feat(portal-bff): /auth/login route — pkce flow start + signed cookie (#105)
## Summary
Third step of ADR-0009 wiring. Adds the first OIDC route, `GET /api/auth/login`: it 302s the browser to Entra's authorize endpoint with a freshly-generated state + PKCE challenge, and stashes the matching `{state, codeVerifier}` payload in a short-lived signed cookie so the next-PR callback can verify the round-trip.
## What lands
- **Cookie infra**: `cookie-parser` + `@types/express` deps; `main.ts` mounts the cookie middleware with the `SESSION_SECRET` signing key. Signed cookies are now available via `req.signedCookies` for the upcoming callback.
- **[`.env.example`](apps/portal-bff/.env.example)** promotes `SESSION_SECRET` from a future-vars comment into an active section, with a one-liner showing how to generate 32 random bytes.
- **[`check-session-secret.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/config/check-session-secret.ts)** — boot-time guard: refuses to start if `SESSION_SECRET` is unset, still the .env.example placeholder, or decodes below 32 bytes of entropy. Same family as `check-database-url` / `check-entra-config`.
- **[`auth.service.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.service.ts)** — `beginAuthCodeFlow()` uses MSAL's `CryptoProvider` for canonical PKCE verifier / challenge generation and a fresh GUID state per call, calls `msal.getAuthCodeUrl()` with the configured redirect URI + OIDC scopes (`openid profile email` — no `offline_access` in v1), and returns `{ authUrl, preAuthPayload }`.
- **[`auth.cookie.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.cookie.ts)** — `portal_pre_auth` name, 5-minute TTL, shared `CookieOptions`: `signed`, `httpOnly`, `sameSite: 'lax'` (lets Entra's cross-site top-level redirect back through), `secure` toggled by `NODE_ENV`.
- **[`auth.controller.ts`](apps/portal-bff/src/auth/auth.controller.ts)** — `@Controller('auth') @Get('login')`: writes the cookie then 302s. Thin shell around the service.
- **AuthModule** registers the new controller + service alongside the existing `ENTRA_CONFIG` and `MSAL_CLIENT` providers.
## Decisions worth flagging
- **Scope deliberately stops before the callback.** It's the next PR. Clicking `/auth/login` today round-trips through Entra and lands on a 404 — bounded mid-state, documented in the commit and here.
- **State + verifier in the cookie, not in Redis.** Keeps `/login` stateless (no server-side store), which means the BFF stays horizontally scalable from day one without sticky-session config. The next-PR callback reads `req.signedCookies` to recover the payload.
- **`portal_pre_auth`, not `__Host-portal_pre_auth`.** `__Host-` mandates `Secure`, and local dev is HTTP. The prefix + `Secure: true` lands together with the production TLS hardening ADR.
- **No `offline_access` scope.** Sessions are short-lived (per ADR-0010); the user re-authenticates through Entra rather than the BFF refreshing tokens behind their back. Smaller token footprint, less code to write, easier to reason about.
- **5-minute cookie TTL.** Enough for the Entra round-trip (including a fresh MFA prompt), short enough that a stale cookie can't be replayed long after the user abandoned the flow.
## Verification
- `nx run-many -t lint test build --projects=portal-bff` — green.
- **39 / 39 specs** (was 30; +9 across `check-session-secret`, `auth.service`, `auth.controller`).
- The service spec mocks `getAuthCodeUrl`, asserts the redirect URI / scopes / S256 method, the state-verifier identity between the cookie payload and what's sent to Entra, and fresh-per-call replay protection.
- The controller spec asserts the cookie name + options + serialized payload and the 302 redirect.
## Manual smoke test (next PR completes the loop)
1. `apps/portal-bff/.env` has real `ENTRA_*` + `SESSION_SECRET`.
2. `nx serve portal-bff`.
3. `curl -i http://localhost:3000/api/auth/login` → 302 with `Set-Cookie: portal_pre_auth=…; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/`, `Location: https://login.microsoftonline.com/<tenant>/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?...`.
4. Open the `Location` in a browser, authenticate, Entra redirects to `http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback?code=…&state=…` → 404 today, will be the next PR.
## Next PR on the auth track
`GET /api/auth/callback` — reads the signed cookie, verifies `state` matches, calls `acquireTokenByCode` with the stored verifier, validates the ID token (issuer, audience, exp, nonce, `amr` per ADR-0011), clears the pre-auth cookie, logs the resolved user identity, redirects to `/` (SPA). Still no session — that's the PR after.
---------
Co-authored-by: Julien Gautier <julien.gautier@apf.asso.fr>
Reviewed-on: #105
This commit was merged in pull request #105.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
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import type { Response } from 'express';
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import { AuthController } from './auth.controller';
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import { PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_TTL_MS } from './auth.cookie';
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import type { AuthService, PreAuthPayload } from './auth.service';
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const PRE_AUTH: PreAuthPayload = {
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state: 'state-nonce',
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codeVerifier: 'verifier-secret',
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createdAt: 1_000,
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};
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function makeResStub() {
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return {
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cookie: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
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redirect: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
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} as unknown as Response & { cookie: jest.Mock; redirect: jest.Mock };
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}
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describe('AuthController', () => {
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let beginAuthCodeFlow: jest.Mock;
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let service: AuthService;
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let controller: AuthController;
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beforeEach(() => {
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beginAuthCodeFlow = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
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authUrl: 'https://entra.example/authorize?state=state-nonce',
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preAuthPayload: PRE_AUTH,
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});
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service = { beginAuthCodeFlow } as unknown as AuthService;
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controller = new AuthController(service);
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});
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it('writes the pre-auth cookie and 302s to the Entra auth URL', async () => {
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const res = makeResStub();
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await controller.login(res);
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expect(res.cookie).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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const call = res.cookie.mock.calls[0] ?? [];
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const [name, value, options] = call;
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expect(name).toBe(PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_NAME);
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expect(JSON.parse(value as string)).toEqual(PRE_AUTH);
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expect(options).toMatchObject({
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signed: true,
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httpOnly: true,
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sameSite: 'lax',
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path: '/',
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maxAge: PRE_AUTH_COOKIE_TTL_MS,
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});
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expect(res.redirect).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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302,
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'https://entra.example/authorize?state=state-nonce',
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);
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});
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it('toggles cookie `secure` based on NODE_ENV', async () => {
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const originalNodeEnv = process.env['NODE_ENV'];
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try {
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process.env['NODE_ENV'] = 'production';
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const res = makeResStub();
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await controller.login(res);
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const call = res.cookie.mock.calls[0] ?? [];
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const options = call[2] as { secure: boolean };
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expect(options.secure).toBe(true);
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} finally {
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if (originalNodeEnv === undefined) {
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delete process.env['NODE_ENV'];
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} else {
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process.env['NODE_ENV'] = originalNodeEnv;
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}
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}
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});
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});
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