diff --git a/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml b/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml
index 6bdcac4..23bd7df 100644
--- a/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -55,14 +55,22 @@ jobs:
 
   scan:
     runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
+    # Step ordering matters here: Trivy and gitleaks BOTH run before
+    # `pnpm install`. Reason: gitleaks scans the working tree
+    # (`--no-git --source .`), and after install, `node_modules/`
+    # and `.pnpm-store/` are full of upstream packages whose READMEs
+    # and test fixtures contain demo RSA keys / fake API tokens —
+    # gitleaks then false-positives on them by the hundreds (caught
+    # the hard way: 381 hits on the first run). Trivy reads
+    # `pnpm-lock.yaml` for its vuln scan, not `node_modules`, so it
+    # also doesn't need install. `pnpm ci:audit` does the same — it
+    # queries the advisory DB against the lockfile.
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v6
       - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6
       - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
         with:
           node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
-      - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
-      - run: pnpm ci:audit
       # Dependency vulnerability scan. Trivy is a Go binary, not an npm
       # package, so it cannot live in package.json scripts as cleanly
       # as audit/lint do.
@@ -150,6 +158,11 @@ jobs:
             --source . \
             --redact \
             --exit-code 1
+      # npm-advisory check (against pnpm-lock.yaml). Run last so
+      # `pnpm install` does not pollute the working tree before the
+      # scanners above.
+      - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+      - run: pnpm ci:audit
 
   commits:
     # PRs opened by Renovate (apf-portal-bot) carry commit messages
diff --git a/.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml b/.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml
index 703313f..324dada 100644
--- a/.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml
+++ b/.gitea/workflows/security-scheduled.yml
@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@ on:
 jobs:
   full-tree-scan:
     runs-on: [self-hosted, on-prem]
+    # Step ordering mirrors ci.yml: scanners run before `pnpm install`
+    # so the working tree is not polluted with node_modules content
+    # (READMEs / fixtures of upstream packages contain demo
+    # secrets that gitleaks false-positives on by the hundreds).
+    # The deep-history gitleaks scan here doesn't strictly need it
+    # (history doesn't contain node_modules), but consistency with
+    # ci.yml keeps the two workflows reading the same way.
     steps:
       # fetch-depth: 0 → full history. The per-PR gitleaks scan is
       # shallow + working-tree-only; this scheduled job is where we
@@ -26,8 +33,6 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
         with:
           node-version-file: '.nvmrc'
-      - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
-      - run: pnpm audit
       # Full-tree Trivy (no skip-dirs, no severity filter — the per-PR
       # gate filters by severity for speed; this run wants the full
       # surface for the security feed). Manual install + curl, same
@@ -69,6 +74,11 @@ jobs:
             --source . \
             --redact \
             --exit-code 1
+      # npm-advisory check (against pnpm-lock.yaml). Run last so
+      # `pnpm install` does not pollute the working tree before the
+      # scanners above.
+      - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+      - run: pnpm audit
 
   lighthouse-prod:
     # Skipped silently if the prod URL hasn't been configured yet.