache.read_failed`. | | Write of a token already inside the 60 s buffer | Skipped (TTL would be useless). | | Redis write failure | Logged, non-fatal. | Reads never throw — every failure collapses to a miss, the strategy re-acquires from Entra. ### [`OboStrategy`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/strategies/obo.strategy.ts) Wraps MSAL Node's `acquireTokenOnBehalfOf` with the cache. ``` acquire(input): cached = cache.get(...) if cached && cached.expiresAt - now > 60s → return cached result = msal.acquireTokenOnBehalfOf({ oboAssertion, scopes }) if !result || !result.accessToken || !result.expiresOn → throw OboAcquireError(msal-no-result) cache.set(...) return result ``` `OboAcquireError` carries a typed `reason` discriminator (`msal-refused` / `msal-no-result`) the future framework will translate to a **502 + `auth.token.validation.failed`** audit event per ADR-0014 — "the BFF does NOT silently fall back to the user's original token". ### One scope nuance from ADR-0014 ADR-0014 §"OBO strategy" says *"uses MSAL Node's `acquireTokenOnBehalfOf` with the user's current Entra access token (read from session via CLS)"*. v1 sessions don't persist the user's access token (ADR-0009 omits `offline_access` deliberately). For now the strategy takes the user access token as an **input parameter** — when the first concrete integration ships, the framework will fetch it from CLS / MSAL's token cache and forward here. That keeps the strategy a testable primitive without coupling to a session shape that doesn't exist yet. ### [`DownstreamModule`](apps/portal-bff/src/downstream/downstream.module.ts) Provides `OBO_CACHE_KEY` (via the validator at factory time), `DownstreamTokenCache`, `OboStrategy`. Imports `AuthModule` for the shared `MSAL_CLIENT` and `RedisModule` for the shared `ioredis` client. Wired into `AppModule` though no runtime consumer yet — the registration makes the strategy injectable for the future integration without that integration having to also touch the module graph. ## Required env update (mandatory at boot) ```env OBO_CACHE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace_with_32_random_bytes_base64url ``` Generate with `node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"`. Must differ from `SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY` — the boot validator refuses identical values. ## Out of scope (deferred until the first concrete integration) Per ADR-0014's "until then" clause: - `DownstreamApiClientFactory` + per-service typed config. - `cockatiel` resilience composition (timeout, retry, circuit breaker, bulkhead). - Audience pre-check at the call site (`audienceConstraint` → `authz.deny` audit event). - Error-translation tables per service. - OTel custom spans `downstream.<service>.<verb>.<path>`. - The `auth.token.validation.failed` audit event itself (the discriminator is on `OboAcquireError`, the audit-emission glue lives in the future framework). - The framework wiring that reads the user access token from CLS instead of accepting it as a parameter. These land alongside the first concrete integration so the framework shape is validated against a real consumer, not speculative needs. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **334 specs pass** (was 308; +26: env validator 8, token cache 9, OBO strategy 9). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean. - [x] Env validator refuses placeholder, wrong length, non-base64url, AND identical-to-`SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY`. Boot-order tolerant: accepts the value when `SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is unset. - [x] Token cache round-trip verified: written ciphertext starts with `v1.`, never contains the plaintext sentinel. - [x] Tamper rejection verified: flipping the last char of the GCM-encrypted blob fails decryption and collapses to a miss. - [x] Wrong-key rejection verified: writing with one key, reading with another, returns `null`. - [x] TTL math verified: PX TTL = `expiresAt − now − 60 000`. Write skipped when token already inside the buffer. - [x] OBO strategy: cache-hit short-circuit, stale-cache re-acquire, cold-cache → MSAL → cache.set, MSAL refusal → typed error, MSAL null-result → typed error, empty access token → typed error, null expiresOn → typed error. ## Notes for the reviewer - The strategy file uses `override readonly cause` on `OboAcquireError` because TS `strict.exactOptionalPropertyTypes + noImplicitOverride` flags shadowing the built-in `Error.cause`. The shadowing is intentional — we want the typed cause property visible in error consumers — so the `override` keyword is the canonical way. - `DownstreamTokenCache.get`'s "never throws" posture is deliberate. A cache failure must not poison a downstream call: the strategy re-acquires from Entra. The trade-off is that a key-rotation gone wrong shows up as silent re-acquisitions (no errors, just extra MSAL load); the structured Pino warns are the ops signal. - The `DownstreamModule` is wired into `AppModule` even though nothing consumes the strategy at runtime. Without the wiring, the first integration PR would have to also touch the module graph; with it, the integration is just "inject `OboStrategy` and call `.acquire()`". --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #137	2026-05-14 18:13:30 +02:00
julien	3ed6dae3a5	feat(portal-bff): admin module + role guard + /api/admin/me self-test (#127) ... ## Summary Lays the foundation for the `/api/admin/*` surface per [ADR-0020](docs/decisions/0020-portal-admin-app.md). This PR ships the role guard, the `@RequireAdmin()` decorator, and a self-test endpoint — no business routes yet. The next consumer (audit log viewer) lands in a later PR once the distinct admin session is in place. ## What ships - **[AdminRoleGuard](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin-role.guard.ts)** — three branches: - No session at all → **401**. No audit; unauthenticated probes are normal traffic, not a privilege-escalation signal. - Session but `roles` lacks `admin` → **403** + `admin.access_denied` audit row with actor hash, attempted route (`${METHOD} ${originalUrl}`), and the roles the user did hold. - Session with `admin` role → pass through. - Audit-write failures propagate (no audit ⇒ no action, consistent with the existing call sites in [AuthController](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.ts)). - **[`@RequireAdmin()`](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/require-admin.decorator.ts)** — semantic sugar for `@UseGuards(AdminRoleGuard)` built with `applyDecorators` so future composition (e.g. with the upcoming `@RequireMfa({ freshness })` for the admin entry route) is mechanical. - **`GET /api/admin/me`** — self-test endpoint named in ADR-0020 §"Confirmation" step 3. Returns the public user payload + `roles` so ops can `curl` the gate with three sessions (no cookie / non-admin cookie / admin cookie) and observe `401` / `403` + audit / `200` respectively. - **[`AuditWriter.adminAccessDenied()`](apps/portal-bff/src/audit/audit.service.ts)** — new typed method using the pre-existing `denied` outcome enum value. Keeps the salt inside the audit module, matches the pattern of `signIn` / `signOut` / `sessionExpired`. ## Why the shared portal-shell session (for now) ADR-0020 mandates a distinct `__Host-portal_admin_session` cookie + Redis namespace `session:admin:*` for the admin app. **That is not in this PR.** The chantier sequence splits it out: this PR proves the guard semantics + audit integration on the existing session; the next PR introduces the distinct session middleware + admin-specific auth flow. Rationale: the guard logic is independent of the session implementation — `session.user.roles` is the only field it reads. Landing it first means a smaller diff to review, a faster opportunity to validate the audit emission on a real Postgres, and a clean baseline to layer the session split onto. ## Notes for the reviewer - The non-null assertion on `req.session.user!` in [admin.controller.ts:27](apps/portal-bff/src/admin/admin.controller.ts#L27) is explicitly disabled with an inline comment pointing at the guard's contract. The alternative (a defensive runtime check) duplicates the guard's logic without adding safety. The spec for the guard covers every branch including the absent-user path. - `AdminController` does not depend on `AuthService`'s `toPublicUser` projection — that helper is private to the auth module and pulls `displayName` / `username` with extra account-object fallbacks specific to the OIDC callback. The admin response is built from the already-populated session, so a duplicated projection here is the simpler shape. ## Open questions (out of scope) - The Entra app role `admin` must be **declared on the app registration manifest** and **assigned to at least one test user** before this gate can be exercised end-to-end. That's an Entra Admin Center operation, not code. The guard's behaviour under all three branches is covered by unit tests; e2e validation waits until the role is assigned. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **214 specs pass** (was 203; +11 covering guard branches, controller projection, audit method). - [x] `pnpm exec nx affected -t format:check lint test build --base=origin/main` — clean (the pre-existing `_res` / `_next` warnings in `rate-limit.middleware.ts` are unrelated). - [x] Audit row schema verified — `admin.access_denied` events use `outcome=denied`, store the route in `subject`, and persist `{ rolesHeld: [...] }` in the JSONB payload. - [ ] e2e — pending Entra role declaration + assignment. Will be covered by manual ops curl checks once the role exists. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #127	2026-05-14 01:17:30 +02:00
julien	5bbe2304ff	feat(portal-bff): helmet + env-driven CORS allowlist + double-submit CSRF (#122) ... ## Summary Phase-2 security baseline that the `main.ts` placeholder note has been advertising since the auth/session work began. Three independent middlewares + their SPA counterparts, all mounted in a single PR because they only become meaningful together. ### Helmet on the BFF `helmet()` with three overrides matching our specific shape: - **HSTS only in production** — dev runs on plain HTTP, HSTS is just noise. - **`crossOriginResourcePolicy: 'cross-origin'`** — the SPA on its own origin reads JSON from the BFF; the default `same-origin` would block it. - **CSP disabled in non-production** — the BFF doesn't render HTML, so CSP on JSON responses is mostly inert, but Helmet's default CSP triggers noisy `connect-src` violations in browser devtools that we don't need. Everything else is Helmet defaults: `X-Frame-Options=SAMEORIGIN`, `X-Content-Type-Options=nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy=no-referrer`, `X-Powered-By` removed, etc. ### CORS allowlist, env-driven `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` env (comma-separated) is now **mandatory** at boot. The BFF refuses to start without it via `readCorsAllowlist()` — same boot-time validator family as `assertSessionSecret` etc. The previous hardcoded `http://localhost:4200` fallback is gone; getting CORS wrong silently is the kind of "works in dev, breaks in prod" trap the validator is specifically designed to catch. `X-CSRF-Token` is now in the allowed headers. ### Double-submit CSRF - BFF mints a 256-bit `csrfToken` at session creation (`/auth/callback`), stored on `req.session.csrfToken` and mirrored to a JS-readable cookie (`__Host-portal_csrf` prod / `portal_csrf` dev). The cookie is the SPA's read-only view; the server-side session is the source of truth. - `createCsrfMiddleware` (mounted after the session middleware in `main.ts`) compares the `X-CSRF-Token` header with `req.session.csrfToken` using `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. Skips: - safe methods (`GET / HEAD / OPTIONS`), - anonymous requests (no `req.session.user`), - `/api/auth/login` and `/api/auth/callback` (those mint the token themselves). - Mismatch → `403 {"error":"csrf"}` with a structured Pino warn. - SPA's `csrfInterceptor` reads the cookie via `document.cookie` and copies its value into `X-CSRF-Token` on every mutating BFF request. The header is omitted on `GET / HEAD / OPTIONS` (BFF skips them anyway) and on non-BFF origins. - Logout and the absolute-timeout middleware both clear the CSRF cookie alongside the session cookie. ## Notable choices **Session-bound double-submit, not pure cookie-vs-header.** A naive "compare cookie with header" check is defeated when an attacker can plant a cookie (subdomain takeover, etc.). Comparing the header to the server-side session-stored token instead means the attacker would also need to be the authenticated user — which is what CSRF defense is supposed to prevent in the first place. **No CSRF for anonymous mutating routes (v1).** None exist today; we don't have an unauthenticated POST endpoint anywhere. Generating a CSRF token for anonymous sessions would conflict with `saveUninitialized: false` on express-session and add complexity we don't need yet. Anonymous public-form CSRF defenses (site-key, captcha) land if and when those routes ship. **`SameSite=Lax`, not `Strict`, on the CSRF cookie.** Matches the session cookie's policy so the two travel together on the SPA→BFF cross-origin same-site fetch (different ports = different origin, same registrable domain). The double-submit pattern is what gives the protection; `SameSite=Lax` is a belt-and-braces layer. **`csrfInterceptor` runs after `bffCredentialsInterceptor` and before `bffUnauthorizedInterceptor` in the chain.** Order: credentials first (set `withCredentials`), then CSRF (set the header), then unauthorized handling (catch 401s). Forward order, no surprises. **`CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` has no localhost fallback.** I considered keeping the fallback for ergonomics but it makes the BFF silently misconfigured if someone forgets the env. The error message points straight at the file to edit. ## Out of scope (next PRs) - Rate limiting + structured error filter (still in the phase-2 to-do). - CSP fine-tuning when we have actual HTML pages (portal-shell + portal-admin static serving). - CSRF token rotation on idle-extension (today the token lives the session's lifetime; refreshing on each request would invalidate in-flight mutations). ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t test --projects=portal-bff,feature-auth,portal-shell` clean env → **177 + 28 + 34 = 239/239 pass** (was 144 + 19 + 34 = 197 before; +42 specs across CSRF middleware, CSRF cookie helpers, CORS allowlist parser, csrfInterceptor, and extended auth.controller / absolute-timeout coverage). - [x] `pnpm nx run-many -t lint build --projects=portal-bff,feature-auth,portal-shell` → clean. - [x] **CI clean-env repro** (lesson from prior PRs): every env var unset (including new `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`) → tests still pass. The BFF refuses to boot without `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, which is the intended behaviour. - [x] Prettier-clean. - [ ] Manual smoke against running BFF: - [ ] Sign in → `__Host-portal_csrf` (prod) / `portal_csrf` (dev) cookie set, value matches `audit.events.payload->>actorIdHash`-style traceability via `req.session.csrfToken` in Redis. - [ ] Hit a future POST route from the SPA → request carries `X-CSRF-Token`, BFF accepts. - [ ] Forge a POST without the header (curl) → 403 `{"error":"csrf"}`. - [ ] Sign out → both cookies cleared. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #122	2026-05-13 20:50:44 +02:00
julien	758d723744	feat(portal-bff): session middleware with AES-256-GCM at rest per ADR-0010 (#110) ... ## Summary Mounts `express-session` + `connect-redis` at bootstrap on top of the shared `ioredis` client, with **AES-256-GCM applied to the full JSON payload before it lands in Redis** (per ADR-0010). The configured middleware is exposed as a NestJS provider (`SESSION_MIDDLEWARE`) and `main.ts` mounts it through `app.get(...)` so it sits on the same Redis connection the rest of the BFF uses — no second client at the bootstrap layer. Envelope is versioned (`v1.<iv>.<tag>.<ciphertext>`, all base64url) so the algorithm / key derivation can rotate without a flag-day re-encryption. Tamper / wrong-key / unknown-version all raise `SessionDecryptError`; for now the failure is logged via Pino with `event: session.decrypt_failed` — the first-class audit event lands with ADR-0013. Scope is intentionally **infrastructure only**: - middleware mounted on every request, `req.session` available downstream - session id = `crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')` (256 bits per ADR-0010) - cookie name: `__Host-portal_session` in production, `portal_session` in dev (the `__Host-` prefix mandates `Secure`, which dev HTTP can't satisfy) - `httpOnly + sameSite=lax + path=/`; `resave:false`, `saveUninitialized:false`, `rolling:true` - cookie `maxAge` follows `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` (default 1800) - encryption-at-rest active end-to-end Out of scope, landing in follow-ups: `/auth/callback` populating `req.session.user`, `/me`, `/auth/logout`, the absolute-timeout interceptor, and the `user_sessions:{userId}` secondary index. ## Notable shape choices (ADR-0010 amended in the same commit) **Full-payload encryption vs. just the `tokens` field.** The first draft of ADR-0010 scoped at-rest encryption to a `tokens` sub-field. The session also carries claims (`oid`, `tid`, `preferred_username`, …) that qualify as PII under GDPR — for an APF-Handicap portal handling health-adjacent data this matters. Encrypting the envelope is strictly stronger and removes the need to classify fields one by one. The ADR text is updated to match. **`ioredis` + adapter vs. switching the BFF to `node-redis`.** `connect-redis` v9 was rewritten for `node-redis` v4 and no longer accepts `ioredis` directly. Two reasonable paths: 1. **Adapter (chosen)** — keep the shared `ioredis` client; shim the six commands `connect-redis` actually calls (`get`, `set` with `{expiration:{type:'EX',value}}`, `expire`, `del`, `mGet`, `scanIterator`) to the node-redis shape. Smallest blast radius — RedisModule, OBO cache (ADR-0014), future pub/sub all stay on a single Redis library. 2. **Switch RedisModule to `node-redis`** — clean alignment with `connect-redis`'s expectations, but touches every Redis consumer and would itself require an ADR amendment. The adapter is reversible: if we ever decide to standardise on `node-redis`, deleting one file removes it. Happy to switch if you'd rather take that path. ## Env vars - `SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY` — **mandatory**, AES-256-GCM key (32 bytes after base64url decode). New `assertSessionEncryptionKey()` validator wired in `main.ts` alongside the other pre-flight checks. - `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` — optional, default `1800`. - `SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` — optional, default `43200` (consumed by the absolute-timeout interceptor in a follow-up). `.env.example` updated; the three variables are promoted from the "future vars" block to the active section. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` — **99/99 pass** (was 62 before this PR; +37 new specs across the 5 new files). - [x] `pnpm nx build portal-bff` — clean webpack build. - [x] `pnpm nx lint portal-bff` — clean. - [x] Prettier-clean for all PR source files. - [ ] Local smoke test once the next PR wires `/auth/callback` → `req.session.user`; this PR has no user-visible behaviour to exercise on its own. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #110	2026-05-12 18:06:13 +02:00
julien	d4b5ed1c5d	feat(portal-bff): redis client foundation per ADR-0010 (#109) ... ## Summary First step toward Redis-backed sessions (ADR-0010). Adds the shared `ioredis` connection that every downstream consumer (session storage, OBO token cache, …) injects via the new `REDIS_CLIENT` DI token. No session logic in this PR — that's the next one. ## What lands - **`ioredis@^5.10.1`** as a direct dependency. Chosen by ADR-0010 for its mature Sentinel support — single-instance URL today, Sentinel-HA configuration lands with the prod infrastructure ADR. - **[`.env.example`](apps/portal-bff/.env.example)** promotes `REDIS_URL` from its future-vars comment to an active variable, defaulting to the local Compose stack's address. The Sentinel-style keys (`REDIS_SENTINEL_HOSTS`, `REDIS_SENTINEL_NAME`, `REDIS_TLS`) stay in the future-vars comment until the prod deploy. - **[`check-redis-config.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-redis-config.ts)** — boot-time guard mirroring the existing four: - Refuses to start on missing / non-`redis(s)://` / passwordless / placeholder URLs. - Returns a typed `RedisConfig` with parsed `host` + `port` for downstream observability. - **[`redis.token.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/redis/redis.token.ts)** — `REDIS_CLIENT` string token + `Redis` type alias. Same shape as the existing `ENTRA_CONFIG` / `MSAL_CLIENT`. - **[`redis.module.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/redis/redis.module.ts)** — `RedisModule` factory provider: - Caps `maxRetriesPerRequest: 3` so an unreachable Redis surfaces a clear command-time error rather than an infinite reconnect storm. - Wires `connect` / `ready` / `error` / `close` / `reconnecting` events into the Pino stream under the `redis` context — easy log isolation. - Non-global; consumers import the module to state "I depend on Redis". - **`main.ts`** calls `assertRedisConfig()` alongside the other three validators; **`AppModule`** imports `RedisModule`. ## Decisions worth flagging - **`maxRetriesPerRequest: 3`** rather than the ioredis default of 20. With the default, a Redis outage masquerades as request-level timeouts spread over minutes. Capping low surfaces the outage in the first command failure — the BFF can then return 503 and recover quickly when Redis comes back. - **Single shared client.** Pub/sub use-cases (when they appear) duplicate via `redis.duplicate()` per ioredis convention. Connect/disconnect is one socket per BFF instance. - **No explicit shutdown hook yet.** Node's process-exit handlers and ioredis's own cleanup take care of the socket on SIGTERM / Ctrl+C. If we see stuck connections in real load, we wire `OnApplicationShutdown` + `redis.quit()`. - **Sentinel-style config stays in the future-vars comment.** ioredis supports it natively, but plumbing it on top of the URL form complicates the validator and the factory for zero v1 payoff. Lands with the prod infrastructure ADR. ## Verification - `nx run-many -t lint test build --projects=portal-bff` — green. - **62 / 62 specs** (was 52; +10 — `check-redis-config` covers happy path + 6 failure modes; `redis.module` covers DI resolution against an unreachable URL plus the missing-env failure). - Boot smoke against the local Compose stack: Pino's `redis` context shows `redis.connect` → `redis.ready` on startup; killing the Redis container produces `redis.close` / `redis.reconnecting` lines. ## What this PR explicitly does NOT do - Mount `express-session` + `connect-redis` middleware. The next PR wires the session cookie (`__Host-portal_session`), the encrypted payload, and the lookup middleware that attaches `user` to every request. - Plug the callback into session creation. Auth still ends with a Pino log + redirect; the SPA still sees the user anonymous on the next request. - Sentinel / TLS configuration. Future-var keys are documented in `.env.example` for when the prod deploy lands. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #109	2026-05-12 16:48:20 +02:00
julien	58e3b65bd9	feat(portal-bff): entra config foundation — boot validator + auth module (#102) ... ## Summary First step of ADR-0009 wiring on the BFF: capture the Entra app-registration env vars in the boot pipeline so subsequent PRs can plug `@azure/msal-node` onto a typed, already-validated config without re-reading `process.env`. **No MSAL client, no OIDC routes, no session integration yet** — those land in follow-up PRs. ## What lands - **[`.env.example`](apps/portal-bff/.env.example)** promotes the Entra block from its previous "future-vars" comment stub to an active section. Six keys: - `ENTRA_INSTANCE_URL` — the Microsoft login endpoint (e.g. `https://login.microsoftonline.com/`). - `ENTRA_TENANT_ID`, `ENTRA_CLIENT_ID`, `ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET` — the values from the Entra app-registration UI. - `ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI`, `ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI` — consumed by the OIDC routes in a follow-up PR. Multi-tenant `ENTRA_ACCEPTED_TENANT_IDS` stays in the future-vars comment until External ID activation (ADR-0008 phase 2). - **[`apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-entra-config.ts)** — boot-time validator mirroring `check-database-url.ts`. Verifies every required key is present, the instance URL is `https://` and ends with `/`, tenant + client IDs are UUIDs, none of them are the literal placeholder values from `.env.example`, and the two redirect URIs parse as URLs. Returns a typed `EntraConfig` object with a pre-computed `authority` field (`${instanceUrl}${tenantId}`) so the future MSAL factory does not re-derive it. - **[`auth.module.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.module.ts)** — `AuthModule` whose v1 surface is one provider: the parsed `EntraConfig` keyed by the `ENTRA_CONFIG` injection token. Factory delegates to `assertEntraConfig()`. Non-global on purpose — consumers state intent by importing the module. - **Bootstrap wiring** — `main.ts` calls `assertEntraConfig()` alongside `assertDatabaseUrl()` so misconfiguration fails fast at boot rather than mid-request (per ADR-0018 §"BFF env-var loading"). `AppModule` imports `AuthModule`. ## Naming choice Chose `ENTRA_*` rather than `AZURE_AD_*` to align with the ADR text (Microsoft Entra ID, post-2023 rebrand). The values you copy from the Entra app-registration UI go into `apps/portal-bff/.env` (git-ignored). ## Decisions worth flagging - **Validator called twice** — once in `main.ts` (boot-time fail-fast) and once in the `AuthModule` factory (to obtain the value for DI). Both reads are idempotent and trivially cheap. The duplication is intentional: boot-time gives a clear, pre-NestFactory error; the factory call surfaces the typed value to consumers. - **No `@azure/msal-node` dependency added yet** — introducing the dep without a consumer would be a smell. Lands in the next PR alongside the MSAL client factory. - **Pre-computed `authority`** in the parsed config rather than letting each MSAL consumer concatenate `instanceUrl + tenantId`. One place to change if the multi-tenant authority (`/organizations`, `/common`) replaces the tenant-scoped one when External ID activates. ## Verification - `nx run-many -t lint test build --projects=portal-bff` — green. - **29 / 29 specs** (was 20; +9 from the new entra-config spec + auth.module spec). - Boot smoke test (manual): with the placeholder values in `.env.example`, `nx serve portal-bff` aborts immediately with `ENTRA_CLIENT_ID is still the .env.example placeholder (…)`. With real values in a local `.env`, the BFF starts normally. ## Test plan - [x] Lint + test + build green. - [x] Validator unit-test covers happy path + every documented failure mode. - [ ] Manual: drop the real Entra values you obtained into `apps/portal-bff/.env`, `nx serve portal-bff` boots clean. - [ ] Manual: temporarily blank out one of the four `ENTRA_*` keys → BFF aborts at boot with a clear message naming the missing key. ## Next PRs on the auth track 1. Install `@azure/msal-node`, add the `MsalConfidentialClient` factory provider in `AuthModule`, expose it via DI. 2. First OIDC routes: `/api/auth/login` (PKCE-initiated redirect to Entra) + `/api/auth/callback` (token exchange + ID-token validation, audit-logged, no session persistence yet). 3. Session persistence per ADR-0010 (Redis + AES-GCM, `__Host-portal_session` cookie). Closes the auth loop. 4. RP-initiated logout, CSRF protection, route guards. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #102	2026-05-12 02:27:55 +02:00
julien	02ac44e498	feat(portal-bff): audit log foundation per ADR-0013 (#76) ... ## Summary Lays down the append-only audit log per ADR-0013: schema declaration, first migration with role grants, NestJS `AuditWriter` service. Typed event-family methods, the separate `AUDIT_DATABASE_URL` pool, the retention job, and the live-DB integration tests are explicitly listed as "wired as features land" in the ADR's confirmation block — they ship when the matching feature ADRs do. ## What lands **Prisma schema** ([`apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma`](apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma)): - `multiSchema` preview enabled; datasource declares `public` + `audit` schemas. - `AuditEvent` model: `id` (uuid), `createdAt`, `eventType` (free-form in v1), `audience` enum (`workforce | customer`), `actorIdHash`, `traceId`, `subject`, `outcome` enum (`success | failure | denied`), `payload` (jsonb). - Indexes on `createdAt`, `eventType`, `traceId` — covering the three obvious query shapes. **Migration** ([`prisma/migrations/*_init_audit_schema/migration.sql`](apps/portal-bff/prisma/migrations/20260510011453_init_audit_schema/migration.sql)): - Standard Prisma `CREATE TABLE` / enums output, then the **append-only contract** re-applied explicitly: - `ALTER TABLE/TYPE OWNER TO audit_owner`. - `GRANT INSERT` to `audit_writer`, `SELECT` to `audit_reader`, **`SELECT, DELETE`** to `audit_archiver` (SELECT is needed to evaluate the `created_at` predicate of "delete older than retention" — Postgres requires SELECT on every column referenced in DELETE's WHERE). - `GRANT USAGE` on the enum types to all three roles (without it `audit_writer.INSERT` fails with "permission denied for type"). - **No** GRANT for `UPDATE` / `TRUNCATE` to anyone — including `audit_owner` at runtime; only fresh schema migrations amend the table. **Service** ([`apps/portal-bff/src/audit/`](apps/portal-bff/src/audit/)): - `AuditWriter.recordEvent(input)` — single entry point. Wraps every INSERT in a transaction whose first statement is `SET LOCAL ROLE audit_writer`, so the role contract holds at runtime even from the otherwise-privileged BFF connection. - `traceId` auto-resolved from the active OTel span (so audit row joins with traces and Pino logs on the same `trace_id`). - `actorIdHash` auto-resolved from CLS (key `actorIdHash`) with explicit input-side override; `null` when neither is set (placeholder until ADR-0009 / ADR-0010 guards populate CLS). - Errors propagate (no catch-and-swallow), per ADR-0013's "blocking writes: no audit ⇒ no action". **Tests** — 8 unit tests on `AuditWriter` (mocked Prisma + CLS): role-locking ordering, input pass-through, `Prisma.JsonNull` for missing payload, CLS-vs-input precedence on `actorIdHash`, OTel trace capture, error propagation. ## End-to-end verification (manual, against local-dev Postgres) ``` INSERT under audit_writer: ok UPDATE under audit_writer: permission denied for table events DELETE under audit_writer: permission denied for table events DELETE under audit_archiver: ok, row removed (after the SELECT-grant fix) ``` ## ADR-0013 §Confirmation rewritten Two-block split: "wired in foundation PR" lists what landed here; "wired as features land" lists the typed event-family methods, AUDIT_DATABASE_URL connection split, startup self-test probe, retention purge job, salt-shared cross-correlation test, and live-DB role-contract integration tests — each anchored to the feature ADR that triggers it. ## Recovery for anyone with a pre-existing local-dev DB If your local-dev Postgres already had the audit migration applied **before** the SELECT-grant fix, the archiver's DELETE will fail. Two options: 1. Apply the missing grant directly: ```bash psql "$DATABASE_URL" -c "GRANT SELECT ON audit.events TO audit_archiver;" ``` 2. Or wipe the volume and re-migrate cleanly: ```bash ./infra/local/dev.sh down -v ./infra/local/dev.sh up pnpm --filter @apf-portal/source exec prisma migrate deploy # or `cd apps/portal-bff && pnpm exec prisma migrate deploy` ``` Fresh DBs land with the corrected migration directly. ## Out of scope (separate PRs) - Typed event-family methods (`signIn`, `signInFailed`, …) — added per matching feature ADR. - `AUDIT_DATABASE_URL` separate connection pool — defense-in-depth, when production needs it. - Startup self-test probe (deliberate failing UPDATE asserting rejection) — lands with the connection split. - Retention purge job (`audit_archiver` daily cron) — phase-3b infra. - Live-DB integration tests asserting the role contract — Testcontainers-style harness, separate PR. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green on this PR. - [ ] `prisma migrate deploy` succeeds on a fresh DB (the recovery instructions cover the SELECT-grant gap for already-migrated dev DBs). - [ ] `psql -c "\dp audit.events"` shows the expected privilege matrix: `audit_owner=arwdDxtm/audit_owner`, `audit_writer=a/audit_owner`, `audit_reader=r/audit_owner`, `audit_archiver=rd/audit_owner`. - [ ] BFF boots; calling `AuditWriter.recordEvent` from a controller (manual smoke once a real flow lands) writes to `audit.events` with the expected `trace_id` matching the request's Jaeger span. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #76	2026-05-10 03:44:01 +02:00
julien	b74d3f1b9b	feat(portal-bff): observability foundations (Pino + CLS + OTel) (#70) ... ## Summary Implements ADR-0012 phase 1, BFF side. The SPA wiring is a separate phase-2 PR. The BFF now emits structured JSON logs to stdout, tagged with `trace_id` / `span_id` from the active OTel context, and exports OTLP traces over HTTP/Protobuf to the Collector that already runs in the local-dev compose. Anything Nest, Express, HTTP-out, Prisma (Postgres) or `ioredis` does is auto-spanned. A `GET /api/health` liveness endpoint is added to round things out. ## What lands **Runtime libs added** (production deps): - `nestjs-pino`, `pino`, `pino-http` — structured logging - `nestjs-cls` — request-scoped context - `@opentelemetry/api` / `sdk-node` / `resources` / `semantic-conventions` - `@opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-proto` (HTTP/Protobuf, port 4318) - `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-{http,express,nestjs-core,pg,ioredis,pino}` — curated, **no** `auto-instrumentations-node` mass-import (anti-bricolage) Dev: `pino-pretty` (gated by `NODE_ENV`). **Code:** - `apps/portal-bff/src/observability/tracing.ts` — OTel `NodeSDK` bootstrap. Documents the load-order constraint inline (must be the very first import of `main.ts`). Pure side-effect module. - `apps/portal-bff/src/observability/observability.module.ts` — composes `ClsModule` (UUID per request stored as `request_id`) and `LoggerModule` (`pino-pretty` in dev, raw JSON in prod, `LOG_LEVEL` env-driven, `/health` excluded from auto-logging, `X-Request-Id` honoured if inbound). - `apps/portal-bff/src/health/{health.controller,health.module,health.controller.spec}.ts` — `GET /api/health` returning `{status, uptimeSeconds, service, version}`. Cheap liveness only — `/readiness` lands when dependencies have a readiness story. - `apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-database-url.{ts,spec.ts}` — fail-fast validator called from `main.ts` before NestFactory boots. Catches the same family of bug that bit pgweb in #63: a literal special character in `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` that needs URL-encoding in `DATABASE_URL`. Prisma requires a URL string (no discrete-flag escape hatch), so early validation + a clear error message is the v1 mitigation. Six unit tests cover happy path, missing URL, wrong scheme, encoded special chars, literal `@` in password, malformed URL. **Wiring:** - `main.ts` imports `./observability/tracing` as line 1, then uses `app.get(Logger)` from `nestjs-pino` with `bufferLogs: true` so early-bootstrap lines are not lost. - `app.module.ts` imports `ObservabilityModule` first, then `PrismaModule`, then `HealthModule`. - `apps/portal-bff/.env.example` promotes `LOG_LEVEL`, `OTEL_SERVICE_NAME`, `OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION`, `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT`, `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL`, `OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER` from the "future" comment to active settings — defaults target the local-dev Collector. - Both `apps/portal-bff/.env.example` and `infra/local/.env.example` now spell out the URL-encoding constraint on `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` with the char-by-char encoding table (`@` → `%40`, etc.). **ADR-0012 §Confirmation** rewritten to distinguish what landed in this PR from what is wired as the corresponding feature ADRs ship (CLS keys for `session_id` / `user_id_hash` / `audience`, `LOG_USER_ID_SALT` enforcement, redact list, custom spans, SPA-side SDK, full integration tests, prod Collector config). ## Trace ↔ log correlation Automatic via `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pino` — every Pino record gets `trace_id` and `span_id` injected from the active OTel context. No CLS gymnastics needed for that concern. ## Verification ```bash pnpm exec nx run-many -t lint test build # 8 projects green pnpm audit --audit-level=moderate # 0 vulnerabilities ./infra/local/dev.sh up observability # start Collector + Jaeger cp apps/portal-bff/.env.example apps/portal-bff/.env pnpm nx serve portal-bff curl http://localhost:3000/api/health # → {"status":"ok","uptimeSeconds":N,"service":"portal-bff","version":"dev"} ``` Then hit `GET http://localhost:3000/api` once or twice and open http://localhost:16686 — the corresponding spans appear in Jaeger, and Pino logs on stdout carry the matching `trace_id`. ## Test plan - [ ] `nx run-many -t lint test build` green on this PR's CI run. - [ ] `pnpm audit` clean. - [ ] BFF boots, `/api/health` returns the expected JSON. - [ ] Pino logs in dev are colourised one-liners; in prod they would be raw JSON (toggled by `NODE_ENV=production`). - [ ] With the local-dev stack's `--profile observability` active, traces are visible in Jaeger UI. - [ ] Each Pino log line for a request carries the same `trace_id` as the trace span in Jaeger. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #70	2026-05-09 22:28:17 +02:00
Julien Gautier	2b0e20bd85	chore: wire PostgreSQL + Prisma per ADR-0006 ... Add Prisma 7 + nestjs-prisma. The schema lives at apps/portal-bff/prisma/schema.prisma with provider postgresql; the new prisma-client generator (Prisma 7 default) outputs the typed client to apps/portal-bff/generated/prisma/ which is gitignored. apps/portal-bff/src/app/app.module.ts imports PrismaModule.forRoot ({ isGlobal: true }) so PrismaService is injectable across the BFF without per-module imports. apps/portal-bff/.env.example documents DATABASE_URL with a local-dev default, plus a forward list of env vars introduced by upcoming phases and ADRs (auth, sessions, MFA, observability, audit, downstream APIs) - catalog reference, not implementation. The actual .env stays gitignored at both repo root and app levels. prisma.config.ts (Prisma 7's TypeScript config) is committed; it loads DATABASE_URL via dotenv. Schema and migrations paths are pinned to prisma/ relative to the bff app. PostgreSQL provisioning, RLS policies for the dual-audience design, the dedicated audit schema with role grants (audit_owner / audit_writer / audit_reader / audit_archiver per ADR-0013), and column-level encryption for L3-scoped data are out of scope of this commit - they belong with the future on-prem infrastructure ADR.	2026-04-30 17:28:54 +02:00
Julien Gautier	bea5e1954f	chore: generate portal-shell and portal-bff apps per ADR-0004 / ADR-0005 ... Add the @nx/angular, @nx/nest, @nx/vite, @nx/eslint plugins, then generate the two apps. Adjust the empty-template tsconfig.base.json to be Angular-compatible (drop project references and customConditions that the empty-template defaults to but Angular doesn't support; keep the strict-TS extensions from ADR-0004). apps/portal-shell (Angular 21): - standalone APIs, routing, SCSS, esbuild - vitest-angular as unitTestRunner, playwright for e2e - strict mode - tags scope:portal-shell, type:app - app.config.ts wired with provideZonelessChangeDetection() per ADR-0004 (Angular 21 + Nx 22 generates without zone.js by default) apps/portal-bff (NestJS 11): - Express adapter (default per ADR-0005) - Jest as unitTestRunner - tags scope:portal-bff, type:app - main.ts wired with a global ValidationPipe configured whitelist + forbidNonWhitelisted + transform per ADR-0005 - Phase-2 security additions (helmet, CORS, sessions, CSRF, rate limit, auth guards, error filter) deferred to their respective ADRs - placeholder comment in main.ts Workspace dependencies: class-validator + class-transformer added (required by NestJS ValidationPipe at runtime). Nx-generated .gitignore additions (.angular, __screenshots__) merged into ours. .vscode/extensions.json and launch.json added by Nx are kept (do not override our existing settings.json).	2026-04-30 16:12:42 +02:00