feat(portal-bff): user directory upserted at sign-in
First PR of the portal-admin User-list chantier per ADR-0020 §"v1
scope — User list (read-only)". Ships the write side only:
- a `public.users` table that holds the BFF's local cache of
identities seen sign in to either portal-shell or portal-admin,
- a `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn(user)` upsert called from
`SessionEstablisher.establish` AFTER the blocking audit write.
The read side (`GET /api/admin/users` + the admin viewer SPA
screen) lands in subsequent PRs of the chantier.
Schema
- `public.users` model in `schema.prisma`. Primary key on `oid`
(Entra's stable per-user identifier inside the tenant — the
natural choice; per-tenant uniqueness is sufficient for the v1
single-workforce-tenant design per ADR-0008).
- Columns: `oid`, `tid`, `audience`, `username`, `display_name`,
`first_seen_at` (default NOW, never overwritten), `last_seen_at`
(default NOW, updated on every upsert).
- Indexes: `last_seen_at DESC` for the admin "most recently
active" default sort, plain `username` for prefix filtering.
- Migration in `prisma/migrations/20260514192014_users_directory/`.
UserDirectoryService
- `recordSignIn(entry)` issues `prisma.user.upsert({ where: { oid },
create: {...}, update: {...} })`. Create sets `first_seen_at` +
`last_seen_at` via the DEFAULT clauses; update touches
`last_seen_at` + every mutable identity field but NOT
`first_seen_at`.
- Best-effort: catches its own errors, logs a Pino warn
(`user_directory.record_sign_in_failed`) and returns
`undefined`. The directory is a convenience for admin browsing,
not a security boundary — a Postgres hiccup must not lock a
user out of sign-in. ADR-0013's "no audit ⇒ no action" applies
to the audit module only.
SessionEstablisher wiring
- Calls `userDirectory.recordSignIn` AFTER `audit.signIn` so an
audit failure short-circuits the directory write (audit-first
invariant per ADR-0013). The await ensures the upsert completes
before the response is sent — an admin who just signed in sees
themselves on the user list immediately, without racing the
response.
- v1 hardcodes `audience: 'workforce'` per ADR-0008's single-
workforce-tenant simplification. Will read the real audience
from the session/claims when External ID activates.
Module wiring
- `UsersModule` declared `@Global()` so `SessionEstablisher`
(which lives in `AuthModule`) injects `UserDirectoryService`
without re-routing the module graph through an import. The
directory is a true cross-cutting concern: one writer (auth
callback), one future reader (admin endpoint).
- Wired into `AppModule` alongside the other v1 modules.
Tests: +7 specs (UserDirectoryService 4, SessionEstablisher
integration 3 — directory called with the right payload, called
AFTER audit, NOT called when audit fails, audience pinned to
workforce).
Pre-existing test updates: `auth.module.spec.ts` now imports
UsersModule (slice-of-graph compile would otherwise fail to
resolve SessionEstablisher's new dep); `auth.controller.spec.ts`
passes a noop directory mock to the SessionEstablisher
constructor — kept noop because that spec's behavioural surface
is about the controller path, not the directory.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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-- Users directory (per ADR-0020 §"v1 scope — User list").
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--
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-- Persistent ledger of identities the BFF has seen sign in to either
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-- portal-shell or portal-admin. Upserted by `UserDirectoryService`
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-- at every sign-in. Read by the future `GET /api/admin/users` admin
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-- endpoint. Entra ID is the source of truth for identity; this
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-- table is the BFF's local cache so the admin UI does not have to
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-- re-query the IdP at every page render.
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-- CreateTable
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CREATE TABLE "users" (
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"oid" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"tid" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"audience" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"username" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"display_name" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"first_seen_at" TIMESTAMPTZ(6) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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"last_seen_at" TIMESTAMPTZ(6) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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CONSTRAINT "users_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("oid")
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);
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-- DESC index supports the default admin sort ("most recently active first")
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-- without a server-side sort.
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CREATE INDEX "users_last_seen_at_idx" ON "users"("last_seen_at" DESC);
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-- Plain (default ASC) index supports prefix matching on the
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-- admin-side username filter.
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CREATE INDEX "users_username_idx" ON "users"("username");
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@@ -49,6 +49,57 @@ enum AuditOutcome {
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@@schema("audit")
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}
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// ============================================================
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// User directory (per ADR-0020 §"v1 scope — User list")
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// ============================================================
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//
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// Persistent ledger of every identity that has signed in to either
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// portal-shell or portal-admin. Upserted at sign-in by
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// `UserDirectoryService.recordSignIn` (called from
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// `SessionEstablisher.establish`), read by the future
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// `GET /api/admin/users` endpoint per ADR-0020 §"User list
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// (read-only)".
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//
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// **Not the source of truth for identity.** Entra ID is. This table
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// is a cache the BFF maintains so the admin UI can list "everyone
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// who's ever signed in" without re-querying the directory at
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// every render. Per-tenant `oid` is the join key on the audit side
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// (combined with the salted hash) — never the BFF's primary actor
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// identifier elsewhere.
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//
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// **No PII redaction on read.** Per ADR-0013 the audit module
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// hashes the actor id to defend against an audit-log dump leaking
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// who-did-what. This table is the *deliberate* PII storage: an
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// admin browsing the user list explicitly wants display names and
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// usernames. The trust boundary is the admin role gate
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// (ADR-0020 §"Auth — `admin` role claim").
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model User {
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// Entra `oid` — stable per-user identifier inside the tenant.
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// Used as the natural primary key. Per-tenant uniqueness is
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// sufficient: the dual-audience design (ADR-0008) currently
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// assumes single workforce tenant; cross-tenant collisions
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// become a separate ADR when we onboard the second one.
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oid String @id
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tid String
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audience String
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username String
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displayName String @map("display_name")
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// `first_seen_at` is set once at first sign-in and never
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// updated thereafter. Lets the admin list "users since
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// <date>" without joining anything.
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firstSeenAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("first_seen_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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// `last_seen_at` is set every time the upsert fires (one upsert
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// per sign-in), so "most recently active" can be computed
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// without scanning audit.events.
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lastSeenAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("last_seen_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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@@map("users")
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@@schema("public")
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@@index([lastSeenAt(sort: Desc)])
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@@index([username])
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}
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model AuditEvent {
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id String @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
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createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(6)
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