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1 Commits
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 julien
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da2bd6d481 |
docs(adr-0021): phase-2 security baseline (helmet, CORS, CSRF, rate-limit, error envelope) (#124)
## Summary Documents the security middleware stack shipped across the five most recent BFF PRs (#115, #117, #120, #122, #123) as a single MADR ADR. Today the rationale for each choice lives in code comments and PR descriptions; the next contributor reaching for `csurf`, a cookie-only CSRF, or a hardcoded localhost CORS fallback won't have a single place to read why those are wrong here. ADR-0021 covers: - **Response envelope** — `{ error: { code, message, traceId } }`, single contract shared between Nest's `StructuredErrorFilter` and raw Express middlewares (CSRF, rate-limit) via the exported `errorResponse()` helper. Status code → code mapping documented. 500s never leak the underlying exception. - **CSRF — session-bound double-submit**, not pure cookie-vs-header. Rationale: a subdomain-takeover cookie injection can't bypass the comparison because the source of truth is the server-side session token, not the cookie. Cookie is the SPA's read-only mirror. - **CORS allowlist** — `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` mandatory at boot, no fallback. "Works in dev, breaks in prod" is the exact trap the validator catches. - **Rate limiting** — buckets keyed by session id (auth) or IP (anonymous), 10/min on `/auth/login` + `/auth/callback`, 120/min general, `/api/health` skipped. In-memory v1 store; Redis-backed migration is one constructor arg. - **Helmet config** — defaults plus three overrides (HSTS prod-only, `crossOriginResourcePolicy: cross-origin`, CSP prod-only). Each override has a code-anchored justification. ## Scope This is the **implementation-level** security ADR. The **strategic** security baseline ADR — OWASP ASVS reference level, HDS / GDPR / NIS 2 framing, RSSI sign-off — remains paused per the note in [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md). When that ADR lands it'll either confirm 0021 or supersede pieces of it; 0021 is explicit about which choices are tactical and revisitable. ## Notable structural choices in the ADR - **"Considered Options" mirrors the actual debate.** For CSRF: session-bound vs pure double-submit vs `csurf` vs synchronizer. For rate-limit bucket key: sessionID-then-IP vs IP-only vs Entra `oid`. Each rejected option has its "Bad, because …" so the reader sees why we didn't go that way. - **Each "Decision Outcome" line points at the file / function that enforces it.** Cross-references are absolute paths so they survive folder reorgs. - **The "Consequences" section is brutally honest about trade-offs.** In-memory rate-limit doesn't scale horizontally. The CSRF cookie is XSS-readable. No `details` field in the envelope for field-level validation errors yet. These aren't hidden in the prose. ## Other doc touches - [docs/decisions/README.md](docs/decisions/README.md) index entry added. - [notes/handoff.md](notes/handoff.md) refreshed (gitignored; not part of the commit but useful for the next session). ## Noted for a separate PR (out of scope here) [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md) §"Repository status" still says "The Nx workspace is **not yet bootstrapped**" and refs ADRs up to 0020. The whole paragraph is stale (the project is fully scaffolded, 22 ADRs in place). Worth a small dedicated docs PR. ## Test plan - [x] `pnpm exec prettier --check docs/decisions/` → clean. - [x] ADR follows the MADR 4.0.0 template (frontmatter with `status`, `date`, `decision-makers`, `tags`; sections in the canonical order). - [x] Tags drawn from the vocabulary in [docs/decisions/README.md](docs/decisions/README.md#tag-vocabulary): `security`, `backend`. - [x] Index in `docs/decisions/README.md` updated in the same change. - [x] Cross-references to ADRs 0009, 0010, 0012, 0015 verified. - [ ] Renders in Gitea / IDE markdown preview without parser warnings. --------- Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr> Reviewed-on: #124 |