From ad44c5b15d14d5f28116767ce24532993754f39c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julien Gautier Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 23:14:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] docs(infra): document team mkcert CA on vm-gitlab (cross-VM trust) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add a Team mkcert CA on vm-gitlab subsection to infra/README.md so the dockerised dev mode scales to a multi-dev team: one shared CA held on vm-gitlab, public rootCA.pem distributed to each developer's Windows trust store, R&D Lead mints per-VM certs on vm-gitlab. The CA private key never leaves vm-gitlab. The solo flow already in the HTTPS dev-server setup section stays the entry point for the first dev; this subsection picks up where that one ends and answers the next question — how a teammate can browse another dev's VM with a green padlock. Covers initial CA setup on vm-gitlab, the canonical mkcert per-VM mint command, onboarding a new dev (rootCA.pem + per-VM cert delivery + Windows-side import), and operational notes (departures, CA rotation, per-VM rotation, migration to a future corp-CA cert). No code changed. --- infra/README.md | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 111 insertions(+) diff --git a/infra/README.md b/infra/README.md index 1f9285d..2f31031 100644 --- a/infra/README.md +++ b/infra/README.md @@ -270,6 +270,117 @@ Native `nx serve` (WSL / localhost) is **unaffected** — it keeps using the `de When real DNS + corp-CA-signed certs arrive, the hostname can be reused as-is (Entra registrations are literal strings — they don't care who signs the cert). Drop the cert files back into `.secrets/` and remove the mkcert step. +### Team mkcert CA on `vm-gitlab` — sharing the trust root + +The previous section is the **solo flow** (one dev mints their own CA, certs only trusted by their own workstation). It does not let a teammate browse another dev's VM without a certificate warning — every dev has their own private CA, none of which the others trust. + +For a multi-dev team the canonical pattern is one shared CA held on `vm-gitlab`. The CA private key (`rootCA-key.pem`) stays on `vm-gitlab` — never copied to any workstation; only the public `rootCA.pem` is distributed to each developer's Windows trust store, and the R&D Lead mints per-VM certs on `vm-gitlab` when a new VM (or new developer) joins. Browsing any dev VM from any workstation then "just works" — green padlock, no warning. + +This subsection assumes the per-dev workstation procedure of "HTTPS dev-server setup" above is what every developer will do **once**, with the rootCA.pem they receive from this shared CA. + +#### Initial setup on `vm-gitlab` (one-time, by the R&D Lead) + +```bash +# 1. Install mkcert on vm-gitlab (no service to run — mkcert is one-shot). +sudo curl -fsSL https://dl.filippo.io/mkcert/latest?for=linux/amd64 \ + -o /usr/local/bin/mkcert +sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/mkcert + +# 2. Create the shared CAROOT, root-only. +sudo mkdir -p /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca +sudo chown root:root /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca +sudo chmod 700 /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca + +# 3. Generate the CA into that CAROOT. (`-install` here just touches +# the local trust store of vm-gitlab — cosmetic for an infra VM, +# no harm.) +sudo CAROOT=/srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca mkcert -install + +# 4. Verify. +sudo ls -la /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca/ +# → rootCA.pem (-rw-r--r--), rootCA-key.pem (-rw-------, root only) +``` + +After this, the CA exists and is owned by `root` on `vm-gitlab`. Developers never touch it directly. + +#### Minting a cert for a dev VM (R&D Lead, on `vm-gitlab`) + +Repeat once per VM hostname (`apf-portal.dev-jg.local`, `apf-portal.dev-vc.local`, `apf-portal.dev.local`, …). Replace `` and the SSH/scp target accordingly: + +```bash +sudo CAROOT=/srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca mkcert \ + -key-file /tmp/-tls.key \ + -cert-file /tmp/-tls.pem \ + apf-portal..local + +# Sanity check. +sudo openssl x509 -in /tmp/-tls.pem -noout -subject -issuer +# subject CN must be apf-portal..local; issuer the mkcert CA name. + +# Ship to the target VM, renaming to the path the `https` Nx serve +# configuration expects (.secrets/dev-tls.{key,pem}). +sudo scp /tmp/-tls.key :~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/dev-tls.key +sudo scp /tmp/-tls.pem :~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/dev-tls.pem + +# Wipe the staging copies. +sudo rm /tmp/-tls.* +``` + +The certificate is good for ~2 years (mkcert default). When it nears expiry, regenerate with the same command and re-`scp` — the dev-server picks up the new files on next restart. + +#### Onboarding a new developer + +A new teammate needs **three things**: a copy of `rootCA.pem` (public, low-sensitivity), a per-VM cert minted by the R&D Lead, and the same hosts-file + `.env` configuration every dev follows. + +**R&D Lead side** — on `vm-gitlab`: + +```bash +# Hand off the public CA cert to the new dev via a secure channel +# (1Password shared vault, Bitwarden, direct scp). Never plain e-mail. +sudo cat /srv/apf-portal/mkcert-ca/rootCA.pem +``` + +Then mint that dev's per-VM cert (see "Minting a cert for a dev VM" above) and ship it to their VM's `~/Works/apf_portal/.secrets/`. + +**New developer side** — on their Windows workstation: + +```powershell +# 1. Install mkcert (only to get the `-install` command — no need to +# generate certs on the workstation). +choco install mkcert -y + +# 2. Drop the rootCA.pem they received into the local CAROOT path. +$caroot = mkcert -CAROOT +Copy-Item "C:\path\to\rootCA.pem" "$caroot\rootCA.pem" +# NB: only rootCA.pem — they do NOT receive rootCA-key.pem. + +# 3. Register the team CA in their Windows trust store. +mkcert -install +# Confirm the Windows security dialog. Their machine now trusts every +# cert minted by the team CA on vm-gitlab. +``` + +Then they: + +- Edit `C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts` (admin) and add the entries for every VM they want to reach (their own + the others as needed): + ``` + 10.100.201.20 apf-portal.dev-vc.local + 10.100.201.21 apf-portal.dev-jg.local + 10.100.201.22 apf-portal.dev.local + ``` +- Edit `apps/portal-bff/.env` on their VM so the four `ENTRA_*_REDIRECT_URI` values point at `https://apf-portal.:{4200,4300}/...` (the matching URIs are already registered Entra-side — no action there). +- Set `NX_SERVE_CONFIGURATION=https` in `infra/local/.env` on their VM. +- `./infra/local/dev.sh down && ./infra/local/dev.sh up apps`. + +Total onboarding budget: ~5 min of R&D Lead time on `vm-gitlab` (mint + transfer) + ~10 min of work on the new dev's workstation + VM. No SSH access to `vm-gitlab` is granted to developers — only the R&D Lead operates the CA. + +#### Operational notes + +- **Departures.** mkcert has no CRL; revoking trust on a former dev's machine isn't actionable from the CA side. The risk surface is what that dev could have signed before leaving — and they only ever had the public `rootCA.pem`, never the private key, so they cannot have signed anything in your trust circle. No action required when a dev leaves. +- **CA rotation.** Rare (audit, suspected compromise, annual hygiene). Regenerate the CA on `vm-gitlab`, re-mint every VM's cert, redistribute the new `rootCA.pem` to each dev. Each dev re-imports + re-`mkcert -install`. No `.env` or Entra change. +- **Per-VM cert rotation.** Same pattern as initial mint — regenerate, scp, `dev.sh restart portal-shell portal-admin`. No client-side action. +- **Migration to a corp-signed CA.** When the infra team issues an internal-CA-signed cert (already trusted by every domain-joined workstation, no mkcert step), drop those files into `.secrets/dev-tls.{key,pem}` and remove the team mkcert CA from each dev's trust store. Entra registrations are unchanged — they reference hostname + port, not the issuer. + ### Service endpoints (defaults) | Service | Host port | Purpose |