feat(portal-bff): absolute-timeout middleware + user_sessions index per ADR-0010 (#115)

## Summary

Hardens the BFF session per ADR-0010 §"TTL policy" and §"Revocation":

- **Absolute-timeout middleware** — every request that survives `express-session` runs through a new middleware that checks `req.session.absoluteExpiresAt`. Past the 12 h hard ceiling, the middleware destroys the Redis-side session, clears the `portal_session` cookie, drops the entry from the per-user index, and lets the request continue anonymously. Route-level guards (`/me`, future `@RequireAuth`) turn that into a 401 where the user actually needs auth — public routes keep serving.
- **`user_sessions:{userId}` secondary index** — a new `UserSessionIndexService` maintains a Redis set of active session ids per user. Hooked into `/auth/callback` (SADD on sign-in) and `/auth/logout` + the absolute-timeout middleware (SREM on destroy). Best-effort: a failed `SADD`/`SREM` logs a warning and the auth flow continues. No in-product consumer in this PR — the admin "logout everywhere" endpoint lands with the admin module.
- **Session payload extension** — `createdAt` and `absoluteExpiresAt` are now set on the session at the same moment as `req.session.user` (in `/auth/callback`). The `session.types.ts` declaration merging exposes them as optional `SessionData` fields.

## Notable choices

**Non-intrusive enforcement on expiry.** ADR-0010 says "returns 401"; we interpret that as "the user eventually sees a 401 when they touch something that needs auth", not "every route returns 401 the moment we notice the ceiling". The middleware destroys the session and calls `next()` — `/me` returns 401 on its own (no user on the session), public routes stay accessible. Validated with the project lead 2026-05-12.

**Express middleware exposed via DI, not a NestJS `MiddlewareConsumer`.** Same pattern as `SESSION_MIDDLEWARE`: factory inside `SessionModule`, resolved from the application context in `main.ts` with `app.get<RequestHandler>(SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MIDDLEWARE)`. Keeps the wiring co-located with the session middleware and avoids the `AppModule.configure(consumer)` boilerplate for a one-off enforcement layer.

**Best-effort index maintenance.** `UserSessionIndexService.add` / `remove` catch Redis errors and log a Pino warning instead of throwing. Rationale (per ADR-0010): the index is a convenience for admin operations, not a security invariant — a Redis hiccup must not break sign-in / sign-out. Orphans (entries pointing to keys that have expired idle-TTL on their own) are tolerated and will be filtered by future consumer code.

**Per-user index identifier = Entra `oid`.** Stable per-user inside the tenant, matches `req.session.user.oid`. Admin "logout user X" will work against this same key. Future multi-tenant scenarios may want `${tid}:${oid}` — easy refactor when External ID activation lands (ADR-0008).

## Out of scope (next PRs)

- Admin "logout everywhere" endpoint consuming `UserSessionIndexService.list(userId)`. Waits on the admin module + `@RequireAdmin` / `@RequireMfa` guards.
- Audit-pipeline first-class events for `session.absolute_timeout` and `user_session_index.*` (ADR-0013). For now they're structured Pino logs.
- Token blob persistence (id_token / access_token / refresh_token) in the encrypted session — ADR-0014 dependency.

## Test plan

- [x] `pnpm nx test portal-bff` → **123/123 pass** (was 110 before; +13 specs across new `user-session-index.service.spec.ts`, `absolute-timeout.middleware.spec.ts`, and added cases in `auth.controller.spec.ts`).
- [x] `pnpm nx lint portal-bff` → clean.
- [x] `pnpm nx build portal-bff` → clean webpack build.
- [x] Prettier-clean for all touched files.
- [ ] Manual smoke against running BFF:
  - [ ] Sign in normally → Redis has `session:<id>` + `user_sessions:<oid>` SISMEMBER returns `<id>`.
  - [ ] Logout → both keys gone.
  - [ ] Forge a past `absoluteExpiresAt` in Redis (or shorten `SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=5` in `.env`) → next request after expiry returns 401 on `/me`, cookie cleared, index entry SREM-ed.

---------

Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #115

apps/portal-bff/src/main.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,11 @@ import { assertEntraConfig } from './config/check-entra-config';
 import { assertRedisConfig } from './config/check-redis-config';
 import { assertSessionEncryptionKey } from './config/check-session-encryption-key';
 import { assertSessionSecret } from './config/check-session-secret';
-import { SESSION_MIDDLEWARE, type RequestHandler } from './session/session.token';
+import {
+  SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MIDDLEWARE,
+  SESSION_MIDDLEWARE,
+  type RequestHandler,
+} from './session/session.token';
 
 // Fail fast on a malformed DATABASE_URL (most often a special char in
 // the password that needs URL-encoding) rather than letting Prisma
@@ -86,6 +90,14 @@ async function bootstrap() {
   // cookie is parsed by the time `express-session` reads it.
   app.use(app.get<RequestHandler>(SESSION_MIDDLEWARE));
 
+  // Absolute-timeout enforcement (ADR-0010 §"TTL policy"). Runs on
+  // every request that survives `express-session`; if the session
+  // is past its 12 h hard ceiling, destroy it + clear the cookie +
+  // drop the per-user index entry, then let the request continue
+  // anonymously (route-level guards turn it into a 401 where
+  // needed).
+  app.use(app.get<RequestHandler>(SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MIDDLEWARE));
+
   // Phase-2 security ADRs will harden the above: helmet, real CORS
   // allowlist, CSRF protection, rate limiting, auth guards,
   // structured error filter.