feat(portal-bff): absolute-timeout middleware + user_sessions index per ADR-0010
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closes the ttl-policy + revocation pieces left from #110.

absolute-timeout middleware:
  every request that survives express-session runs through a new
  middleware that checks req.session.absoluteExpiresAt. past the
  12 h hard ceiling, it destroys the redis-side session, clears the
  portal_session cookie, drops the entry from the per-user index,
  and lets the request keep flowing anonymously. route-level
  guards (/me today, future @requireauth) turn that into a 401
  where auth is actually needed — public routes stay accessible.
  not the "every route returns 401" reading of adr-0010 §"ttl
  policy" (validated with the project lead): "returns 401" is
  interpreted as "the user eventually sees a 401 when they touch
  something that needs auth", not as a hard refusal on the
  current in-flight request.

user_sessions:{userId} secondary index (adr-0010 §"revocation"):
  a new UserSessionIndexService maintains a redis set of active
  session ids per user. wired on /auth/callback (sadd at sign-in,
  after session.save() so the session row exists before the index
  points at it) and on /auth/logout + the absolute-timeout
  middleware (srem on destroy). best-effort: a failed sadd/srem
  logs a pino warning and the auth flow continues — the index is
  a convenience for admin operations, not a security invariant.
  orphans (entries whose session:<id> redis key has expired on
  idle ttl) are tolerated per the adr; future consumer code
  filters them out.

  no in-product consumer ships in this pr — the admin "logout
  everywhere" endpoint lands with the admin module (+ @requireadmin
  / @requiremfa guards). today the index is write-only on the bff
  side.

session payload extension:
  createdAt and absoluteExpiresAt are now set on the session at
  the same moment as req.session.user, in /auth/callback. the
  session.types.ts declaration merging exposes them as optional
  SessionData fields so every consumer sees a typed payload.

wiring:
  - SessionModule provides UserSessionIndexService and a
    SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MIDDLEWARE token whose factory builds
    the middleware via createAbsoluteTimeoutMiddleware(index,
    logger). same pattern as the existing SESSION_MIDDLEWARE token.
  - AuthModule now imports SessionModule so AuthController can
    inject UserSessionIndexService.
  - main.ts mounts the absolute-timeout middleware immediately
    after the session middleware.

per-user identifier is the entra `oid` claim (stable per-user
inside the tenant, matches req.session.user.oid). future
multi-tenant scenarios may want `${tid}:${oid}` — easy refactor
when external id activation lands (adr-0008). not in scope here.

out of scope, landing in follow-ups:
- admin "logout everywhere" endpoint consuming
  UserSessionIndexService.list(userId)
- audit-pipeline first-class events for session.absolute_timeout
  + user_session_index.* (adr-0013)
- token blob persistence (id_token / access_token / refresh_token)
  in the encrypted session — adr-0014 dependency

123/123 tests pass (was 110); +13 specs across the two new files
and the auth controller spec.
This commit is contained in:
Julien Gautier
2026-05-12 23:22:08 +02:00
parent 0e4f0fc611
commit 5c346820ea
11 changed files with 607 additions and 24 deletions
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
import type { Logger } from 'nestjs-pino';
import type { UserSessionIndexService } from '../session/user-session-index.service';
import { AuthController } from './auth.controller';
import { PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_TTL_MS } from './auth.cookie';
import { AuthCodeFlowException } from './auth.errors';
@@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ function makeResStub() {
interface SessionStub {
user?: AuthenticatedUser;
createdAt?: number;
absoluteExpiresAt?: number;
save: jest.Mock;
destroy: jest.Mock;
}
@@ -70,11 +73,13 @@ function makeSessionStub(opts?: {
function makeReqStub(opts?: {
signedCookies?: Record<string, unknown>;
session?: SessionStub;
}): Request & { session: SessionStub } {
sessionID?: string;
}): Request & { session: SessionStub; sessionID: string } {
return {
signedCookies: opts?.signedCookies ?? {},
session: opts?.session ?? makeSessionStub(),
} as unknown as Request & { session: SessionStub };
sessionID: opts?.sessionID ?? 'sid-test',
} as unknown as Request & { session: SessionStub; sessionID: string };
}
function makeLoggerStub() {
@@ -96,6 +101,7 @@ interface ControllerFixture {
beginAuthCodeFlow: jest.Mock;
completeAuthCodeFlow: jest.Mock;
logger: ReturnType<typeof makeLoggerStub>;
userSessionIndex: { add: jest.Mock; remove: jest.Mock; list: jest.Mock };
}
const LOGOUT_URL = `${ENTRA.authority}/oauth2/v2.0/logout?post_logout_redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(ENTRA.postLogoutRedirectUri)}`;
@@ -112,12 +118,23 @@ function makeController(opts?: { completeAuthCodeFlow?: jest.Mock }): Controller
completeAuthCodeFlow,
buildLogoutUrl,
} as unknown as AuthService;
const userSessionIndex = {
add: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
remove: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
list: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
};
const logger = makeLoggerStub();
return {
controller: new AuthController(service, logger as unknown as Logger, ENTRA),
controller: new AuthController(
service,
logger as unknown as Logger,
ENTRA,
userSessionIndex as unknown as UserSessionIndexService,
),
beginAuthCodeFlow,
completeAuthCodeFlow,
logger,
userSessionIndex,
};
}
@@ -196,6 +213,45 @@ describe('AuthController.callback', () => {
expect(res.redirect).toHaveBeenCalledWith(302, ENTRA.postLogoutRedirectUri);
});
it('records createdAt + absoluteExpiresAt on the session (ADR-0010 §"TTL policy")', async () => {
const before = Date.now();
const { controller } = makeController();
const res = makeResStub();
const session = makeSessionStub();
const req = makeReqStub({
signedCookies: { [PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_NAME]: JSON.stringify(PRE_AUTH) },
session,
});
await controller.callback(req, res, 'auth-code', PRE_AUTH.state);
const after = Date.now();
expect(session.createdAt).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(before);
expect(session.createdAt).toBeLessThanOrEqual(after);
// Default absoluteSeconds = 43200 (12 h) per ADR-0010.
expect(session.absoluteExpiresAt).toBe((session.createdAt as number) + 43_200 * 1000);
});
it('registers the new session in the user_sessions index after save', async () => {
const { controller, userSessionIndex } = makeController();
const res = makeResStub();
const session = makeSessionStub();
const req = makeReqStub({
signedCookies: { [PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_NAME]: JSON.stringify(PRE_AUTH) },
session,
sessionID: 'fresh-sid',
});
await controller.callback(req, res, 'auth-code', PRE_AUTH.state);
expect(userSessionIndex.add).toHaveBeenCalledWith(USER.oid, 'fresh-sid');
// Order matters: the Redis session row must be written before
// the index points at it. We can't enforce a strict
// `toHaveBeenCalledBefore` ordering across jest mocks without
// a plugin — assert at least that the index entry was added.
expect(session.save).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('propagates a session.save() error as an exception (so the SPA never sees a successful redirect with no session)', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController();
const res = makeResStub();
@@ -343,13 +399,14 @@ describe('AuthController.me', () => {
describe('AuthController.logout', () => {
it('destroys the session, clears the session cookie, logs success, redirects to Entra logout', async () => {
const { controller, logger } = makeController();
const { controller, logger, userSessionIndex } = makeController();
const res = makeResStub();
const session = makeSessionStub({ user: USER });
const req = makeReqStub({ session });
const req = makeReqStub({ session, sessionID: 'logged-out-sid' });
await controller.logout(req, res);
expect(userSessionIndex.remove).toHaveBeenCalledWith(USER.oid, 'logged-out-sid');
expect(session.destroy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(res.clearCookie).toHaveBeenCalledWith('portal_session', { path: '/' });
expect(logger.log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
@@ -390,13 +447,17 @@ describe('AuthController.logout', () => {
});
it('still clears the cookie and redirects when the user was already anonymous', async () => {
const { controller, logger } = makeController();
const { controller, logger, userSessionIndex } = makeController();
const res = makeResStub();
const session = makeSessionStub();
const req = makeReqStub({ session });
await controller.logout(req, res);
// Nothing was ever added to the index for an anonymous request —
// skip the SREM (cheaper + avoids racing the cleanup of a
// future user's session id collision).
expect(userSessionIndex.remove).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(session.destroy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(logger.log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ event: 'auth.signed_out', wasAuthenticated: false },